COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges AtLee, Athey and Callins UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
CHRIS LEE THOMPSON STEVENS MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0075-24-2 JUDGE CLIFFORD L. ATHEY, JR. JULY 22, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY William E. Glover, Judge
Lauren E. Brice, Assistant Public Defender (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Sabina B. Thaler, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Lauren C. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County (“trial court”), Chris
Lee Thompson Stevens (“Stevens”) was convicted of numerous offenses in connection with the
death of his girlfriend, J.D. On appeal, Stevens assigns error to the trial court: 1) for finding
S.D.1 competent to testify; 2) for admitting S.D.’s testimony in evidence; 3) for admitting S.D.’s
recorded interview in evidence; 4) for admitting the statements of J.D. made to Deputy Walker;
and 5) for failing to strike Jurors 2 and 45 for cause. For the following reasons, we affirm.
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the juvenile and victim. I. BACKGROUND2
In November 2021, Stevens was charged with two counts of abduction in violation of
Code § 18.2-47, two counts for both violating a protective order and for possessing a firearm
while under a protective order, both of which were in violation of Code § 16.1-279.1, and one
count of murder in the first degree, in violation of Code § 18.2-32. The five charges were
subsequently certified to the grand jury on April 6, 2022. Stevens was also directly indicted on
two counts of felony child endangerment in violation of Code § 40.1-103, one count of statutory
burglary with a deadly weapon in violation of Code § 18.2-90, and two counts of child abuse in
violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(B).
By motion filed on February 6, 2023, Stevens challenged the competency of J.D.’s
children (S.D. and E.D.), contending that neither child was competent to testify because they had
contradicted themselves in prior interviews.3 The Commonwealth contested the motion and also
sought to introduce portions of the children’s interviews at trial. The court preliminarily granted,
in part, the Commonwealth’s motion to admit the interviews at trial, but the motion was granted
pending additional findings pursuant to Code § 19.2-268.3(B)(1)(c) at trial. Stevens’s jury trial
began on October 16, 2023.
2 “On appeal, we review the evidence ‘in the “light most favorable” to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court.’” Womack v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. App. 289, 292 n.1 (2024) (quoting Konadu v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. App. 606, 609 n.1 (2024)). “Doing so requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Konadu, 79 Va. App. at 609 n.1). “To the extent that this opinion mentions facts found in the sealed record, we unseal only those specific facts, finding them relevant to the decision in this case. The remainder of the previously sealed record remains sealed.” Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va. 283, 288 n.1 (2017). 3 On October 11, 2022, the Commonwealth moved, pursuant to Code § 18.2-67.9, for S.D. and E.D. to testify through the use of closed-circuit television. On February 6, 2023, Stevens objected and was overruled by the trial court on February 23, 2023. Stevens does not assign error to this ruling on appeal. -2- During voir dire, Stevens’s attorney asked the venire if there was anyone “who has
themselves or a close loved one, friend or family, experienced domestic violence?” Juror 2
responded in the affirmative, stating that the charges in this case were “eerily similar” to a
situation that occurred in his life where his sister’s boyfriend killed his sister and their child
before the boyfriend committed suicide. Counsel then had the following exchange with Juror 2:
[Counsel]: I’m so sorry. So that’s obviously a very significant event in your life and the life of your family. Is there anything about that with the facts alleged being so similar in this case that would cause you to kind of -- [Juror 2]: (Interjecting) I would hope not, but its’s heavy right now, so . . . [Counsel]: Sure. The more we’re talking about it . . . [Juror 2]: It’s very personal. [Counsel]: The more -- okay. And obviously there’s going to be more evidence and more testimony. [Juror 2]: It is what it is. [Counsel]: Right. So with that experience, which, again, I’m so sorry that you had, do you look at this case -- or would you as you hear this case be more likely to lean towards guilt because of the allegations here? [Juror 2]: I would hope not. [Counsel]: Okay. [Juror 2]: I hope I would be perfectly impartial, but I’m letting you know where I’m coming from.
