Choi v. Korea First Bank

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Choi v. Korea First Bank

244 A.D.2d 236, 664 N.Y.S.2d 437, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11724

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 20, 1997

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 244 A.D.2d 236 (Choi v. Korea First Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Choi v. Korea First Bank, 244 A.D.2d 236, 664 N.Y.S.2d 437, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11724 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered June 21, 1996, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

[237]*237The documentary evidence establishes that the second, so-called Disputed Note was the obligation of Manhattan, not Kornew, which defendant could properly enforce by foreclosing on the Manhattan mortgage containing a “dragnet clause” making it applicable to future advances (State Bank v Fioravanti, 51 NY2d 638, 645). Under these circumstances, even assuming that defendant altered the second mortgage to include a clause subordinating it to the first mortgage, such alteration did not increase plaintiffs’ liability and was therefore immaterial (see, Phalanx Corp. v Philite Radiant, 19 AD2d 515; Megaris Furs v Gimbel Bros., 172 AD2d 209, 212-213). Nor do plaintiffs’ allegations show that defendant’s alleged deceptive acts and practices were of a recurring nature and harmful to the public at large, necessary to their claim under General Business Law § 349 (see, United Knitwear Co. v North Sea Ins. Co., 203 AD2d 358). We have considered plaintiffs’ other arguments and find them to be without merit. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Milonas, Ellerin, Rubin and Tom, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered June 21, 1996, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

[237]*237The documentary evidence establishes that the second, so-called Disputed Note was the obligation of Manhattan, not Kornew, which defendant could properly enforce by foreclosing on the Manhattan mortgage containing a “dragnet clause” making it applicable to future advances (State Bank v Fioravanti, 51 NY2d 638, 645). Under these circumstances, even assuming that defendant altered the second mortgage to include a clause subordinating it to the first mortgage, such alteration did not increase plaintiffs’ liability and was therefore immaterial (see, Phalanx Corp. v Philite Radiant, 19 AD2d 515; Megaris Furs v Gimbel Bros., 172 AD2d 209, 212-213). Nor do plaintiffs’ allegations show that defendant’s alleged deceptive acts and practices were of a recurring nature and harmful to the public at large, necessary to their claim under General Business Law § 349 (see, United Knitwear Co. v North Sea Ins. Co., 203 AD2d 358). We have considered plaintiffs’ other arguments and find them to be without merit. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Milonas, Ellerin, Rubin and Tom, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

244 A.D.2d 236, 664 N.Y.S.2d 437, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11724, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/choi-v-korea-first-bank-nyappdiv-1997.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack