Chislett v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: September 25, 2025
• Docket: 24-972
• Status: Published

Opinion

24-972-cv Chislett v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2024

Argued: April 4, 2025 Decided: September 25, 2025

No. 24-972-cv ______________________________________

LESLIE CHISLETT, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, RICHARD CARRANZA AS CHANCELLOR OF NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, INDIVIDUALLY, Defendants-Appellees.

______________________________________

Before: LEVAL, BIANCO, and NARDINI, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Leslie Chislett appeals from the grant of summary judgment by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Rochon, J.) in favor of Defendants New York City Department of Education and Richard Carranza. Chislett, who is Caucasian, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of racial discrimination under three theories: (1) she was demoted pursuant to a municipal policy that made race a determinative factor in employment decisions; (2) she suffered a hostile work environment fostered by mandatory implicit bias trainings; and (3) she was constructively discharged. The district court rejected all three theories, largely on the basis that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a municipal policy linked to the demotion, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. We conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s demotion and constructive discharge claims. However, we hold that genuine disputes of material fact precluded the grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. We therefore AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND.

BRIAN HELLER (Davida S. Perry, on the brief), Schwartz Perry & Heller LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

LAUREN L. O’BRIEN (Richard Dearing and Jamison Davies, on the brief), for Muriel Goode-Trufant, Acting Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.

LEVAL, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Leslie Chislett appeals from the grant of summary judgment by

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Rochon,

J.) in favor of Defendants New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) and

Richard Carranza (collectively, “Defendants”). Chislett, who is Caucasian,

brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of racial discrimination based on three theories:

(1) she was demoted pursuant to a municipal policy that made race a

determinative factor in employment decisions; (2) she suffered a hostile work

environment fostered by mandatory implicit bias trainings; and (3) she was

constructively discharged. The district court rejected all three theories, largely on

2 the basis that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a municipal policy

linked to the demotion, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge.

We conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s demotion and constructive discharge claims. However,

we hold that genuine disputes of material fact precluded the grant of summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. We therefore AFFIRM

in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND.

BACKGROUND

I. Facts

As required in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, although

Defendants dispute much of the evidence summarized below, we construe the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, here Chislett.

Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010).

Chislett is an educator who worked at the DOE. In 2017, she was asked to

serve as the Executive Director of the “AP for All” program, an initiative of

former Mayor Bill de Blasio to increase participation in Advance Placement

3 courses by students in “underserved communities.” App’x at 1421. “AP for All”

was housed in the DOE’s Office of Equity & Access (“OEA”).

In her role, Chislett supervised fifteen employees and achieved success in

expanding access to AP courses. However, there was early racial tension on her

team. One subordinate, Akua Adefope, whom Plaintiff had criticized for “poor

performance,” reported her to the DOE’s Office of Equal Opportunity and

Diversity Management (“OEO”) and accused her of “‘microaggressions’ toward

people of color, such as ignoring, dismissing, avoiding, interrupting, and

belittling them.” App’x at 64–65; App’x at 413. The OEO found that although

Chislett’s comments did not rise to the level of discrimination, some of her

statements were “inappropriate.” App’x at 75. Several of Chislett’s subordinates

also denounced her for allegedly “holding employees of color back,” and when

she objected, she was “accused” of being “‘white and fragile.’” App’x at 145.

Chislett complained to the head of the OEA but was “scolded.” App’x at 145.

According to Chislett, racial conflict escalated when de Blasio selected

Carranza as Chancellor of the DOE in 2018. Carranza implemented an “equity

agenda” to tackle racial and economic disparities among students in their access

4 to privileges within the school system. App’x at 201. At the time, Carranza

stressed the importance of his equity agenda, reportedly stating: “If you draw a

paycheck from the DOE, you will either get on board with my equity platform or

leave.” App’x at 2077.

Both de Blasio and Carranza were intent on promoting racial diversity

within the DOE. To this point, de Blasio was reportedly “fixated” on the

diversity of candidates, and Carranza declared there was “no daylight” between

their approaches. App’x at 1306; App’x at 201. After becoming Chancellor,

Carranza created nine Executive Superintendent roles. Seven of the nine roles

were filled by Black employees. Additionally, Meisha Ross-Porter, one of the

new Executive Superintendents and the person de Blasio later selected to succeed

Carranza as Chancellor, declared: “When I am selecting principals, teachers, or

leaders—after we make the list, we look at it and we count: how many women,

how many people of color, and why. . . . I look at the makeup, and I literally

count—and it’s OK for us to do that.” App’x at 2060.

