Chloe Paige Clark v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: May 21, 2025
• Docket: 24-0445
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0445 Filed May 21, 2025

CHLOE PAIGE CLARK, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. Grady,

Judge.

An applicant appeals the denial of postconviction relief from her simple-

misdemeanor conviction for fifth-degree criminal mischief. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and

Sandy, JJ. 2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Chloe Clark was stopped riding in her ex-boyfriend’s car after he reported

it—and other items taken from his home—stolen in March 2020. She was charged

with two class “D” felonies—third-degree burglary and second-degree theft—and

a simple misdemeanor—fifth-degree criminal mischief. And she eventually

pleaded guilty to only fifth-degree criminal mischief and received a fine-only

sentence. As part of the plea agreement, the two felony charges were dismissed.

After sentencing, Clark promptly paid her fines and restitution. And she did

not appeal her conviction. Then about five months later—and continuing over the

next year—she filed a series of requests to expunge her record that were all denied

by the district court. As she eventually testified, she “applied at multiple jobs and

they said they won’t hire someone with vandalism.”

So she then brought this petition for postconviction relief alleging that she

received ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel failed to ensure

her plea to the criminal-mischief charge was knowing and voluntary.1 At the

postconviction-relief trial, she testified that her counsel told her she was pleading

guilty to “littering” and that she did not understand the actual criminal-mischief

charge.2 Her mother testified similarly. But her counsel testified to the contrary—

that he did not tell her she was pleading guilty to littering or even that criminal

1 Clark also unsuccessfully claimed that she was actually innocent of fifth-degree

criminal mischief. But she does not appeal the denial of that claim. 2 Criminal mischief is defined as “[a]ny damage, defacing, alteration, or destruction

of property . . . when done intentionally by one who has no right to so act.” Iowa Code § 716.1 (2020). Fifth-degree criminal mischief is the catch-all level of the offense for all conduct that “is not criminal mischief in the first degree, second degree, third degree, or fourth degree,” which is generally when the conduct causes damages of $300 or less. Id. § 716.6(2); see also id. § 716.6(1)(a)(1). 3

mischief was “along the lines of littering or something like that.” He also testified

that he explained the criminal mischief charge, did not recall her expressing any

concerns, and believed that she understood the guilty plea. The district court found

that Clark failed to prove her counsel “violated any fundamental duty toward Clark

in his representation of her,” noting the conflicting testimony and Clark’s initial

satisfaction with the resolution of the case.

Criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to assistance of counsel.

See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. We give force to that

constitutional demand by requiring counsel to provide effective assistance. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). And criminal defendants who

believe their defense counsel fell below the constitutional floor may petition for

postconviction relief. See Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(a) (2023). To prove ineffective

assistance, a defendant must show both that “(1) counsel failed to perform an

essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted.” State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 641

(Iowa 2009). We review the postconviction court’s ruling on ineffective-assistance

issues de novo. Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015).

Because the failure to prove either prong is fatal, we can affirm a denial of

an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on either prong. See id. at 870.

We elect to focus on the prejudice prong. “In the context of a guilty plea, an

applicant for postconviction relief must prove a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s alleged errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial.” Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 641 (cleaned up). “The

probability of a different result must be sufficient to undermine confidence in the 4

outcome.” Id. (cleaned up). And the applicant “must proffer more than his or her

own subjective, self-serving testimony.” Dempsey, 860 N.W.2d at 869.

Clark has failed to establish prejudice here. Her counsel negotiated a plea

deal that dismissed two felony charges—exposing her to a total prison sentence

of ten years and a felony criminal record—in return for plea to a simple

misdemeanor. She claims her counsel told her that the simple misdemeanor was

a littering offense and that she would not have accepted the plea deal if she had

understood that she was pleading to fifth-degree criminal mischief, which she

describes as vandalism. But other than the self-serving testimony of Clark and her

mother, we see no other corroborating evidence to support this claim.

For starters, all written records in Clark’s criminal case accurately recount

her fifth-degree-criminal-mischief charge and conviction and lack any reference to

littering. Clark’s plea agreement was quite favorable, and we see no reasonable

probability that Clark would have rejected the agreement and insisted on going to

trial on all three offenses if she had better understood the precise simple

misdemeanor to which she was pleading guilty. See Iowa Code § 455B.364

(making littering a simple misdemeanor). What’s more, Clark’s conduct for the first

five months after her sentencing shows satisfaction with her guilty plea and

counsel’s assistance rather than any concern. See Dempsey, 860 N.W.2d at 873

(looking to the timing of the assertion of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim

to assess whether counsel’s conduct was actually the cause of the guilty-plea

decision). And it was only once she began to experience some related adverse

consequences from how potential employers viewed her conviction that her

concerns arose. This record does not meet Clark’s burden to prove prejudice. 5

On appeal, Clark argues that her pursuit of this postconviction relief

proceeding—and willingness to “risk[] undoing her plea bargain if she

succeeded”—establishes prejudice. But accepting the mere assertion of an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as proof of prejudice in the guilty-plea

context would eviscerate that requirement. She also tries to avoid the negative

inference we have drawn about her lack of appeal by contending she asked her

attorney to appeal and he refused. But given the attorney’s contrary credible

testimony, we find that further self-serving testimony not convincing.

Because Clark failed to prove a reasonable probability that she would not

have pleaded guilty but for her counsel’s alleged errors, her ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel claims fails. The district court correctly denied her application for relief.

AFFIRMED.