ACCEPTED 03-15-00078-CV 5673814 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/15/2015 11:38:21 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK
No. 03-15-00078-CV __________________________________________________________________ FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALSAUSTIN, TEXAS 6/15/2015 11:38:21 AM AUSTIN, TEXAS JEFFREY D. KYLE __________________________________________________________________ Clerk
CHRIS BELL, Appellant
v.
REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION Appellee __________________________________________________________________
On appeal from the 261st Judicial District Court, Travis County Honorable John Dietz Presiding __________________________________________________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT __________________________________________________________________
ELIZABETH G. BLOCH State Bar No. 02495500 Heidi.bloch@huschblackwell.com THOMAS H. WATKINS State Bar No. 20928000 Tom.watkins@huschblackwell.com Husch Blackwell LLP 111 Congress, Suite 1400 Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 472-5456 (512) 479-1101 (fax)
Attorneys for Appellant Chris Bell
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
AUS-6115934-1 523389/1 INTERESTED PARTIES
APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
Chris Bell Trial Counsel Randall B. Wood Doug W. Ray Ray & Wood 2700 Bee Caves Rd. #200 Austin, Texas 78746
Counsel on Appeal Elizabeth G. Bloch Thomas H. Watkins Husch Blackwell LLP 111 Congress, Suite 1400 Austin, Texas 78701
APPELLEE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Republican Governors Association Trial Counsel and Counsel on Appeal Terry L. Scarborough Hance Scarborough, LLP 111 Congress, Suite 500 Austin, Texas 78701
i AUS-6115934-1 523389/1 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTERESTED PARTIES .......................................................................................... i TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii STATUTORY AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. iii ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES .....................................................................1 I. The fact that the amount of attorneys’ fees is reasonable does not mean there has been no abuse of discretion.. ..................................1 II. Section 253.151 of the Election Code is designed to deter violations and encourage private enforcement by candidates; the award of fees in this case will discourage private enforcement.. .........................................................................................2 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................4 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .........................................................................5 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................6
ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL CASES Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1 (1976) ..................................................................................................3
STATE CASES Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1996) ...............................................................................2 Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. 2000)....................................................................................2 Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 790 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.—Dallas), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 881 (Tex. 1990)).......................................................................2, 3 Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. 2011) ...............................................................................1
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.131 .......................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 4 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021 ......................................................................................4
iii ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES I. The fact that the amount of attorneys’ fees is reasonable does not mean there has been no abuse of discretion. The RGA asserts that “if the award of fees was reasonable then there has
been no abuse of discretion.”1 That is simply wrong. Bell has not challenged the
reasonableness of the amount of fees incurred by the RGA. The cases cited by the
RGA are not helpful to this case since the issue here is not whether the amount of
fees awarded was a reasonable amount incurred for this type of case.
Instead, Bell argues the award of any fees was an abuse of discretion as the
ruling did not take into consideration the underlying principles of the Election
Code and § 253.131. Since this section of the Election Code provides no guidance
regarding whether and when to award attorney’s fees, that “[g]uidance must come
instead from the broader purposes of the [statute], of which [that section] is a part.”
See, Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011) (analyzing what
principles must guide a trial court’s discretion to allow an extension to file an
expert affidavit under the Texas Medical Liability Act).
The RGA insists that consideration of the guiding principles requires reading
“additional language” into the statutes concerning the discretion of a trial court.2
But as stated above, the Texas Supreme Court has held a trial court’s exercise of
discretion must be made with reference to guiding principles underlying the statute 1 Appellee’s Brief p. 11. 2 Appellee’s Brief at 13.
1 AUS-6115934-1 523389/1 as a whole. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d at 666. Doing so does not require reading
additional words into the statute.
II. Section 253.151 of the Election Code is designed to deter violations and encourage private enforcement by candidates; the award of fees in this case will discourage private enforcement. The Texas Election Code was “designed to ‘deter violators and encourage
enforcement by candidates and others directly participating in the process, rather
than placing the entire enforcement burden on the government.” Osterberg v. Peca,
12 S.W.3d 31, 49 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Ragsdales v. Progressive Voters League,
790 S.W.2d 77, 84-85 (Tex. App.—Dallas), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other
grounds, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990)).