Counsel for Stevens later asked the venire if there was “anyone here who thinks that a man under
no circumstances should ever hit or injure a woman no matter what?” Counsel for Stevens later
rephrased the question, asking the venire if there was “anyone here who thinks that a man should
never hit or make physical contact with a woman no matter what?” Juror 2 again responded in
the affirmative, noting that he agreed with the statement because of “how [he] was raised.” But
when later asked if Juror 2’s belief extended to the “context of someone defending themselves
against an attack where they might be injured or killed,” and if “that person would not be able to
defend themselves if the person who was the aggressor was a woman,” Juror 2 stated, “[w]ell,
-3- that’s a different circumstance, a different question.” Counsel for Stevens clarified, “[p]utting it
in the context of this particular case, let me say,” to which Juror 2 replied, “[t]hen I’ll sit back
down.”
Juror 45 also responded to the first question regarding if anyone had experienced
domestic violence, noting that her first husband was “abusive” towards her. Juror 45 further
stated that her husband would “get drunk and just, you know, beat on me, but it didn’t get to the
place where I had to go to the hospital or anything.” In response, she was asked if—based on her
experiences—there was “anything about that that would cause you to view this evidence in a
way that you would find Mr. Stevens to be more likely guilty?” Juror 45 responded, “I don’t
think so, no.” Counsel for Stevens then asked for Juror 45 to further explain her response,
inquiring if Juror 45 could “just tell me why you think you wouldn’t?” Juror 45 elaborated that it
was “[b]ecause not all men are like that” and that she would “just have to hear the evidence and
go based on that.” Later, in responding to a question from Stevens’s counsel about whether
anyone in the venire was “involved as a volunteer or an advocate or an employee in a domestic
violence advocacy organization or a victim-oriented organization around domestic violence,”
Juror 45 stated, “I know [sic] the member of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, and we do donate a
lot of money to Empower House and domestic violence and children’s charities.” Counsel for
Stevens noted that one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses worked for Empower House and asked
Juror 45 if “there [was] anything about that that you would tend to give that witness more
credibility just because of her role?” Juror 45 responded, “No. I really didn’t know anybody
there. I just knew we donated money and toys and stuff.”
Following voir dire, Stevens moved to strike Juror 2 for cause. Stevens’s attorney
contended that Juror 2 should be struck for cause because “[w]hen [she] asked the question about
whether or not a man can ever hit a woman, he was very adamant about that.” Counsel for
-4- Stevens also noted that she “did follow-up with him about whether he could put that aside and
listen to the facts in this case fairly, and I believe one of his statements was, [‘]I hope.[’] I think
that’s equivocal.” The Commonwealth objected to Juror 2 being struck for cause since Juror 2
had merely “stated that a man should never hit a woman unless it was self-defense,” which
therefore “rehabilitated him and he indicated he could be fair.” The Commonwealth further
objected to Juror 2 being removed for cause, reasoning that “[t]he only other thing that he
mentioned was there was a murder-suicide in his close family” but that Juror 2 “didn’t say
anything about that other than it would be a little bit difficult.” The trial court denied the motion
to strike Juror 2 for cause, noting that Juror 2 “repeatedly said that he would be impartial.”
Steven’s counsel responded, “[o]kay. Just note our objection.”
Steven’s counsel also moved to strike Juror 45 for cause, asserting that Juror 45 had
made statements that her organization, [F]raternal [O]rder [of Eagles] does donations to Empower House, which is also going to be a significant witness in this case. And that connection is the same concern for [J]uror number twelve, that there is a support there, a connection there, there’s a bias there about those particular witnesses and that organization.
The Commonwealth also objected to Juror 45 being struck for cause, contending that Juror 45
simply stated that her organization “donate[d] to many different nonprofits, including Empower
House” and that Juror 45 disclosed that she had “never met any of the workers there at Empower
House and indicated that she would have no problem being a neutral witness concerning those
donations.” The court opined that Juror 45 had said “she would not be biased” and denied the
motion to strike Juror 45 for cause as well. Juror 2 was subsequently peremptorily struck by
Stevens, but Juror 45 was empaneled as a member of the petit jury.
Following the jury being empaneled and sworn but prior to returning from recess to hear
opening statements, counsel for Stevens objected to Spotsylvania Sheriff’s Office Deputy John
B. Walker’s (“Deputy Walker”) testifying concerning any statements made by J.D. to -5- Deputy Walker. In support, counsel for Stevens contended that any statements made to Deputy
Walker by J.D. were hearsay not subject to an exception and further that the statements violated
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the statements were testimonial.