5 During his time as Chancellor, Carranza mandated implicit bias trainings

among DOE staff. 1 The OEA was allocated $23 million and hired approximately

twenty staffers to scale these trainings, which were “part and parcel” and a

“‘cornerstone’” of Carranza’s equity agenda. App’x at 1688; App’x at 2066. Both

DOE staff and outside vendors facilitated implicit bias workshops. As a member

of the OEA, Chislett was required to participate in the trainings, which she

claims “exacerbated the already racially-charged workplace.” Appellant’s Br. at

13. Some of the trainings Chislett attended were part of the DOE’s formal

implicit bias training initiative. Some were sponsored by specific DOE

departments. 2

During the first bias training on May 4, 2018, the instructor told

participants that “white colleagues must take a step back and yield to colleagues

1Bias trainings predated Carranza’s tenure as Chancellor. However, Chislett reported that while aspects of those trainings pre-Carranza made her “uncomfortable,” “they were really about equity” and “seemed more generic.” App’x at 375. 2 At oral argument, counsel for Defendants stated: “I don’t think it’s always entirely clear which trainings were technically implicit bias trainings versus internally planned trainings that were separate from the implicit bias trainings . . . .” Oral Arg. Audio Recording at 19:30–19:42.

6 of color” and “recognize that values of [w]hite culture are supremacist.” App’x at

137–38. At the session, LaShawn Robinson, who led the OEA and would soon be

promoted to Deputy Chancellor, told an employee, “We’ve all taken on

whiteness.” App’x at 138. The training also included PowerPoint slides that

described the traits of “internalized white superiority,” including

“individualism;” “denial;” “dominating space;” and “intellectualization.” App’x

at 138.

On May 10, 2018, OEA employees attended an overnight retreat that

included additional training. Speakers stated that “white culture’s values” are

“homogenous and supremacist” as well as that the “Protestant work ethic” and

“devotion to the written word” are examples of “white supremacy.” App’x at

138. Once again, PowerPoint slides listed values associated with “white

supremacy culture,” including “Perfectionism;” “Sense of Urgency;”

“Paternalism;” “Defensiveness;” “Individualism;” “Either/or thinking;”

“Objectivity;” and “Power Hoarding.” App’x at 216; see also App’x at 139. During

a Q&A session, instructors told Chislett that her “interest in excellence was

perfectionism and consistent with white supremacy.” App’x at 138–39.

7 At another mandatory training on June 21, 2018, instructors wrote aspects

of “white culture” on four posters, including “Entitlement – access to

everything;” “Need to feel validated in feelings;” and “Privilege to establish

norms/‘set the bar.’” App’x at 141; App’x at 218. Another poster was labeled,

“The Haves . . . of white culture,” and included traits such as “Individualistic;”

“Privilege;” “Money;” and “Single Identity.” App’x at 221. Dr. Ruby Ababio-

Fernandez, who developed the implicit bias initiative and became the OEA’s

Senior Executive Director, declared: “There is white toxicity in the air, and we all

breathe it in.” App’x at 141. Participants were instructed to answer questions

about themselves that would grade them on a scale of 0 to 130 “according to

[their] white privilege like being able to buy products for [their] hair type at a

typical drug store” and were physically “lined up to reveal the dividing ‘color

line of privileges that favored whites.’” App’x at 141.

On day two of the training, participants were asked to break into small

groups and list “white values” on a poster. App’x at 142. Chislett felt

uncomfortable and opted not to participate. In response, another participant told

Chislett that she was a “horrible person” who “did not deserve to be working

8 with children in New York City.” App’x at 142. Additionally, one of the

facilitators told participants that if they did not learn to stand up to “people like

[Chislett] who disagree with these views about white supremacist values,

children’s lives would be at stake.” App’x at 142. In no instance did a supervisor

intervene.

After the implicit bias trainings, racial tensions simmered. On September

17, 2018, when Chislett asked a subordinate, Deonca Renee, why she was late to a

meeting that she was supposed to help lead, Renee purportedly answered that

Chislett was making a “race-based judgment” and could “not be trusted.” App’x

at 146. In a meeting the following week, Renee referred to the previous incident

and said to Chislett: “How dare you approach me out of your white privilege!”

App’x at 146. Chislett complained to her supervisors but did not receive support.

In a meeting on November 6, 2018, Chislett’s subordinate Adefope told her that

she was “racist.” App’x at 147. Around the same time, Adefope and Renee told

Chislett that “race is at the center of every conversation” they had with her.

App’x at 147. At one point, Chislett told her team that “this is becoming almost

unbearable for me because there is increasing hostility.” App’x at 452. In

9 response, Renee stated: “How dare you use the word unbearable, there is black

people dying in the street, you don’t have the right to use that term. You’re

coming from the position of white privilege and white supremacy.” App’x at 452.

Chislett again complained, but her supervisors did not intervene.

Content from the trainings also spilled over into workplace interactions.

OEA employees directed terminology from the trainings at Chislett, for example

telling her that she was “socialized as a white person to be defensive.” App’x at

445. In conversations, Chislett’s subordinates frequently spoke of the

stereotypical “presumed values” of Caucasians, a perception frequently

expressed in the training sessions. App’x at 470.

OEA employees were expected to have racial conversations in group

settings approximately once a month. At an internal meeting on September 24,

2018, Shannon Maltovsky, Senior Director of Anti-Bias and School Support,

shared PowerPoint slides listing ground rules for the office as they began to have

“more conversations about race.” App’x at 450. Chislett described the rules as

explaining that “whites who wanted to withdraw or not participate in order to

10 be safe were demonstrating white fragility, and it was no longer [the] right [of

white people] to be safe in the workplace.” App’x at 450.

