Choratch v. Finch

310 F. Supp. 1202, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12119
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 13, 1970
DocketCiv. A. No. 69-347
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 310 F. Supp. 1202 (Choratch v. Finch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Choratch v. Finch, 310 F. Supp. 1202, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12119 (W.D. Pa. 1970).

Opinion

[1204]*1204OPINION

GOURLEY, Senior District Judge.

This is an action under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 405(g), to review a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The final decision of the Secretary was rendered by the Appeals Council on January 22, 1969. This final decision holds that plaintiff is not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits based on his application filed February 15, 1967.

The immediate matter before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the defendant and it is argued and presented through briefs that the Court should grant summary judgment in behalf of the plaintiff. Consistent with well reasoned Court decisions, the Court will consider the issues as if each of the parties had presented a Motion for Summary Judgment. Hennessey v. Federal Sec. Adm’r., 88 F.Supp. 664 (D.C.Conn.1949); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Allstate Ins. Co., 143 F.Supp. 213 (D.C.Mich.1956); United States v. Franklin Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n., 140 F.Supp. 286 (D.C.Pa.1956); American Auto Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 108 F.Supp. 221, aff. 228 F.2d 622 (D.C.Pa.1952); Boeing Co. v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America (UAW; AFL-CIO), 234 F.Supp. 404 (D.C.Pa.1964).

The Court has considered the pleadings, the full and complete records, the argument, briefs of counsel and the references to law set forth therein.

The only issue before the Court is whether the final decision of the Secretary is supported by substantial evidence.

The burden of proof in this action is on the plaintiff to show that he has impairments provable by clinical findings, diagnoses, examination, tests, or other means either subjective or objective, which are of such severity that he was unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity on or before March 31, 1966.

To qualify for disability insurance benefits and a period of disability under Sections 223 and 216(i) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423 and 416(i), an individual must meet the insured status requirements of these sections, be under age 65, file an application for disability insurance benefits and a period of disability, and be under a “disability” as defined in the Act.

The term “disability” is defined in Section 223 to mean:

“(d) (1) * * *
“(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continous period of not less than 12 months; * * *
“(B) * * *
“(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) (A) — 1
“(A) an individual * * * shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy ex[1205]*1205ists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), ‘work which exists in the national economy’ means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.
“(B) * * *
“(3) For purposes of this subsection, a ‘physical or mental impairment’ is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. “(4) * * *
“(5) An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Secretary may require.”

For purposes of establishing a period of disability under Section 216(i) of the Social Security Act, as amended, the same disability provisions as contained in Section 223(d) (1) (A), (2) (A), (3) and (5) of the Act apply.

Plaintiff last meets the special insured status requirements of the Act on March 31, 1966. Therefore, plaintiff must establish that his disability began on or before that date. In other words, this is the critical and only date involved in determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings and conclusions of the Secretary.

It is not disputed that in the summer of 1960 the United States Steel Company discontinued its operations in Donoro, Pennsylvania, for economic reasons, and he was laid off. The claimant testified that he collected unemployment compensation benefits for one year, and then was on public assistance for six months, until October 1962 when he was granted a retirement pension of $140 a month by the United States Steel Company. The claimant testified that his pension was subsequently increased, and that he was currently receiving $155 a month on his retirement pension. The claimant was advised in 1967 by the United States Steel Company to apply for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act since he would then be eligible for larger total benefits even though his retirement pension from the United States Steel Company would be somewhat decreased.

The plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits on February 15, 1967, alleging that he became unable to work on January 3, 1966, at age 56. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration by the Bureau of Disability Insurance of the Social Security Administration, after the Pennsylvania State Agency, upon evaluation of the evidence by physicians and disability examiners had found that the plaintiff was not under a disability. The hearing examiner, before whom the plaintiff, his wife, and a vocational expert appeared, considered the case de novo, and on August 30, 1968, found that the plaintiff was not under a disability.

The plaintiff has not worked since January 3, 1966. His chief complaint was that he experienced pain all over his body. The earnings requirement for disability purposes expired on March 31. 1966.

When denying the case, the hearing examiner ruled that the plaintiff’s impairments were not disabling as of March 31, 1966, when his disability insurance status expired. On this basis, he concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to either a period of disability or to disability insurance benefits.

Plaintiff was born on April 3, 1910 and quit school while in the eighth grade. He worked in the milk dairy for three years and subsequently for thirty-three years in a steel mill at various jobs. He performed odd jobs as late as 1963.

It must be kept in mind at all times that the criteria date in this proceeding is March 31, 1966, which is the time that [1206]*1206the plaintiff’s eligibility or status for benefits expired.

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Related

Horner v. Richardson
331 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1971)

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Bluebook (online)
310 F. Supp. 1202, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/choratch-v-finch-pawd-1970.