Following oral argument, the trial court ruled that the statements could not be referenced during
opening statements but that the trial court would decline to rule on the admissibility of the
statements until “a contemporaneous objection” was made when Deputy Walker was called to
testify as a witness.
Following opening statements, Deputy Walker was sworn and testified that he responded
to a residence in Spotsylvania County on November 26, 2021. When he arrived at the residence,
he observed J.D. and S.D. standing by a car outside of the house. Deputy Walker observed that
J.D. appeared “visibly upset,” that her “hair was a mess,” that she was crying, and “shaking a
little bit.” The Commonwealth asked Deputy Walker if J.D. told him “why you were called
there?” Deputy Walker testified in response that J.D. had told him that “her boyfriend was . . . in
the house with her son, they had had a verbal argument and she was trying to get her son out of
the house.” Deputy Walker also testified that J.D. told him that “[t]he children were not his, and
she was trying to leave the area due to her being upset and the verbal argument.” The
Commonwealth next asked Deputy Walker if J.D. had said “whether Mr. Stevens had put his
hands on her?” At this point, counsel for Stevens objected, “on the same hearsay grounds and
confrontation grounds” as before. The trial court opined that “[b]ased on the testimony of the
officer at this point the testimony that’s being offered is nontestimonial and, otherwise, not
prohibited by the hearsay rule based on the prior argument of counsel.” Deputy Walker then
testified that when J.D. “initially talked to [Deputy Walker], she stated that it was verbal. When
I began to talk to her further she said during the argument he jerked her hair and then stabbed the
-6- bed with a knife.” Deputy Walker then testified to the existence of a protective order between
Stevens and J.D., a copy of which was admitted without objection.4
The jury was then excused, and outside of their presence, the Commonwealth played a
short video clip of Deputy Walker’s body-worn camera footage for the trial judge. During the
video recording, Deputy Walker asks J.D. if she was planning to go back inside the house, to
which J.D. answers, “No.” She then confers with Deputy Walker about potentially getting a
phone charger from the house and ensuring that the residence was secured. J.D. then says, “I’m
not coming back here until I know for sure he’s not coming back.” Counsel for Stevens re-raised
his earlier objections to the admission of the video recording on hearsay and Confrontation
Clause grounds, asserting that “we’re outside the excited utterance exception for hearsay, as well
as the present sense impression.” The trial court ruled with “absolutely no hesitation” that J.D.’s
statements were an excited utterance because the statements “follow[ed] the allegation that she
had been attacked in her residence by the defendant.” The trial court also held that J.D.’s
statement was nontestimonial because Deputy Walker and J.D. were “having a conversation
about whether the door is locked and whether she’s afraid to go back in because of what had just
happened.” The jury returned, and following the video recording being entered into evidence,
the video recording was played for the jury. Deputy Walker then testified that J.D. “would not
go back in” the house, even after law enforcement had determined that Stevens was not inside.
Deputy Walker also testified, without objection, that J.D. “said she planned on leaving,
even if he wasn’t there, she wasn’t coming back.” Deputy Walker further described entering the
house and arriving in the bedroom where “[J.D.] made statements about [Stevens] pulling her
4 The protective order lists J.D. as the petitioner and Stevens as the respondent, and Stevens was ordered to “not commit acts of family abuse or criminal offenses that result in injury to person or property” and was allowed to have only “peaceful contact” with J.D. The order shows that it was issued on November 10, 2021, and Stevens was served that day at 12:03 p.m. -7- hair and stabbing the bed,” which led Deputy Walker to ask J.D. where the bed had been
stabbed. Deputy Walker then testified that there was a “one-inch mark” on the bedsheet and the
“knife [was] on the bookshelf.” In addition, Deputy Walker testified, again without objection,
that he remained at the scene with J.D. because “she was fearful” and “wanted someone to stay
there while she got her stuff.” Finally, Deputy Walker testified that he obtained warrants for
domestic assault and battery and violation of the protective order against Stevens.