Several of Chislett’s Caucasian coworkers began to perceive the

environment as hostile. One employee repeatedly stated that the workplace

conduct was “unlawful.” App’x at 453. In a declaration, another employee

described the “open hostility against Caucasian employees within the ranks of

the DOE.” App’x at 2091. Chislett and a coworker tried to meet with Ababio-

Fernandez to discuss their concerns. However, Ababio-Fernandez “invited the

very individuals” Chislett and her colleague hoped to discuss. App’x at 147.

On November 30, 2018, Ababio-Fernandez assigned Chislett a leadership

coach, OEA Senior Strategy and Policy Advisor Courtney Winkfield, who is also

Caucasian. Winkfield offered Chislett insight into “what it means to be a white

leader leading staff members of color.” App’x at 1867. During a training on

February 12, 2019, the facilitator told participants:

It’s going to feel a little bit more uncomfortable when we get to inclusion because I’m going to ask you to talk about your power and your privilege. You are going to have to name that you have privilege. And then I’m going to ask you, while naming your privilege, to acknowledge that you may have to step back from

11 some things, and that’s not going to feel good. And you’re probably going to question your job security. You’re probably going to wonder how you feel you belong right now.

App’x at 150 (emphasis added).

DOE employees made racist statements about a colleague of partially

white parentage. In February 2019, Chislett heard Renee use racialized

sentiments when discussing a “white adjacent” colleague “from a mixed race

family” who “adopted [B]lack daughters” and married “a white man.” App’x at

471–72. After the colleague attempted to monitor Renee’s productivity, Renee

called her “a slave master,” and another employee labeled her “a white dominant

leader.” App’x at 472. Chislett complained about what she heard to Ababio-

Fernandez and the Senior Director of Operations Shahzad Kazi, but they did not

address her complaints.

On March 20, 2019, Ababio-Fernandez and Winkfield removed Chislett’s

supervisory responsibilities although her title and pay remained the same. They

told Chislett that the team needed “time to heal.” App’x at 152. The decision was

allegedly based on feedback from Chislett’s team and other employees who

reported that Chislett was an ineffective leader who caused “chaos” and “a

12 negative work environment.” App’x at 1896. Within two days, many of Chislett’s

duties were transferred to Adefope, her subordinate.

On April 3, 2019, Chislett complained to Ababio-Fernandez and Winkfield

that meetings had become racially divisive. Kazi then stated: “I too am concerned

about the tone of these conversations about race during team meetings. We need

to make sure that we do not violate [the] Chancellor’s Regulations or Union

policy during OEA trainings.” App’x at 106. In response, OEA Executive Director

of Educational Equity, Anti-Bias and Diversity Paul Forbes declared: “I am not

concerned . . . because this Chancellor truly has our back.” App’x at 153.

On April 11, 2019, Chislett retained legal counsel who contacted the DOE

about her “unanswered complaints regarding the hostile work environment she

was forced to endure and the discriminatory manner in which . . . her role had

been diminished . . . .” App’x at 106. The DOE “did not take any steps to address

Chislett’s complaint.” App’x at 107.

On April 16, 2019, Winkfield announced that the “AP for All” team would

engage in eight weeks of “racial literacy training.” App’x at 154. Several weeks

later, Chislett complained to Winkfield about a particular assigned reading,

13 which she felt “stereotyped Caucasians.” App’x at 154. Chislett also reported that

she had to “endure a colleague’s offensive race-based accusations” during the

trainings that her “lack of vulnerability in conversations was because [she was]

white.” App’x at 154. Winkfield told Chislett that it was her “responsibility to ask

people to stay in protocol” and stated that the “trainings [were] not going to

change.” App’x at 154.

Around this time, several Caucasian DOE employees contacted the New

York Post about Carranza’s equity agenda. A reporter reached out to Chislett,

who spoke anonymously about the implicit bias trainings. However, Chislett’s

supervisors were aware that she had spoken to the press because the New York

Post reached out to the DOE to confirm her title. On May 18, 2019, the New York

Post published an article titled “Schools Chancellor Richard Carranza accused of

demoting admins because they were white.” App’x at 259–62. Two days later,

the New York Post published another article titled “Richard Carranza held ‘white

supremacy culture’ training for school admins,” which contained a picture that

Chislett took during an implicit bias training. App’x at 264–66.

14 On May 23, 2019, Chislett attended an OEA staff training retreat.

Conversation quickly turned to the New York Post articles. Forbes declared:

We see there are people within who already have views and say they are part of the equity excellence work and they’re sitting amongst us, next to us, between us and alongside of whiteness. I keep saying, if you go to Tweed [the DOE headquarters], there are people there who say they have that title but they are not about this, but they don’t know what that’s about.

App’x at 157. The room became very tense, and Renee stood up. She addressed

Chislett by name and told her that she was “prohibiting this work from

happening.” App’x at 157. Adefope stood up and called out Chislett as well.

