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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 CHRIS HARMON, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00140-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS v. 13 LISA LEONE and D. GAGNER, 14 Defendants. 15
16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 16. Plaintiff 18 did not respond to Defendants’ motion, but did, however, send a letter response to Defendants on 19 August 18, 2025.1 See Dkt. No. 18 at 1–2. Defendants attached Plaintiff’s letter to their Reply 20 brief. See Dkt. No. 18 at 6. Having reviewed Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff’s letter (Dkt. No. 18 21 at 6), Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. No. 18), and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS the 22 Defendant’s motion and DISMISSES this case WITH PREJUDICE. 23
24 1 The letter was also addressed to the Clerk of the Court, but the Clerk’s Office has been unable to locate the letter. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. The Current Case 3 This case arises from Plaintiff Chris Harmon’s claim that his rights were violated under 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. No. 12 (amended complaint)), because “proper service was not
5 performed,” and his “sixth amendment [was] not satisfied” (Dkt. No. 1 (complaint)). Plaintiff 6 seeks relief through the overturning of a Des Moines Municipal Court (“DMMC”) decision and 7 reimbursement of court costs. Id. The allegations are based on the decisions made by Judge Lisa 8 Leone and Judge Pro Tem Denice Gagner in a civil infraction matter in DMMC. Dkt. No. 16 at 9 1. 10 In the present case, Plaintiff filed his complaint on January 22, 2025, listing Judge Leone 11 as the defendant. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. The Statement of Claim alleged, “Proper service was not 12 performed”; and “Sixth amendment not satisfied.” Id. at 5. The relief sought was “overturn 13 municipal court adjudication” and “reimburse court costs.” Id. On May 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed 14 an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 12. The amended complaint left the Statement of Claim and
15 Relief sections blank. Id. at 5. However, it appears Plaintiff was amending his complaint to 16 include Judge Pro Tem Gagner as a second defendant (see id. at 2) and to request a jury trial (see 17 id. at 7).2 18 Defendants filed the instant motion on August 7, 2025. Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff did not file 19 a response with the Court but did write a letter response, which was addressed to the Court, 20 responding to Plaintiff’s motion. Dkt. No. 18 at 6. However, this response was only received by 21 the Court because Defendants included Plaintiff’s response as an attachment in Defendants’ 22 reply. Id. 23 2 Plaintiff wrote “to formally request a jury trial” (Dkt. No. 12 at 7), but the jury-trial box was not checked in either 24 the original complaint (Dkt. No. 1 at 1) or the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 12 at 1). 1 B. The Underlying Case 2 Defendants’ motion states that this lawsuit stems from an underlying civil infraction in 3 Des Moines Municipal Court, Case No. # 4A0684555 (“DMCC Case”). Dkt. No. 16 at 1. 4 Plaintiff does not contest the accuracy of this in his response or the facts of the underlying case
5 as Defendants presented them in their motion. See generally Dkt. No. 12. A court may take 6 judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record. See Frlekin v. Apple, Inc., 979 7 F.3d 639, 643 n.1 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(d) and Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. 8 Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006)). Therefore, the Court will take judicial 9 notice of the DMCC Case and the court records associated with that case. 10 In the DMCC Case, Plaintiff requested a contested infraction hearing for an alleged speeding 11 violation. Dkt. No. 16 at 1. The contested hearing took place on October 24, 2024, and 12 Defendant Judge Pro Tem Gagner “found the violation committed.” Id. at 1–2. On October 22, 13 2024, Plaintiff filed a request in DMMC for that court to reconsider the committed finding. Id. at 14 2. On November 18, 2024, Defendant Judge Leon reviewed and denied Plaintiff’s motion for
15 reconsideration. Id. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 A. Rule 12(b)(6) 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may assert the defense of 19 failure to state a claim. Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate 20 when there is either “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts 21 alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 22 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). 23 //
24 // 1 B. Judicial Immunity 2 Courts can consider judicial immunity when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 3 for failure to state a claim. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 4 (9th Cir. 1987). When determining whether an act by a judge is considered judicial for the