The Commonwealth called additional witnesses on its behalf. In addition, both parties
asked questions of S.D. concerning her competency to testify before she was permitted to testify
in the presence of the jury. Responding to the questions, S.D. began by spelling her first name,
stating that she was in the first grade and that she lived in “Earliesville.” When asked if she
meant “Charlottesville,” S.D. replied, “I don’t know.” She also stated that she had a 10-year-old
dog named Apollo and that she went to school at “The Bob Cat School.” S.D. was able to
correctly provide the name of her kindergarten teacher, her current teacher, and her favorite
subject in school. The Commonwealth further asked S.D. who had brought her to court, and she
responded that her dad’s girlfriend, Karen, had transported her to the courthouse. The
Commonwealth next asked, “if someone said that [one of your teachers] brought you today,
would that be a truth or a lie,” to which S.D. responded, “A lie.” S.D. further agreed that it was
“a bad thing” to tell a lie, that she “might get in trouble” if she told her father a lie, and that she
could be punished. She also agreed that if she called a pink marker blue, that statement would be
a lie, but if she said that the pink marker was pink, then that would be the truth. She affirmed
that it was a “good thing” to tell the truth and answered yes to the question, “if we asked you to
promise today to only tell the truth about questions that you’re asked, you could do that?” When
asked if she could “promise to tell the truth” and to “only say things that you remember,” S.D.
responded that she wasn’t sure if she could keep that promise because she wasn’t sure what to do
-8- if she didn’t remember something. But after prompting from the Commonwealth, S.D. agreed
that she would be comfortable with saying “I don’t know” if she didn’t know the answer to a
question.
Stevens’s attorney asked S.D. her birthday, which she stated accurately. When asked
again if she could “make a promise to tell the truth,” S.D. said, “No. I’m very bad at telling
secrets.” Stevens’s attorney asked if there were “times when [S.D.] didn’t keep a promise and
. . . lied?” S.D. responded in the affirmative but said that doing so was a “bad” thing. S.D.
explained that a “promise is when somebody tells you to do something and you have to do the
thing.”
Following oral argument, the trial court noted that S.D. was “well aware of the difference
between a truth and a lie” and that she also was “keenly aware of the fact that it’s good to tell the
truth and wrong to tell a lie.” The trial court then ruled that based on S.D.’s answers it had
“absolutely no question whatsoever that” S.D. was “competent to testify.”5
During direct examination, S.D.’s initial testimony included answers of “I don’t know.”
She was also unable to testify in significant detail regarding the events surrounding her mother’s
death. On cross-examination, S.D. said that her “dad” told her that if she didn’t know what to
say then to just say, “I don’t know” and that her dad’s girlfriend told her to say, “I forgot.”
Prior to the Commonwealth entering any portion of S.D.’s previous interview in
evidence, the trial court denied Stevens’s motion in limine, holding that the interviewer was
credible. Then the Commonwealth entered a video recording of the forensic interviews of S.D.
and E.D. in evidence and played S.D.’s and E.D.’s forensic interviews for the jury. The
E.D.’s competency was also evaluated outside the presence of the jury, and the trial 5
court likewise found him competent to testify. Once E.D. was evaluated by the trial court, Stevens abandoned any challenge to his competency and likewise does not challenge E.D.’s competency on appeal. -9- Commonwealth then rested its case. Counsel for Stevens moved to strike the Commonwealth’s
evidence, which was denied by the trial court. Stevens then testified in his own defense,
claiming that he acted in self-defense in causing the death of J.D. At the conclusion of all the
evidence, counsel for Stevens renewed his motion to strike, which was denied.
After the trial court ruled on Stevens’s motion, the jury was instructed by the trial court
with respect to the law applying in the case. Following closing statements, the jury retired to
deliberate. The jury subsequently returned with its verdict finding Stevens guilty of second-
degree murder, guilty of two counts of abduction, guilty of violating a protective order while
armed, guilty of violating a protective order, and guilty of two counts of child cruelty. Stevens
was also found not guilty of assault and battery, not guilty of two counts of child abuse, and not
guilty of statutory burglary. Following a sentencing hearing on December 15, 2023, Stevens was
sentenced to a total of 75 years and 12 months’ incarceration and ordered to register with the sex
offender registry upon his release. No time was suspended. Stevens appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that “the whole question of competency is
largely left to the discretion of the trial court, and that its judgment will not be reversed except
for manifest error.” Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 864 (1947). “Decisions
regarding the admissibility of evidence ‘lie within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.’” Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 692,
697 (2019) (quoting Michels v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 461, 465 (2006)). “Only when
reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Nottingham
v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 221, 231 (2021) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va.
602, 620 (2009)).
- 10 - “Juror impartiality is a question of fact.” Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 125,
136 (2019). “[W]hen conducting appellate review on [a] question of fact, . . . the trial court’s
[finding] must be affirmed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”
Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 387 (1995). “On appellate review, this Court gives
deference to a trial court’s decision whether to exclude a potential juror for cause.” Roberts v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 279 Va. 111, 115 (2010). Therefore, “a trial court’s denial of a motion to
strike a juror for cause ‘will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been manifest error
amounting to an abuse of discretion.’” Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329-30
(2005) (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 823, 826 (2001)).
B. The trial court did not err in finding that S.D. was competent to testify, nor did it err in admitting in evidence both her testimony and her recorded interview.
Stevens first assigns error to the trial court for determining that S.D. was competent to
testify, further contending that S.D. “lacked the capacity to independently recall and
communicate events or to understand the duty to be truthful.” The Commonwealth responds by
asserting that “S.D. clearly demonstrated the understanding of the difference between the truth
and a lie, and that she could face repercussions for telling a lie.” We agree with the
Commonwealth.
“In general, ‘[a] court may declare a person incompetent to testify if the court finds that
the person does not have sufficient physical or mental capacity to testify truthfully, accurately, or
understandably.’” Bista v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Nov. 14, 2024) (alteration in
original) (quoting Va. R. Evid. 2:601(b)). Code § 8.01-396.1 provides that “no child will be
deemed incompetent to testify solely because of age.”
There is no specific age at which a child must have arrived in order to be competent as a witness. A child is competent to testify if it possesses the capacity to observe events, to recollect and communicate them, and has the ability to understand questions and
- 11 - to frame and make intelligent answers, with a consciousness of the duty to speak the truth.
Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 64 (1953). The trial court must also consider the “child’s
age, his intelligence or lack of intelligence, and his sense of moral and legal responsibility.”
Greenway v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 147, 153 (1997) (quoting Hepler v. Hepler, 195 Va. 611,
619 (1954)); see, e.g., Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705, 720-21 (2008) (upholding a court’s
competency determination for a nine year old who “explained the difference between the truth
and a lie”). “The competency of a witness to testify is a determination to be made by the trial
judge based upon the circumstances before him.” Durant v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 454,
462 (1988).
Here, we cannot find a manifest error in the trial court’s determination that S.D. was
competent to testify. As to her intelligence and age, S.D. was six years old at the time of trial,
was able to spell her first name, state that she was in the first grade, say what her favorite subject
was, state her birthday, give the name and age of her dog, and provide the names of her former
and current teachers. Although S.D. failed to provide completely accurate answers to questions
about where she lived and the name of her school, this alone is not sufficient to support Stevens’s
contention that no reasonable jurist could have found that S.D. was intelligent enough to testify.
As to her sense of moral and legal responsibility, and her consciousness of her duty to
speak the truth, S.D. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie and clearly testified that
it was a “bad thing” to tell a lie and that she could get in trouble and be punished for telling a lie.
She also noted that it was a “good thing” to tell the truth and responded in the affirmative when
asked if she could promise to tell the truth, especially after clarifying that she could say “I don’t
know” when she didn’t remember something. When asked on cross-examination if she could
“make a promise to tell the truth,” S.D. said, “No. I’m very bad at telling secrets.” Despite this,
S.D. was still able to say that her difficulty in telling the truth was a “bad” thing. Ortiz, 276 Va. - 12 - at 720-21. In fact, the trial court noted that S.D. was “well aware of the difference between a
truth and a lie” and that she also was “keenly aware of the fact that it’s good to tell the truth and
wrong to tell a lie.” In addition, although any difficulty that S.D. had in telling the truth was ripe
for cross-examination by counsel for Stevens, any such difficulty was not so great that the circuit
court abused its discretion in finding that S.D. was aware of her legal and moral obligations to
speak the truth. Like any other witness, S.D.’s answers qualified her to serve as a competent
witness, but the veracity of her statements themselves remained entirely within the jury’s
purview.