Other employees also stood up and told Chislett that she was “not willing to do

the [equity] work” and that she “should just go.” App’x at 158. This continued

for approximately fifteen minutes before Ababio-Fernandez terminated it.

Chislett “tried to defend herself” and left the meeting “humiliated;”

“frightened;” and “in tears.” App’x at 1593; App’x at 158.

Chislett left the retreat before the second day and required short term

disability leave to seek medical attention for her emotional distress. After her

15 leave, Chislett felt she could not return to the workplace. Consequently, Chislett

resigned from the DOE in September 2019.

II. The Proceedings Below

On October 1, 2019, Plaintiff initiated this suit in the Supreme Court of

New York (New York County). She amended her complaint on October 25, 2021,

asserting claims of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New York

City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–101 et seq. On November 22,

2021, Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her state law

claims on May 4, 2023.

On June 16, 2023, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Defendants

asserted that the reasons for Plaintiff’s demotion were her inadequate leadership

skills and the interpersonal conflict she caused—not race discrimination. They

argued that the implicit bias trainings did not create a hostile work environment

and that Plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a race-based DOE policy

needed for municipal liability under Monell v. New York City Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In opposition, Plaintiff argued that the DOE had a

16 racially discriminatory policy that caused her demotion, created a hostile work

environment, and led to her constructive discharge.

The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

March 14, 2024. The district court ruled that (1) Plaintiff failed to present

evidence demonstrating that Defendants’ actions were attributable to

discrimination; (2) Plaintiff did not present evidence of a municipal race-based

policy; and (3) Plaintiff did not demonstrate a causal link between any municipal

policy and the demotion, hostile work environment, or constructive discharge.

Plaintiff timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

“We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment,

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom

summary judgment was granted and drawing all reasonable inferences in that

party’s favor.” Bey v. City of New York, 999 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2021). Summary

judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

17 return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law.” Id.

“As recent discrimination cases of our court have made clear, summary

judgment may not be granted simply because the court believes that the plaintiff

will be unable to meet his or her burden of persuasion at trial.” Danzer v. Norden

Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1998).

“Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to sue municipal entities (and municipal

officials in their personal capacities) for deprivations of constitutional rights.”

Quinones v. City of Binghamton, 997 F.3d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 2021). “[T]hrough its

application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, [it]

protects public employees from various forms of discrimination, including

hostile work environment and disparate treatment on the basis of race.” Littlejohn

v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 320 (2d Cir. 2015) (alteration adopted) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

18 Monell provides that a municipality or municipal agency may be liable

under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation. 3 Monell,

436 U.S. at 694. “The elements of a Monell claim are (1) a municipal policy or

custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) the deprivation of a

constitutional right.” Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 97 (2d Cir. 2020).

A municipality cannot be held liable on the theory of respondeat superior; the

plaintiff must establish that the municipality’s policy or custom itself was a

“moving force of the constitutional violation.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 694. A

natural person may be liable under § 1983 only if the official was “personally

involved in the alleged deprivation.” Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch.

Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir. 2004). The issue of causation is for the jury. See

3 Defendants argue that it is unclear whether the DOE is a “suable entity;” nevertheless, they “do not press that issue here because Chislett’s claims plainly fail for other reasons.” Appellees’ Br. at 17 n.2. Under Monell, state law determines whether the municipal entity or official possessed final policymaking authority with regard to the actions in question and is therefore subject to § 1983 liability. See McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997). Under New York law, “the city board [of Education] and the Chancellor are responsible for policy having city-wide impact.” N.Y.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Inc. v. Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y., 347 N.E.2d 568, 573 (N.Y. 1976).

19 Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]hether the relevant conduct of

the pertinent policymaking official caused the injury of which the plaintiff

complains is a question of fact for the jury.”).

“To show a policy, custom, or practice [justifying municipal liability], the

plaintiff need not identify an express rule or regulation.” Patterson v. Cnty. of

Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004). It suffices to establish that discriminatory

practices were “persistent and widespread” so as “to constitute a custom or

usage with the force of law” and that a discriminatory practice of subordinates

was “so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policy-

making officials.” Sorlucco v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 971 F.2d 864, 870–71 (2d Cir.

1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan

Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (“[A]n act performed pursuant to a

‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker

may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant

practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.”). A municipal policy can

even consist of “inaction.” Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2011);

see also Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Specifically, Monell’s

20 policy or custom requirement is satisfied where a local government is faced with

a pattern of misconduct and does nothing, compelling the conclusion that the

local government has acquiesced in or tacitly authorized its subordinates’

unlawful actions.”).

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment

to Defendants because there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether

the DOE had a racially discriminatory municipal policy that caused the (1)

demotion; (2) hostile work environment; and (3) constructive discharge. We

address each claim in turn.

I. Plaintiff’s Claim of Demotion

For claims of employment discrimination under § 1983, courts apply the

McDonnell Douglas framework used in the Title VII context. See generally

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Ruiz v. Cnty. of

Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that courts analyze § 1983

claims of employment discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework).