The RGA attempts to distract the Court’s attention from the purpose of
section 253.131 by only partially quoting one sentence in the Osterberg opinion—
“[t]he public interest is preventing campaign finance corruption and ‘[preventing
evasion of . . . important campaign finance provisions.” 3 This quote, however,
must be read in the context in which it was written, which emphasizes the
importance of private enforcement of the campaign finance statute. In Osterberg,
the Texas Supreme Court stated:
We disagree with the Osterbergs’ contention that section 253.131 does not advance a sufficient state interest.
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ACCEPTED 03-15-00078-CV 5673814 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/15/2015 11:38:21 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK
No. 03-15-00078-CV __________________________________________________________________ FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALSAUSTIN, TEXAS 6/15/2015 11:38:21 AM AUSTIN, TEXAS JEFFREY D. KYLE __________________________________________________________________ Clerk
CHRIS BELL, Appellant
v.
REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION Appellee __________________________________________________________________
On appeal from the 261st Judicial District Court, Travis County Honorable John Dietz Presiding __________________________________________________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT __________________________________________________________________
ELIZABETH G. BLOCH State Bar No. 02495500 Heidi.bloch@huschblackwell.com THOMAS H. WATKINS State Bar No. 20928000 Tom.watkins@huschblackwell.com Husch Blackwell LLP 111 Congress, Suite 1400 Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 472-5456 (512) 479-1101 (fax)
Attorneys for Appellant Chris Bell
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
AUS-6115934-1 523389/1 INTERESTED PARTIES
APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
Chris Bell Trial Counsel Randall B. Wood Doug W. Ray Ray & Wood 2700 Bee Caves Rd. #200 Austin, Texas 78746
Counsel on Appeal Elizabeth G. Bloch Thomas H. Watkins Husch Blackwell LLP 111 Congress, Suite 1400 Austin, Texas 78701
APPELLEE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Republican Governors Association Trial Counsel and Counsel on Appeal Terry L. Scarborough Hance Scarborough, LLP 111 Congress, Suite 500 Austin, Texas 78701
i AUS-6115934-1 523389/1 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTERESTED PARTIES .......................................................................................... i TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii STATUTORY AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. iii ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES .....................................................................1 I. The fact that the amount of attorneys’ fees is reasonable does not mean there has been no abuse of discretion.. ..................................1 II. Section 253.151 of the Election Code is designed to deter violations and encourage private enforcement by candidates; the award of fees in this case will discourage private enforcement.. .........................................................................................2 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................4 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .........................................................................5 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................6
ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL CASES Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1 (1976) ..................................................................................................3
STATE CASES Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1996) ...............................................................................2 Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. 2000)....................................................................................2 Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 790 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.—Dallas), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 881 (Tex. 1990)).......................................................................2, 3 Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. 2011) ...............................................................................1
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.131 .......................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 4 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021 ......................................................................................4
iii ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES I. The fact that the amount of attorneys’ fees is reasonable does not mean there has been no abuse of discretion. The RGA asserts that “if the award of fees was reasonable then there has
been no abuse of discretion.”1 That is simply wrong. Bell has not challenged the
reasonableness of the amount of fees incurred by the RGA. The cases cited by the
RGA are not helpful to this case since the issue here is not whether the amount of
fees awarded was a reasonable amount incurred for this type of case.
Instead, Bell argues the award of any fees was an abuse of discretion as the
ruling did not take into consideration the underlying principles of the Election
Code and § 253.131. Since this section of the Election Code provides no guidance
regarding whether and when to award attorney’s fees, that “[g]uidance must come
instead from the broader purposes of the [statute], of which [that section] is a part.”
See, Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011) (analyzing what
principles must guide a trial court’s discretion to allow an extension to file an
expert affidavit under the Texas Medical Liability Act).
The RGA insists that consideration of the guiding principles requires reading
“additional language” into the statutes concerning the discretion of a trial court.2
But as stated above, the Texas Supreme Court has held a trial court’s exercise of
discretion must be made with reference to guiding principles underlying the statute 1 Appellee’s Brief p. 11. 2 Appellee’s Brief at 13.