As to her capacity to observe events and to recollect and communicate them, S.D.’s
initial testimony did contain numerous answers of “I don’t know.” In addition, she did not
testify in any great amount of detail. However, on cross-examination, S.D. revealed that her
“dad” had told his daughter that if she didn’t know what to say then to just say, “I don’t know,”
and that her dad’s girlfriend told her to say, “I forgot.” Accordingly, based on our review of the
record, we cannot find that the court’s exercise of its discretion to find S.D. competent was a
manifest error. Durant, 7 Va. App. at 462.6
Turning to the admission of S.D.’s forensic interview, counsel for Stevens contends that
since “S.D. was erroneously allowed to testify at trial” and since admitting her interview “was
based on this error,” the admission of the forensic interview was in error. As noted above,
because we find no error in the trial court’s determination that S.D. was competent to testify at
trial, we likewise find no error in the trial court permitting S.D.’s forensic interview to be
admitted into evidence. Thus, we affirm the trial court.
6 As S.D. was competent to testify, we find no error in the trial court admitting her relevant testimony at trial. - 13 - C. Stevens’s challenges to J.D.’s statements are waived because of the application of the same-evidence rule.
Stevens contends that J.D.’s statements to Deputy Walker were testimonial hearsay that
violated the Confrontation Clause. Stevens further alleges that this error was not harmless. The
Commonwealth asserts in response that J.D.’s statements were not hearsay, but if they were, the
statements are nontestimonial. Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that even if the statements
were inadmissible hearsay that violated the Confrontation Clause, any error was harmless. The
two statements at issue are J.D.’s first statement to Deputy Walker that Stevens “jerked her hair
and then stabbed the bed with a knife” and her second statement from Deputy Walker’s body-
worn camera video clip where she stated, “I’m not coming back here until I know for sure he’s
not coming back.” We find that as a result of the application of the same-evidence rule,
Stevens’s assignments of error related to the admission of J.D.’s statements are thus waived.
“A party cannot avail itself of an objection to evidence if the party has, at some other
time during trial, ‘voluntarily elicited the same evidence, or has permitted it to be brought out by
his adversary without objection.’” Nat’l Coll. of Bus. & Tech. Inc. v. Davenport, 57 Va. App.
677, 690 n.16 (2011) (quoting Burns v. Bd. of Supervisors of Stafford Cnty., 227 Va. 354, 363
(1984)). An unsuccessful objection “to the admissibility of certain evidence [is] waived by the
failure to object to the same evidence subsequently introduced.” Philip Greenberg, Inc. v.
Dunville, 166 Va. 398, 404 (1936). “The scope of the waiver goes further, however, for it also
includes evidence dealing ‘with the same subject,’ evidence fairly considered to be ‘of the same
character,’ as well as evidence ‘similar to that to which the objection applies.’” Isaac v.
Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 255, 264 (2011) (first quoting Pettus v. Commonwealth, 269
Va. 69, 79 (2005); then quoting Combs v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 490, 499 (1998); and then
quoting Snead v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 787, 802 (1924)). “[O]nce evidence of particular
facts has been introduced without objection[,] the objection is properly deemed waived as to - 14 - those particular facts.” Kent Sinclair, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 2-3(c) (2023). “This
same-evidence principle has . . . stood in roughly the same form for well over a century,” and it
“applies to criminal and civil cases.” Isaac, 58 Va. App. at 260. “[T]he practical effect of the
principle remains clear: ‘Some courts so hold because the error is harmless, and others because
the subsequent introduction of the same evidence is a waiver of the objection. Whether it be
placed upon one ground or the other, the result is the same.’” Id. at 260-61 (quoting N.Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Taliaferro, 95 Va. 522, 523 (1898)).
Here, in response to the Commonwealth’s question concerning whether J.D. told
Deputy Walker that Stevens “had put his hands on her,” Stevens objected, however the objection
was overruled by the trial court. Deputy Walker then said that J.D. told him that “during the
argument [Stevens] jerked her hair and then stabbed the bed with a knife.” Later, without
objection, during direct examination, Deputy Walker described entering the house and arriving in
the bedroom where “[J.D.] made statements about [Stevens] pulling her hair and stabbing the
bed,” which led Deputy Walker to ask where the bed had been stabbed and to discover a cut in
the bedsheet. Additionally, after Stevens initially objected to Deputy Walker’s body-worn
camera video being entered in evidence and played for the jury, Deputy Walker later testified
that J.D. “said she planned on leaving, even if he wasn’t there, she wasn’t coming back.”