5 purposes of judicial immunity, courts consider “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a 6 function normally performed by a judge, and . . . the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether 7 they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). 8 When a judge performs an act within their official capacity, they are “absolutely immune” from 9 liability. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Duvall v. County of 10 Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 11 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999)) (“It is well settled that Judges are generally immune from civil 12 liability under section 1983.”); Swanigan v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. C25-5301, 2025 WL 1345255, 13 at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2025). “[T]he doctrine of judicial immunity is thought to be in the 14 best interests of ‘the proper administration of justice . . . [, for it allows] a judicial officer, in
15 exercising the authority vested in him [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without 16 apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 363–64 (quoting 17 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) (alterations in original)). “However, 18 absolute judicial immunity does not apply to non-judicial acts, i.e. the administrative, legislative, 19 and executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned to perform.” Duvall, 260 F.3d 20 at 1133. In other words “[a] judge loses absolute immunity only when he acts in the clear 21 absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial in nature.” Schucker v. 22 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988). 23 //
24 // 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 In the present case, Plaintiff lacks a cognizable legal theory, because Defendants’ conduct 3 is shielded by judicial immunity. Courts have “long recognized judicial immunity, a ‘sweeping 4 form of immunity’ for acts performed by judges that relate to the ‘judicial process.’” In re
5 Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 6 (1988)).
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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 CHRIS HARMON, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00140-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS v. 13 LISA LEONE and D. GAGNER, 14 Defendants. 15
16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 16. Plaintiff 18 did not respond to Defendants’ motion, but did, however, send a letter response to Defendants on 19 August 18, 2025.1 See Dkt. No. 18 at 1–2. Defendants attached Plaintiff’s letter to their Reply 20 brief. See Dkt. No. 18 at 6. Having reviewed Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff’s letter (Dkt. No. 18 21 at 6), Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. No. 18), and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS the 22 Defendant’s motion and DISMISSES this case WITH PREJUDICE. 23
24 1 The letter was also addressed to the Clerk of the Court, but the Clerk’s Office has been unable to locate the letter. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. The Current Case 3 This case arises from Plaintiff Chris Harmon’s claim that his rights were violated under 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. No. 12 (amended complaint)), because “proper service was not
5 performed,” and his “sixth amendment [was] not satisfied” (Dkt. No. 1 (complaint)). Plaintiff 6 seeks relief through the overturning of a Des Moines Municipal Court (“DMMC”) decision and 7 reimbursement of court costs. Id. The allegations are based on the decisions made by Judge Lisa 8 Leone and Judge Pro Tem Denice Gagner in a civil infraction matter in DMMC. Dkt. No. 16 at 9 1. 10 In the present case, Plaintiff filed his complaint on January 22, 2025, listing Judge Leone 11 as the defendant. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. The Statement of Claim alleged, “Proper service was not 12 performed”; and “Sixth amendment not satisfied.” Id. at 5. The relief sought was “overturn 13 municipal court adjudication” and “reimburse court costs.” Id. On May 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed 14 an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 12. The amended complaint left the Statement of Claim and
15 Relief sections blank. Id. at 5. However, it appears Plaintiff was amending his complaint to 16 include Judge Pro Tem Gagner as a second defendant (see id. at 2) and to request a jury trial (see 17 id. at 7).2 18 Defendants filed the instant motion on August 7, 2025. Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff did not file 19 a response with the Court but did write a letter response, which was addressed to the Court, 20 responding to Plaintiff’s motion. Dkt. No. 18 at 6. However, this response was only received by 21 the Court because Defendants included Plaintiff’s response as an attachment in Defendants’ 22 reply. Id. 23 2 Plaintiff wrote “to formally request a jury trial” (Dkt. No. 12 at 7), but the jury-trial box was not checked in either 24 the original complaint (Dkt. No. 1 at 1) or the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 12 at 1). 1 B. The Underlying Case 2 Defendants’ motion states that this lawsuit stems from an underlying civil infraction in 3 Des Moines Municipal Court, Case No. # 4A0684555 (“DMCC Case”). Dkt. No. 16 at 1. 4 Plaintiff does not contest the accuracy of this in his response or the facts of the underlying case
5 as Defendants presented them in their motion. See generally Dkt. No. 12. A court may take 6 judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record. See Frlekin v. Apple, Inc., 979 7 F.3d 639, 643 n.1 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(d) and Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. 8 Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006)). Therefore, the Court will take judicial 9 notice of the DMCC Case and the court records associated with that case. 10 In the DMCC Case, Plaintiff requested a contested infraction hearing for an alleged speeding 11 violation. Dkt. No. 16 at 1. The contested hearing took place on October 24, 2024, and 12 Defendant Judge Pro Tem Gagner “found the violation committed.” Id. at 1–2. On October 22, 13 2024, Plaintiff filed a request in DMMC for that court to reconsider the committed finding. Id. at 14 2. On November 18, 2024, Defendant Judge Leon reviewed and denied Plaintiff’s motion for