1 AUS-6115934-1 523389/1 as a whole. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d at 666. Doing so does not require reading
additional words into the statute.
II. Section 253.151 of the Election Code is designed to deter violations and encourage private enforcement by candidates; the award of fees in this case will discourage private enforcement. The Texas Election Code was “designed to ‘deter violators and encourage
enforcement by candidates and others directly participating in the process, rather
than placing the entire enforcement burden on the government.” Osterberg v. Peca,
12 S.W.3d 31, 49 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Ragsdales v. Progressive Voters League,
790 S.W.2d 77, 84-85 (Tex. App.—Dallas), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other
grounds, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990)).
The RGA attempts to distract the Court’s attention from the purpose of
section 253.131 by only partially quoting one sentence in the Osterberg opinion—
“[t]he public interest is preventing campaign finance corruption and ‘[preventing
evasion of . . . important campaign finance provisions.” 3 This quote, however,
must be read in the context in which it was written, which emphasizes the
importance of private enforcement of the campaign finance statute. In Osterberg,
the Texas Supreme Court stated:
We disagree with the Osterbergs’ contention that section 253.131 does not advance a sufficient state interest. When an individual breaks Texas’s campaign finance laws, this section allows a candidate to enforce those
3 Appellee’s Brief at 19.
2 laws by seeking civil damages as a penalty. We agree with the Fifth Court of Appeals, which recognized that section 253.131 is designed to “deter violators and encourage enforcement by candidates and others directly participating in the process, rather than placing the entire enforcement burden on the government.” 4 Because state resources for policing election laws are necessarily limited, in many cases [private enforcement under] section 253.131 is likely to provide the only viable means of enforcing reporting requirements. Preventing evasion of these important campaign finance provisions is a legitimate and substantial state interest. 5
Osterberg, 12 S.W.3d at 49.
If the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the RGA is allowed to stand, it
will have the counter effect of discouraging private enforcement and, therefore,
greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the likely “only viable means of enforcing
reporting requirements.”
CONCLUSION In sum, an award of fees to the RGA under the facts and circumstances of
this case would defeat the purpose of the statute by discouraging colorable claims
in the future. It would also further the private financial interest of one political
entity over the public’s interest in maintaining the integrity of the electoral process,
in violation of TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021. The only just, equitable, and
4 Citing Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 790 S.W.2d 77, 84-85 (Tex. App.—Dallas) (construing an earlier version of section 253.131), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 801 S.D.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990). 5 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68, 76 (1976) (preventing evasion of valid contribution limits is a substantial interest).
3 reasonable exercise of discretion in this case, and the only one that is consistent
with the applicable guiding rules and principles, is to deny the RGA its attorney’s
fees. The trial court abused its discretion by not abiding by the important guiding
principles underlying the private enforcement provisions of the Election Code.
Bell therefore requests that this Court reverse the judgment below and render
judgment that the RGA take nothing on its claim for attorney’s fees. In the
alternative, Bell requests that the case be remanded for the trial court to reconsider
its decision in light of, and being guided by, the important public policy concerns
of the Texas Election Code and section 253.131.
Respectfully submitted,
HUSCH BLACKWELL, L.L.P
BY:/s/ Elizabeth G. Bloch ELIZABETH G. BLOCH Texas Bar No. 02495500 Heidi.bloch@huschblackwell.com THOMAS H. WATKINS Texas Bar No. 20928000 tom.watkins@huschblackwell.com 111 Congress Avenue, Suite 1400 Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 472-5456 (512) 479-1101 (facsimile)
Attorneys for Appellant Chris Bell
4 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify that the foregoing document contains 863 words, according to the word count of the computer program used to prepare it, in compliance with Rule 9.4(i)(2).
/s/ Elizabeth G. Bloch Elizabeth G. Bloch
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served upon the following counsel of record via electronic filing and/or facsimile on the 15th day of June, 2015:
Terry L. Scarborough Hance Scarborough, LLP 111 Congress, Suite 500 Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 482-6891 (facsimile)
/s/ Elizabeth G. Bloch Elizabeth G. Bloch