Chris Langer v. 314 North Brand Boulevard, LLC

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: February 9, 2021
• Docket: 2:20-cv-05047
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

O 1

2 3 4 5 6 7

8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

11 CHRIS LANGER, Case № 2:20-CV-05047-ODW (RAOx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

13 v. DEFAULT JUDGMENT [18]

14 314 NORTH BRAND BOULEVARD, LLC; and DOES 1-10, 15

Defendants. 16

17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Chris Langer (“Langer”) moves for entry of default judgment against 20 Defendant 314 North Brand Boulevard, LLC (“Defendant). (See Mot. for Default J. 21 (“Motion” or “Mot.”) 3, ECF No. 18.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court 22 DENIES Langer’s Motion.1 23 II. BACKGROUND 24 Langer requires a wheelchair for mobility and has a van specially equipped with 25 a ramp. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) He alleges that Defendant owns real property 26 located at 308, 312, and 314 North Brand Boulevard, in Glendale, California. (Id. 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 ¶ 3.) Langer claims that in July 2019 he went to eat at Hot Wings Café, Sushi on 2 Brand, and Pho Hut (the “Restaurants”). (Id. ¶ 8.) According to Langer, when he 3 visited the Restaurants, they failed to provide wheelchair accessible parking. (Id. 4 ¶ 10.) Langer asserts that the lack of accessible parking at the Restaurants denied him 5 access to the Restaurants and deter him from returning in the future. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 6 12–13, 17.) He claims that he will return to the Restaurants to use their services once 7 there is accessible parking. (Id. ¶ 17.) 8 Langer filed this action on June 8, 2020, asserting claims under Title III of the 9 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and California state law, relating to his visit 10 to the Restaurants in July 2020. (Id. ¶ 8.) The Court declined to exercise 11 supplemental jurisdiction over Langer’s state law claim and dismissed it without 12 prejudice. (Order Declining Suppl. Jurisdiction 10, ECF No. 12.) 13 Langer served Defendant with a Summons and the Complaint on June 22, 2020. 14 (Proof of Service, ECF No. 10.) Defendant failed to answer or otherwise respond to 15 the Complaint and Langer requested entry of default on July 17, 2020. (Req. for Entry 16 of Default, ECF No. 14.) The Clerk entered default on July 20, 2020. (Entry of 17 Default, ECF No. 15.) Langer then filed the present Motion on August 21, 2020. 18 (Mot.) 19 III. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Plaintiffs seeking default judgment must meet certain procedural requirements, 21 as set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55 and Central District of 22 California Local Rule (“Local Rule”) 55-1. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; C.D. Cal. 23 L.R. 55-1. Local Rule 55-1 requires that motions for default judgment include: 24 (1) when and against which party default was entered; (2) identification of the 25 pleading to which default was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is a minor, 26 incompetent person, or active service member; (4) that the Servicemembers Civil 27 Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3931, does not apply; and (5) that the defaulting party was 28 1 properly served with notice, if required under Rule 55(b)(2). See Vogel v. Rite Aid 2 Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 3 Once the procedural requirements are satisfied, “[t]he district court’s decision 4 whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 5 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Generally, a defendant’s liability is conclusively 6 established upon entry of default by the Clerk, and well-pleaded factual allegations in 7 the complaint are accepted as true, except those pertaining to the amount of damages. 8 See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per 9 curiam) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). Still, 10 “[a] defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered 11 judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 12 2002). Rather, the court considers several factors in exercising its discretion, 13 including: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the 14 plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of 15 money at stake; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether 16 the defendant’s default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy 17 favoring decision on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th. Cir. 18 1986). 19 A party who has violated the ADA is liable for attorneys’ fees and costs under 20 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Where, on motion for default judgment, a party seeks attorneys’ 21 fees and costs pursuant to a statute, those fees are calculated in accordance with the 22 schedule provided by the Court. C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-3. A court may award attorneys’ 23 fees in excess of the schedule when the attorney makes a request at the time of the 24 entry of default. Id. 25 IV. DISCUSSION 26 As detailed below, the Court finds that Langer meets the procedural 27 requirements for his Motion. However, the Eitel factors do not support granting 28 default judgment. 1 A. Procedural Requirements 2 Langer satisfies the procedural requirements for an entry of default judgment. 3 He states in his Motion and supporting declaration that: (1) default was entered 4 against Defendant on July 20, 2020; (2) default was entered based on the Complaint 5 filed on June 8, 2020; (3) Defendant is not a minor, an incompetent person, or a 6 person in military service; (4) Defendant is not exempt under the Servicemembers 7 Civil Relief Act; and (5) Langer properly served Defendant on August 21, 2020, via 8 first class United States mail. (Mot. 1; Decl. of Faythe Gutierrez ¶¶ 2, 5–6, ECF 9 No. 18–13.) Thus, Langer satisfies the procedural requirements of Local Rule 55-1 10 and Rule 55. See Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1006. 11 B. Eitel Factors 12 The second and third Eitel factors are dispositive here, so the Court begins with 13 them. These two factors, which address the merits of the claims and the sufficiency of 14 the complaint, “require that a plaintiff state a claim on which the [plaintiff] may 15 recover.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 499 16 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (alteration in original) (citing PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175); see 17 also Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[F]acts which are not 18 established by the pleadings . . . are not binding and cannot support the judgment.”). 19 Although well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted by a 20 defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and 21 claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life 22 Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning, 572 F.2d 23 at 1388). 24 In this case, Langer seeks relief under the ADA. (See Compl. ¶¶ 19–25.) To 25 prevail on this claim, Langer must show that: (1) “he is disabled within the meaning 26 of the ADA”; (2) “the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a 27 place of public accommodation”; (3) “the plaintiff was denied public accommodations 28 by the defendant because of his disability”; (4) “the existing facility at the defendant’s 1 place of business [or property] presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the 2 ADA”; and (5) removing the barrier is “readily achievable.” Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d 3 at 1007–08 (brackets omitted) (first quoting Molski v. M.J. Cable Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 4 730 (9th Cir. 2007); and then quoting Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 5 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000)). 6 First, Langer alleges that he is a paraplegic and he uses a wheelchair for 7 mobility. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Under the ADA, a “disability” is “a physical or mental 8 impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. 9 § 12102(1)(A). The ADA lists walking as a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. 10 § 12102(2)(A). Thus, Langer has established that he is disabled within the meaning of 11 the ADA. 12 Second, Langer alleges that Defendant owns real property at 308, 312, and 13 314 North Brand Boulevard, or is responsible either jointly or as a necessary party for 14 obtaining relief. (Compl. ¶¶ 2–4.) Property owners are charged with ensuring 15 compliance with the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Nevertheless, Langer fails to assert 16 the Restaurants are located at 308, 312, and 314 North Brand Boulevard. (See Compl. 17 ¶¶ 2–3.) Instead, Langer vaguely states that he “went to the property to eat at” the 18 Restaurants without first establishing where the Restaurants are located. (See id. ¶¶ 2– 19 3, 8.) Thus, even accepting his allegations as true, Langer fails to establish Defendant 20 owns, leases, or operates places of public accommodation subject to Title III of the 21 ADA. 22 Third, Langer asserts that when he visited the Restaurants, they failed to 23 provide wheelchair accessible parking. (Id. ¶ 10.) “Architectural barriers” are defined 24 by reference to the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (the “ADAAG”). See Chapman v. 25 Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). Relevantly, the public 26 accommodation at issue must provide public parking for a plaintiff to establish that 27 the lack of accessible parking creates an architectural barrier under the ADA. See 28 2010 ADAAG § 208.1 (“Where parking spaces are provided, parking spaces shall be 1 provided in accordance with [section] 208.” (emphasis added)); see also id. § 208 2 (setting forth accessibility requirements for parking spaces). Here, Langer’s factual 3 allegations do not establish the fourth element of his ADA claim (i.e., the existence of 4 architectural barriers at the defendant’s property). Langer states in conclusory fashion 5 that the Restaurants “failed to provide wheelchair accessible parking,” without first 6 establishing that they actually provide public parking. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 10–12.) 7 Due to Langer’s failure to allege that the Restaurants provide public parking, he fails 8 to demonstrate the existence of an architectural barrier under the ADA. 9 In sum, even accepting the well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as 10 true, Langer fails to state a claim under the ADA. See Cripps, 980 F.2d at 1267 11 (“[N]ecessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally 12 insufficient, are not established by default.” (citing Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388)). The 13 second and third Eitel factors alone demonstrate that default judgment is improper, 14 and the Court need not assess the remaining factors. See Brooke v. Sunstone Von 15 Karman, LLC, No. 8:19-cv-00635-JLS (ADSx), 2020 WL 6153107, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 16 Aug. 25, 2020). However, leave to amend is appropriate because Langer’s failure to 17 state a claim is based on insufficient allegations which could theoretically be cured. 18 Id. 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 V. CONCLUSION 1 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Langer’s Motion for Default 2|| Judgment. (ECF No. 18.) The Court accordingly DENIES Langer’s request for 3 || attorneys’ fees. The default previously entered against Defendant is hereby SET 4|| ASIDE. (ECF No. 15.) If Langer chooses to amend his Complaint to address the 5 || deficiencies identified herein, any amended complaint must be filed and served within 6 || twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Failure to timely amend will result in 7 || dismissal of this action. 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 1] February 9, 2021 . 12 ee 13 Atal 14 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II Is UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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