Under McDonnell Douglas, the content of the prima facie case changes when

the employer discloses its reasons for the adverse employment action. See

21 Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 307 (“[T]he requirements of a prima facie case for a plaintiff

alleging employment discrimination change as the case progresses.”). Prior to the

employer’s disclosure, a presumption arises in the plaintiff’s favor precluding

dismissal for want of a showing of discrimination or causation if the plaintiff

points to evidence that (1) “she is a member of a protected class;” (2) “she was

qualified for employment in the position;” (3) “she suffered an adverse

employment action;” and (4) she has “some minimal evidence suggesting an

inference that the employer acted with discriminatory motivation.” 4 Id. Coupled

4In McDonnell Douglas itself, which was a case involving allegations of racially discriminatory denial of employment, for the fourth factor, the Supreme Court specified that “the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Supreme Court more recently ceased to rely on this requirement in Title VII cases, apparently recognizing that it had no application to cases involving other adverse employment actions and furthermore that this factor was not useful. See Ames v. Ohio Dep’t Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 309 (2025) (explaining that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case “simply by presenting evidence ‘that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.’” (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981))); see also Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that “there is no unbending or rigid rule about what circumstances allow an inference of discrimination when there is an adverse employment

22 with the temporary presumption, such a showing satisfies the prima facie case,

“shifting the burden of production to the employer and requiring the employer

to come forward with its justification for the adverse employment action against

the plaintiff.” Id.

However, once an employer articulates a reason for its actions, the

presumption of discrimination “drops from the case,” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981), and “is no longer relevant,” St. Mary’s

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993). At this point, the plaintiff must

produce enough evidence for a jury to find intentional discrimination. See

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (explaining that the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion “now

merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the

victim of intentional discrimination”). Additionally, as part of a § 1983 claim (as

opposed to a Title VII claim), the plaintiff must demonstrate that discrimination

“was a ‘but-for’ cause of the adverse employment action or the hostile

environment.” Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d 200, 214 (2d Cir. 2019).

decision,” but rather, “the fourth element set forth in McDonnell Douglas is a flexible one that can be satisfied differently in differing factual scenarios”).

23 Defendants gave reasons why Chislett’s supervisory responsibilities were

removed, such that the presumptions supporting the first phase of the prima facie

case dropped away. Winkfield testified at her deposition that by observing

Chislett over a two-to-three-week period and meeting with her team, she found

“a pattern of feedback from nearly every member of the team that expressed that

they did not believe her to be an effective leader and that they believed that she

created chaos and a negative work environment.” App’x at 1896. Winkfield

further testified that team members felt Chislett “was very inconsistent in the

way she enforced rules and policies, that she was overly harsh with some

employees and overly accommodating with others” and did not “conduct herself

always professionally in small group and team settings.” App’x at 1991–92. The

“majority of the feedback” that Winkfield received from Chislett’s “subordinates

and from her colleagues [was] not racial in nature at all.” App’x at 1896. Ababio-

Fernandez testified that the conflicts between Chislett and her team members

“created inefficiencies in [Chislett’s] ability to do exactly what she wanted to do”

and “interrupted the work.” App’x at 1516.

24 Chislett argues that the district court “shifted the burden on summary

judgment” by requiring her to “disprove Winkfield’s assertions.” Appellant’s Br.

at 45–46. However, the “final and ultimate burden is on the plaintiff” to establish

that discrimination was the cause of the adverse action. Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2014). 5 Chislett did not meet this burden. She

failed to produce evidence that the persons responsible for the decision to

5Decisions on this issue often say that the defendant gave “legitimate, non- discriminatory” reasons for the adverse employment action. See, e.g., Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003). The burden on the defendant at this point, however, does not require that it give “legitimate” reasons for its action. What matters is whether the adverse action was attributable to the discrimination alleged by the plaintiff. For example, if a defendant fired a plaintiff because an executive at the company had accepted a bribe to fire the plaintiff so that the payer of the bribe could get her position, that reason, although not “legitimate,” would nonetheless satisfy the defendant’s burden of giving the reason for which it took the adverse action. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509 (explaining that the defendant’s burden of production is to “introduce evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action”). Upon the defendant’s giving of such a reason, the presumptions usually supporting the prima facie case would drop away, and the plaintiff would bear the burden of proving that the adverse action was taken because of the alleged discrimination.

25 remove her supervisory responsibilities were motivated by racial

discrimination. 6

Plaintiff contends that (1) there was no support for Winkfield’s assertions

beyond Winkfield’s own testimony; (2) Winkfield never told her about the

complaints; and (3) Chislett’s “positive relationships with many of her

colleagues” refute Winkfield’s claims. 7 Appellant’s Br. at 45. These arguments

fail. It was Chislett’s burden to prove that her deprivation of responsibilities was

6Even if some of the adverse evaluations Winkfield received from Chislett’s team members were influenced by racial bias, Winkfield also received feedback adverse to Chislett from persons outside the team. Plaintiff gave no evidence that Winkfield either acted out of a racial bias or should have known that the negative evaluations of the persons she canvassed from outside the team were in any way influenced by anti-white bias. 7 Chislett also claims that Winkfield’s testimony is based on inadmissible hearsay (i.e., the complaints of DOE employees). Plaintiff did not raise this argument in her opening brief, rendering it forfeited. Browe v. CTC Corp., 15 F.4th 175, 191 (2d Cir. 2021). Nevertheless, this argument fails on the merits. Negative evaluations by DOE employees were admissible as non-hearsay not for the truth of what they stated (i.e., that Chislett was an ineffective leader) but rather for their effect on Winkfield, giving her reason to believe that Chislett was an ineffective leader. See, e.g., McPherson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that in a discrimination case, “we are decidedly not interested in the truth of the allegations against plaintiff” but instead care about what motivated the employer).

26 discriminatory. She failed to refute Winkfield’s testimony that she had received

so many negative evaluations.

We find no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

Defendants on Chislett’s claim that her demotion was by reason of race bias.

II. Chislett’s Claim of Hostile Work Environment

“A custom or policy of harassment and other discriminatory acts giving

rise to hostile work environment claims can form the basis of section 1983

claims.” Matusick v. Erie Cnty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31, 62 (2d Cir. 2014). A

plaintiff must show more than occasional hostile comments of co-workers. The

conduct must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v.

Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

doing so, the plaintiff “must demonstrate either that a single incident was

extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous

and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.”

Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Additionally, the plaintiff must establish that the hostile work

27 environment was due to her protected characteristic. Brown v. Henderson, 257

F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001).

The test for a hostile work environment involves “both objective and

subjective components: the conduct complained of must be severe or pervasive

enough that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive, and the victim

must subjectively perceive the work environment to be abusive.” Raspardo v.

Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2014). Courts deploy a “totality of the

circumstances” analysis in determining whether the work environment was

hostile. Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 321.

For hostile work environment claims, “the plaintiff must demonstrate a

specific basis for imputing the conduct creating the hostile work environment to

the employer.” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir. 2004). When “the

alleged harasser is in a supervisory position over the plaintiff, the objectionable

conduct is automatically imputed to the employer.” Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 103. In

contrast, when a plaintiff’s coworkers or non-employees perpetuate the

harassment, the employer will ordinarily not be liable unless the plaintiff

demonstrates that “the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for

28 complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.” Kotcher v. Rosa &

Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Summa v. Hofstra

Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (adopting the same standard for

harassment perpetuated by non-employees). Further, if the plaintiff sues a

municipal agency under § 1983, she must “prove that the hostile work

environment she complained of was the product of a [municipal] ‘policy or

custom.’” Legg v. Ulster Cnty., 979 F.3d 101, 111 n.5 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Monell,

436 U.S. at 694).

The district court did not determine whether Chislett established a genuine

dispute of material fact about whether she experienced a hostile work

environment; instead, the district court held that any such environment could

not be attributed to a DOE policy. We disagree. Viewing the “totality of the

circumstances,” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 321, Chislett raised genuine disputes of

material fact about whether the workplace was racially hostile and whether such

hostility was the product of a municipal policy. “Where reasonable jurors could

disagree as to whether alleged incidents of racial insensitivity or harassment

would have adversely altered the working conditions of a reasonable employee,

29 the issue of whether a hostile work environment existed may not properly be

decided as a matter of law.” Patterson, 375 F.3d at 227.

A. Hostile Work Environment Incidents

Because the parties do not dispute that Chislett subjectively perceived the

environment as hostile, we focus only on the objective prong of the hostile work

environment test. See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436

(2d Cir. 1999). Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, a rational

juror could find that discriminatory conduct at the DOE was sufficiently severe

and pervasive to have created a hostile work environment. There is no

“threshold magic number of harassing incidents,” id. at 439 (internal quotation

marks omitted), and Chislett set forth sufficient evidence for a rational juror to

find that she was repeatedly exposed to racial harassment at her workplace

throughout 2018 and 2019.

First, Chislett presented evidence from which a rational jury could find

that racist comments were expressed during bias trainings. For example,

instructors mentioned several times that the “values of [w]hite culture are

supremacist.” App’x at 137–38. Similarly, during one training session, Ababio-

30 Fernandez, Senior Executive Director of the OEA, declared: “There is white

toxicity in the air, and we all breathe it in.” App’x at 141. In the sessions, there

was persistent messaging to the effect that white culture is generally

“[d]efensive[];” “[e]ntitle[d];” “[p]aternalis[tic];” “[p]ower [h]oard[ers];” and

“[p]rivilege[d].” App’x at 139; App’x at 141; App’x at 216; App’x at 221. Further,

there was physical segregation of white employees and singling out of staff by

race during one training session as participants were ordered as to racial

privilege associated with whiteness and physically “lined up to reveal the

dividing ‘color line of privileges that favored whites.’” App’x at 141. Negative

generalizations and stereotypes about white people were also targeted

specifically at Chislett during the trainings. For instance, during a Q&A session,

instructors told Chislett that her “interest in excellence was perfectionism and

consistent with white supremacy.” App’x at 138–39. On the question of the

objectivity of considering the training environment hostile and abusive, it is

pertinent that one of Chislett’s co-workers was similarly upset about the racial

31 generalizations and that another regarded the DOE as “an extremely hostile

environment for white individuals.” 8 App’x at 2090.