Deputy Walker also testified, without objection, that he remained on scene with J.D. because
“she was fearful” and “wanted someone to stay there while she got her stuff.” Since there was
no objection to the subsequent testimony in the record and the evidence is of the same character
as the evidence that was objected to before and on the same subject, Stevens waived his
- 15 - objection to the trial court’s ruling by failing to object to Deputy Walker’s subsequent
testimony.7
D. The trial court did not err by failing to strike Jurors 2 and 45 for cause.
The Commonwealth contends that Stevens failed to preserve his assignment of error
relating to his objections to Juror 2 and Juror 45 for cause following voir dire. In support, the
Commonwealth asserts that Stevens’s argument during voir dire was that Juror 2 should be
struck for cause solely because he said that a man cannot hit a woman, and he is thus limited to
that sole ground. Similarly, the Commonwealth contends that the objection to Juror 45 is that
she should have been struck solely because of the juror’s donations to Empower House. Stevens
responds that the Commonwealth’s contention is based on an “overly restrictive view” of Rule
5A:18. In support, Stevens argues that because we review the entirety of the juror’s voir dire and
not isolated statements, “the entirety of the jurors’ voir dire was preserved as problematic.” We
agree with the Commonwealth.
“No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an
objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause
shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. “Rule 5A:18 requires a
litigant to make timely and specific objections, so that the trial court has ‘an opportunity to rule
intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals.’” Brown
v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217 (2010) (quoting West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327,
337 (2004)). “Specificity and timeliness undergird the contemporaneous objection rule, [and]
7 At oral argument, Stevens’s counsel said that the objections at trial were “continuing.” But this point was not raised in either of appellant’s briefs before this court, nor is the argument supported by the law or the record. See Sinclair, supra, § 2-5(a) (stating that a continuing objection is noted “by asking that the record reflect that counsel stands firm in objecting to the evidence in question despite the fact that the initial objection or objections have been overruled”). - 16 - animate its highly practical purpose.” Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019). “Not
just any objection will do. It must be both specific and timely—so that the trial judge would
know the particular point being made in time to do something about it.” Id. (emphases omitted)
(quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 351, 356 (2011)).
Here, counsel for Stevens asked if there was anyone in the venire that thought that “under
no circumstances” could a man “ever hit or injure a woman no matter what?” But when Juror 2
responded in the affirmative, counsel for Stevens then asked if Juror 2’s belief extended to self-
defense, to which Juror 2 responded that self-defense was a “different circumstance” and “s[a]t
down.” When moving the trial court to strike Juror 2 for cause, the only rationale given by
Stevens was that Juror 2 was “very adamant” about a man not hitting or injuring a woman. In
response, the Commonwealth noted that Juror 2 had been “rehabilitated” because he had stated
that “a man should never hit a woman unless it was self-defense.” Although the Commonwealth
made brief mention of Juror 2’s prior statements about his sister, Stevens did not press his
objection on those grounds in front of the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court made no ruling
on Juror 2’s supposed disqualifications based on his exposure to or familiarity with domestic
violence or homicide but solely based it on Juror 2’s answer regarding self-defense.
Our Supreme Court’s precedents on this issue guide us in rejecting Stevens’s argument.
In Townsend, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to empaneling a petit jury where the
appellant argued on appeal that “the trial court is required to independently review each member
of the venire to determine if the seating of any juror would undermine the public’s confidence in
the judicial process, regardless of whether a party raises an objection to a juror or gives a reason
for excluding that person.” 270 Va. at 330. However, the Townsend Court, applying Rule 5:25,
found that Townsend “never argued to the trial court that public confidence in the judicial
- 17 - process would be undermined by seating” the challenged jurors.8 Id. at 332. Townsend itself
built upon Blevins, another case where the Supreme Court addressed questions that were
preserved regarding a juror’s “honesty and potential for bias,” but it declined to address issues
that “[were] not raised in the trial court.” Id. at 332 (quoting Blevins v. Commonwealth, 267 Va.
291, 296 n.1 (2004)). The Supreme Court of Virginia’s cases of Townsend and Blevins foreclose
Stevens’s attempt to evade the application of Rule 5A:18 to his arguments.
Stevens is correct that “a juror’s entire voir dire must be considered before an appellate
court will overturn the decision of a trial court to deny a motion to strike a juror for cause.”
Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 125, 139 n.10 (2019). But this principle of law was not
enunciated in the context of Rule 5A:18 or our jurisdictional rules regarding preservation of
issues. Rather, it concerns the situation where a juror’s entire voir dire was properly objected to,
the entirety of that juror’s voir dire had to be reviewed in context without isolating certain
statements made by the particular prospective juror. See id. at 144 (noting that Goodwin’s
analysis “isolates those words from the complete context of the voir dire” and that his argument
“focuse[d] on specific words that [the jurors] used such as ‘think’ and ‘believe’”). The Court
faulted Goodwin for “ignor[ing] that the trial court considered the full statements of those jurors
and their respective demeanors during questioning, and not just the specific words that he
highlights on appeal.” Id. Goodwin’s requirement to consider the entirety of a juror’s voir dire
therefore is not an end-around that skirts the requirements of Rule 5A:18. Therefore, we find
that Stevens’s challenge on appeal as to Juror 2’s impartiality relating to domestic violence is
waived under Rule 5A:18, and therefore we will not consider it. Stevens does not argue that
Juror 2 was otherwise unfit to serve on the jury, and therefore we affirm the trial court’s denial of
Stevens’s motion to strike Juror 2 for cause.
8 Rule 5:25 is the Supreme Court of Virginia’s counterpart to Rule 5A:18. - 18 - As for Juror 45, counsel for Stevens objected to her sitting on the jury because of her
statements that the Fraternal Order of Eagles “donat[es] to Empower House” and that the
“support” and “connection” there indicated the presence of “bias there about these particular
witnesses and that organization.” The Commonwealth noted that Juror 45 had “never met any of
the workers there at Empower House and indicated that she would have no problem being a
neutral witness concerning those donations.” Juror 45’s prior answers about her “abusive”
husband were not addressed by Stevens and accordingly, the trial court did not rule on them. See
Rule 5A:18; Townsend, 270 Va. at 322. Therefore, to the extent that Stevens argues that Juror
45’s prior abusive experiences rendered her unfit to sit on the jury, this argument is also waived.
Accordingly, we address the remaining preserved portion of Stevens’s argument as it pertains to
Juror 45’s involvement with the Fraternal Order of Eagles.
Stevens contends that Juror 45’s membership in the Fraternal Order of Eagles—a group
that provides money to charities that help those seeking to escape abuse—renders her not
impartial. We disagree.
A trial court must excuse for cause a potential juror who “has any interest in the cause, or
is related to either party, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or
prejudice” regarding the action. Spangler v. Ashwell, 116 Va. 992, 996-97 (1914) (quoting
Richardson v. Planters Bank of Farmville, 94 Va. 130 (1896)). If a potential juror has an
opinion that “repels the presumption of innocence in a criminal case, and in whose mind the
accused stands condemned already,” they must be disqualified. Brown v. Commonwealth, 68
Va. App. 746, 785 (2018). Likewise, a potential juror should be struck for cause when “the
prospective juror’s views ‘would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as
a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68,
77 (1994) (quoting Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246 (1990)). “It is prejudicial error
- 19 - for the trial court to force a defendant to use peremptory strikes to exclude a venireman from the
jury panel if that person is not free from exception.” Townsend, 270 Va. at 329.
Here, Juror 45 stated, “I know [sic] the member of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, and we
do donate a lot of money to Empower House and domestic violence and children’s charities.”
Counsel for Stevens noted that one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses worked for Empower
House and asked Juror 45 if “there [was] anything about that that you would tend to give that
witness more credibility just because of her role?” Juror 45 responded, “No. I really didn’t
know anybody there. I just knew we donated money and toys and stuff.” Based on Juror 45’s
responses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Juror 45 would not give more
credence to a particular witness who worked at Empower House. Juror 45 was merely a member
of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, which in turn gave money to many charities, of which Empower
House was one, and one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses worked for that charity. But there
were no facts in the record to suggest that this attenuated chain of transferring money in and of
itself was significant or personal enough to disqualify Juror 45. This is especially evident when
she made it clear that she did not know anyone who worked at Empower House and her
association with it was strictly through the form of an organization she was a part of that gave an
undisclosed amount of money to Empower House. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of Stevens’s motion to strike for cause Juror 45.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Stevens’s convictions. Affirmed.
- 20 -