Chittick v. Thompson Hill Development Corp.

230 A.D. 410, 245 N.Y.S. 71
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedOctober 10, 1930
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 230 A.D. 410 (Chittick v. Thompson Hill Development Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chittick v. Thompson Hill Development Corp., 230 A.D. 410, 245 N.Y.S. 71 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

Rich, J.

Two actions are brought for the foreclosure of two $7,500 second mortgages made by defendant Thompson Hill Development Corporation to defendant Moore & Patience, Inc., recorded December 28, 1925, covering premises 4732 and 4734 Packard street, Woodside, Queens county, N. Y., assigned by Moore & Patience, Inc., to Hunterspoint Lumber & Supply Company, Inc., and by it assigned to plaintiff; and to set aside an order in a lost mortgage proceeding which discharged plaintiff’s mortgages.

John W. Moore and Stanley W. Moore (father and son) were sole stockholders, officers and directors of the defendant corporations, Thompson Hill Development Corporation and Moore & Patience, Inc. Thompson Hill Development Corporation, which [412]*412held, the legal title to the premises in suit, employed Moore & Patience, Inc., as contractor, to construct certain buildings at Woodside, N. Y. The Hunterspoint Lumber & Supply Company, Inc., sold lumber to Moore & Patience, Inc., which was used in the construction of the buildings. Moore & Patience, Inc., on October 28, 1925, was indebted to the lumber company for $12,000. The sales of lumber were all made by plaintiff, general manager of the lumber company, and the purchases by John W. Moore. It is testified that Mr. Moore at this time was informed by plaintiff that unless payment of the lumber company’s claim was secured, a lien would be filed. An agreement was entered into December 28, 1925, between the lumber company, Moore & Patience, Inc., John W. Moore and Stanley W. Moore. For its faithful performance, collateral security in the form of the two mortgages sought to be foreclosed were assigned to the lumber company by instruments dated December 28, 1925, but not recorded until May 11, 1927. This agreement, among other things, and so far as is pertinent to the questions presented by this appeal, provided for the payment of the lumber company’s claim in installments, and in the event of default, for the sale of the mortgages upon notice. Default having been made in payment, the lumber company served the notice provided by the agreement, and claims it sold the mortgages in suit to plaintiff on August 29, 1927 (although the assignment is dated September 7,1927, and does not appear to have been recorded). In the meantime, Thompson Hill Development Corporation, claiming to be the owner of the property affected by the mortgages, verified a petition alleging that the indebtedness had been paid, the mortgages satisfied but lost, and prayed for an order dispensing with their production and for their discharge, which order was entered on July 8, 1927.

Moore & Patience, Inc., after the sale of the securities to plaintiff, made a tender of the indebtedness to the lumber company, which, was rejected. • It thereafter instituted an action in the Supreme Court of New York county, in which it sought judgment directing the lumber company and plaintiff to return the mortgages upon the ground that the lien had been destroyed by the rejection of the tender. It was found by the court in that action that the tender was nugatory, that plaintiff obtained a good, valid and indefeasible title to the mortgages, the judgment so determined, and the complaint was dismissed on the merits.

The Thompson Hill Development Corporation (between the time of the assignment to plaintiff’s assignor, December 28, 1925, and the date of recording of the assignments, May 11, 1927) executed two mortgages, one on June 25, 1926, and the other on June 28, 1926, [413]*413each for $7,500, covering the premises in suit, one to defendants Chopp and Meiselman and the other to defendant Altman. Both mortgages were recorded June 30,1926. The gentleman who acted for the title company upon the closing testified that satisfactions of the mortgages in suit, executed by Moore & Patience, Inc., were delivered with two bonds, the absence of the original mortgages being explained by the Moores by the statement that they had not been returned from record. He testified that, relying upon their statements, of the truth of which he had no knowledge, he closed the title. The papers, he said, were forwarded to the company’s Jamaica office, where the application for the discharge of the mortgages was not prepared for almost a year thereafter. The order discharging the mortgages was made upon these papers and upon the authority of an erroneous register’s search of June 23, 1927, which failed to show the assignment of plaintiff’s assignor, recorded May 11, 1927. Another and blanket mortgage for $12,000 was executed on July 1, 1927, by the Thompson Hill Development Corporation to the defendant Rosenson, also covering the premises in suit, but not recorded until July 9,1927. All of these subsequent mortgagees paid value, with no knowledge that the mortgages in suit were improperly satisfied of record.

The learned Special Term, upon the facts presented, declined to set aside the order discharging the mortgages, or to decree their foreclosure. The court proceeded upon the assumption that the mortgages were made to defraud other creditors, and this is disclosed by an examination of the case cited by the court. (Clarke v. Selben Apartments, Inc., 225 App. Div. 290.) That question, however, was not presented at the trial and was disposed of by the judgment in the New York county action, adjudging that plaintiff had good title to the mortgages in suit. The question presented by plaintiff’s appeal from the judgment dismissing his complaint, under the circumstances, resolves itself into an adjustment of the equities between the plaintiff and the subsequent mortgagees.

The assignment of plaintiff’s assignor, it will be recalled, was not of record until May 11, 1927, while the mortgages of the defendants Chopp and Meiselman and Rose Altman were of record June 30, 1926. The discharge by satisfaction, under the circumstances, however invalid as between the original parties, was good as to these mortgagees. Defendant Rosenson’s mortgage, however, was not recorded until July 9, 1927, and as to her the prior record of the assignment of plaintiff’s' assignor was protection to plaintiff both against a subsequent assignment and an unauthorized discharge. (Viele v. Judson, 82 N. Y. 33; Larned v. Donovan, 155 id. 341). The reason lies in the fact that the recorded assignment of plain[414]*414tiff’s assignor was constructive notice of the lumber company’s rights as against any act of the mortgagee, Moore & Patience, Inc., affecting the mortgage assigned. The discharge of the mortgages by Moore & Patience, Inc., having been perpetrated by fraud, or its equivalent, reckless indifference to the truth, without the assignee’s knowledge and after the recording of its assignment on May 11, 1927, it was not required to reinstate the record in order to protect itself against estoppel. (Viele v. Judson, supra.) Indexing is no part of the record, and the omission of the register to index properly a mortgage or assignment cannot deprive a mortgagee or assignee of the right of priority given by statute. (Real Prop. Law, § 291; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Dake, 87 N. Y. 257.) The defendant Rosenson, under the circumstances, was not entitled to rely upon an erroneous register’s search, nor the satisfactions in the title company’s hands, because the record of plaintiff’s assignment was notice to her that Moore & Patience, Inc., the mortgagee, had no right or authority to affect the mortgages. (Viele v. Judson, supra.)

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Chittick v. Thompson Hill Development Corp.
232 A.D. 818 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1931)

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230 A.D. 410, 245 N.Y.S. 71, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chittick-v-thompson-hill-development-corp-nyappdiv-1930.