15 reconsideration. Id. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 A. Rule 12(b)(6) 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may assert the defense of 19 failure to state a claim. Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate 20 when there is either “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts 21 alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 22 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). 23 //
24 // 1 B. Judicial Immunity 2 Courts can consider judicial immunity when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 3 for failure to state a claim. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 4 (9th Cir. 1987). When determining whether an act by a judge is considered judicial for the
5 purposes of judicial immunity, courts consider “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a 6 function normally performed by a judge, and . . . the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether 7 they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). 8 When a judge performs an act within their official capacity, they are “absolutely immune” from 9 liability. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Duvall v. County of 10 Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 11 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999)) (“It is well settled that Judges are generally immune from civil 12 liability under section 1983.”); Swanigan v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. C25-5301, 2025 WL 1345255, 13 at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2025). “[T]he doctrine of judicial immunity is thought to be in the 14 best interests of ‘the proper administration of justice . . . [, for it allows] a judicial officer, in
15 exercising the authority vested in him [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without 16 apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 363–64 (quoting 17 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) (alterations in original)). “However, 18 absolute judicial immunity does not apply to non-judicial acts, i.e. the administrative, legislative, 19 and executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned to perform.” Duvall, 260 F.3d 20 at 1133. In other words “[a] judge loses absolute immunity only when he acts in the clear 21 absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial in nature.” Schucker v. 22 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988). 23 //
24 // 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 In the present case, Plaintiff lacks a cognizable legal theory, because Defendants’ conduct 3 is shielded by judicial immunity. Courts have “long recognized judicial immunity, a ‘sweeping 4 form of immunity’ for acts performed by judges that relate to the ‘judicial process.’” In re
5 Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 6 (1988)). “A judge is not deprived of immunity because he takes actions which are in error, are 7 done maliciously, or are in excess of his authority.” Meek, 183 F.3d at 965. 8 Here, the Defendant-Judges conducted judicial acts when they entered rulings on 9 Plaintiff’s claims in the DMMC Case. Defendant Judge Pro-Tem Gagner presided over 10 Plaintiff’s contested civil infraction hearing and ruled against Plaintiff. Defendant Judge Leon 11 ruled against Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Presiding over civil infraction 12 hearings and ruling on motions to reconsider are both functions normally performed by a judge, 13 because judges are routinely tasked with hearing and deciding on such issues. See RCW 14 3.66.010. Further, making decisions and ruling about these issues are within a judge’s judicial
15 capacity, because parties bring motions before judges in court with the expectation that the judge 16 will make decisions on the conflict at hand. Regardless of whether Plaintiff agrees with either 17 ruling made in the DMMC Case, both instances are clearly judicial acts. Therefore, both 18 Defendants are immune from liability, and the case must be dismissed. 19 Lastly, the Court does not give Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses this matter with 20 prejudice, because Defendants’ judicial immunity is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim. Therefore, any 21 amended complaint alleging the same thing will also be futile. See Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 22 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988), amended by, 856 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Little v. Ambler, 22 23 F. App’x 764, 765 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that district court did not abuse discretion in denying
24 leave to amend because judicial immunity was fatal to plaintiff’s claim) (citation omitted). 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 16) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's 3 |} Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 12) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 4 5 Dated this 27th day of October 2025.
7 Tana Lin United States District Judge
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