Chism v. Payne

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedOctober 3, 2023
Docket4:22-cv-01106
StatusUnknown

This text of Chism v. Payne (Chism v. Payne) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chism v. Payne, (E.D. Ark. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS CENTRAL DIVISION

NATHAN H. CHISM PLAINTIFF ADC #550129

v. No: 4:22-cv-01106-PSH

DEXTER PAYNE, et al. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Nathan H. Chism filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 15, 2022, while incarcerated at the Arkansas Division of Correction’s Varner Unit (Doc. No. 2). The Court granted Chism’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 3) and directed service on the defendants (Doc. No. 5). Chism alleged that defendants Sergeant Tashalia Dunlap, Corporal Marquis Taylor, and Corporal Latrell White confiscated certain personal property, including some religious materials, at the direction of Lieutenant Jonathon Martin and Major Joseph Mahoney during a cell search on June 9, 2022. He further claimed that defendants Dexter Payne, James Gibson, and Joseph Mahoney were made aware of these violations through the grievance process and failed to take corrective action. After screening Chism’s complaint, the Court allowed Chism’s First Amendment free exercise, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),1 and state law conversion claims to proceed and dismissed his remaining claims for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Doc. Nos. 4 & 21. His claims against a Doe defendant were also dismissed for lack of service. See Doc. No. 21.

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment, a brief in support, and a statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. Nos. 22-24) filed by the defendants, claiming that Chism did not exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to his First Amendment free exercise and RLUIPA claims before he filed this

lawsuit. Chism filed a response, brief in support, and a statement of disputed facts (Doc. No. 33-35). He has also filed a motion to compel the defendants to return his property to him (Doc. No. 36). For the reasons described below, the defendants’

motion for summary judgment is granted. Chism’s motion to compel is denied as moot.

1 RLUIPA provides in part, “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution,” unless the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest,” and does so by “the least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). “Congress enacted RLUIPA and its sister statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., ‘in order to provide very broad protection for religious liberty.’” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014)). II. Legal Standard Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but instead must demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann

v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations

omitted). An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must be supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or

other materials . . .”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact is disputed or undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.

Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude summary judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th

Cir. 2010). III. Analysis Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Chism’s First Amendment free exercise and RLUIPA claims because he failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies with respect to those claims before he filed this lawsuit. See Doc. No. 23. In support of their motions, the defendants submitted: the declaration of Terri Grigsby-Brown, the ADC’s Inmate Grievance Supervisor (Doc. No. 22-1);

the ADC’s grievance policy (Doc. No. 22-2); a copy of Chism’s grievance history (Doc. No. 22-3); a copy of Grievance VSM22-01269 (Doc. No. 22-4); a copy of Grievance VSM22-01270 (Doc. No. 22-5); a copy of VSM22-01271 (Doc. No. 22- 6); and a copy of VSM22-02195 (Doc. No. 28-7).

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires an inmate to exhaust prison grievance procedures before filing suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C.

§1997e(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007); Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 2014). Exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 211; Hammett v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 2012). “[T]he PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

The PLRA does not prescribe the manner in which exhaustion occurs. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 218. It merely requires compliance with prison grievance procedures to properly exhaust. See id.

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Related

City of Boerne v. Flores
521 U.S. 507 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Sitzes v. City of West Memphis Arkansas
606 F.3d 461 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Nidal Othman v. City of Country Club Hills
671 F.3d 672 (Eighth Circuit, 2012)
Mark Hammett v. J. Cofield
681 F.3d 945 (Eighth Circuit, 2012)
Mann v. Yarnell
497 F.3d 822 (Eighth Circuit, 2007)
Roy Burns v. Edward Eaton
752 F.3d 1136 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Avery D. Williams v. Larry Norris
11 F. App'x 656 (Eighth Circuit, 2001)

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Chism v. Payne, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chism-v-payne-ared-2023.