In addition, a reasonable juror could find from the evidence in the record

that there were racialized comments expressed outside the trainings. As a

spillover from the trainings, conversations took on a racialized tone, and OEA

employees directed terminology from the trainings at Chislett. When Chislett

disciplined or managed subordinates, she was allegedly called racist 9 and labeled

“white and fragile.” App’x at 145. Far from being “episodic” or isolated, these

8Defendants argue that many of the identified statements should not form the basis of a hostile work environment claim because they occurred “in the context of discussions about combatting discrimination.” Appellees’ Br. at 30. We reject the argument. The fact that the purpose of the sessions was to combat race discrimination does not excuse the alleged presence of race discrimination in the conduct of the sessions. 9 We do not suggest that calling someone racist by itself constitutes racial discrimination or forms the basis of a hostile work environment claim. See Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep’t, 709 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2013) (“‘Racism’ is not a race, and discrimination on the basis of alleged racism is not the same as discrimination on the basis of race.”). However, in the context of the profusion of remarks attributing numerous detrimental qualities to whiteness (including a sense of racial supremacy), there is at least a question of fact as to whether accusations that Chislett was “racist” were intended as identifying and disparaging a feature of her whiteness.

32 alleged comments were continuous and concentrated, especially given the

frequency of the OEA’s racial conversations. Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d

143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997). Construing the evidence most favorably to Chislett, a

rational juror could find that there was a consistent “pattern” wherein Chislett

“could expect [racist] remarks and other harassment at any time.” Gorzynski, 596

F.3d at 103.

For example, at an internal meeting on September 17, 2018, when Chislett

asked her Black subordinate Renee why she was late to a meeting she was

supposed to help lead (a question appropriately put by a supervisor to a

subordinate), Renee told Chislett she was making a “race-based judgment” and

could “not be trusted.” App’x at 146. The following week, Renee referred to the

previous incident and admonished Chislett: “How dare you approach me out of

your white privilege!” App’x at 146. In or around November 2018, two Black

subordinate employees on Chislett’s team told her that “race is at the center of

every conversation” they had with her. App’x at 147. Further, at one point,

Chislett told her team that “this is becoming almost unbearable for me because

there is increasing hostility.” App’x at 452. In response, Renee stated: “How dare

33 you use the word unbearable, there is black people dying in the street, you don’t

have the right to use that term. You’re coming from the position of white

privilege and white supremacy.” App’x at 452. The presence of such racialized

conflicts and the frequent accusations that Chislett was operating out of white

privilege and supremacy for performing ordinary supervisory responsibilities

further support her hostile work environment claim.

Third, Chislett presented evidence of comments expressed to another DOE

employee of partially white parentage that a reasonable juror could find racially

discriminatory. For instance, in February 2019, Chislett heard Renee use

racialized sentiments when discussing a “white adjacent” colleague “from a

mixed race family” who “adopted [B]lack daughters” and married “a white

man.” App’x at 471–72. After the colleague attempted to monitor Renee’s

productivity, Renee called her “a slave master,” and another employee labeled

her a “white dominant leader.” App’x at 472. While not directed at Chislett, these

statements are pertinent for several reasons. First, discriminatory “conduct not

directly targeted at or spoken to an individual but purposefully taking place in

[her] presence can nevertheless transform [her] work environment into a hostile

34 or abusive one.” Rasmy v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 952 F.3d 379, 389 (2d Cir. 2020); see

also Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Because the crucial

inquiry focuses on the nature of the workplace environment as a whole, a

plaintiff who herself experiences discriminatory harassment need not be the

target of other instances of hostility in order for those incidents to support her

claim.”). Furthermore, such discriminatory conduct by the same individual who

directed similar conduct at a plaintiff may confirm the objective reasonableness

of the plaintiff’s perception of the conduct directed at her as racially

discriminatory. Such conduct also tends to confirm that supervisory personnel

are aware of and tolerate the alleged racial harassment, providing evidence of a

municipal policy or custom of complicity.

From this “mosaic” of evidence, a rational juror could find that Chislett

experienced a racially hostile work environment. Vega v. Hempstead Union Free

Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Collectively, Chislett presented evidence of racially-charged statements

expressed during trainings, in meetings, and about another employee in her

presence, creating a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the

35 workplace was racially hostile. As such, “whether the conduct taken together

created a work environment that was sufficiently hostile to violate [§ 1983] is a

question of fact for the jury.” Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743

F.3d 11, 24 (2d Cir. 2014).

For her hostile work environment claim to be actionable, Chislett must

impute the underlying conduct to her employer by demonstrating that

Defendants “either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the

harassment but did nothing about it.” Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63. 10 Here, a reasonable

juror could find that Defendants knew about the racialized harassment but

consistently failed to intervene. There is ample evidence that from Spring 2018

on, Chislett reported problems to her superiors and had legal counsel reach out

on her behalf in 2019, but no intervention was undertaken (except for appointing

Winkfield as Chislett’s coach).When Chislett spoke out, her superiors allegedly

tolerated the racist behavior she complained of; dismissed her concerns; scolded

10To the extent that the alleged racist comments of Chislett’s supervisors engendered the DOE’s hostile work environment, such conduct is automatically imputed to Defendants. See Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 103.

36 her; told her the trainings were not going to change; put on her the onus of

stopping the harassment; or explained they were not concerned because “this

Chancellor truly has our back.” App’x at 153. We have previously held that

evidence that supervisors were aware of a plaintiff’s experience of harassment

but failed to intervene sufficed to establish genuine disputes of material fact as to

imputation. See Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 F.4th 55, 71 (2d Cir. 2023);

Feingold, 366 F.3d at 152. Here too, a reasonable juror could find that Chislett’s

supervisors knew about the racial harassment Chislett suffered but did nothing

to stop it, satisfying the imputation requirement for her hostile work

environment claim.

B. Municipal Policy

Because Chislett is suing a municipal agency under § 1983, she must show

that the hostile work environment was attributable to a municipal policy or

custom. See Legg, 979 F.3d at 111 n.5. 11 Defendants argue that Chislett failed to

11The district court held that Chislett failed to link a municipal policy to the harassment she experienced. To this point, the district court stressed that the municipal policy Chislett alleged “focused on race in employment decisions” and was not connected “with Carranza’s purported focus on providing implicit-bias

37 raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the purportedly hostile

work environment was attributable to a municipal policy. We conclude that

Chislett established a genuine dispute of material fact on the question. She

presented evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to find that the DOE

consistently ignored racial harassment of Caucasian employees in trainings and

workplace interactions, “support[ing] the inference that policymakers, at the

very least, had a custom or practice of acquiescing to [such racial] misconduct.”

Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir. 2020).

We do not suggest that the conduct of implicit bias trainings is per se

racist. See Vavra v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 688 F. Supp. 3d 758, 770 (N.D. Ill. 2023)

(holding that an employer’s requirement that employees attend implicit bias

training does not, by itself, violate Title VII) (collecting cases), aff’d, 106 F.4th 702

trainings for Department employees.” Chislett v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 723 F. Supp. 3d 285, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). We disagree. Chislett argued that the “DOE’s focus on race also manifested in trainings on ‘implicit bias’ for DOE employees” and that the “trainings were a direct offshoot of the Chancellor’s priorities.” Chislett Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion, ECF No. 52, at 14–15. Further, as explained above, we hold that Chislett raised a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the DOE had a policy of inaction with regard to such racial harassment based on whiteness.

38 (7th Cir. 2024). What matters here is the way the trainings were conducted. When

employment trainings discuss any race “with a constant drumbeat of essentialist,

deterministic, and negative language [about a particular race], they risk liability

under federal law.” De Piero v. Pa. State Univ., 711 F. Supp. 3d 410, 424 (E.D. Pa.

2024). And when a municipal agency consistently ignores the racial harassment

of employees in both trainings and workplace interactions, it can be held liable.

As previously noted, an actionable municipal policy can be based on

municipal inaction. See Cash, 654 F.3d at 334; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489

U.S. 378, 396 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(“Where a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts available to city

policymakers put them on actual or constructive notice that the particular

omission is substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional

rights of their citizens, the dictates of Monell are satisfied.”). A municipal agency

can be liable under Monell when a “consistent pattern of failing to adequately

respond to [] complaints,” Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577

F.3d 415, 440 (2d Cir. 2009), can support an inference of “tacit authorization of

the offensive acts,” Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1980). In particular,

39 we previously recognized that Monell liability may attach when harassment is

pervasive, and the municipal entity fails to intervene. See, e.g., Lucente, 980 F.3d at

297–98; Matusick, 757 F.3d at 63.

Here, Chislett’s hostile work environment claim was based on “the

cumulative effect of individual acts.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101, 115 (2002). She presented evidence of racial harassment that occurred

repeatedly over the course of 2018 and 2019 in trainings and workplace

interactions. Based on Chislett’s evidence, a rational juror could find that such

harassment was “so manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior

policy-making officials.” Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 871.

Chislett must present evidence of “sufficient instances of tolerant

awareness by supervisors of abusive conduct to support an inference that they

had a policy, custom or usage of acquiescence in such abuse.” Jones v. Town of E.

Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2012). She made a sufficient showing to defeat

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. There is evidence that, from Spring

2018 on, Chislett complained to supervisors and requested their help numerous

times about the racialized workplace interactions and training sessions, and even

40 had legal counsel reach out on her behalf in 2019. She complained to individuals

including her leadership coach and Senior Strategy and Policy Advisor

Winkfield, OEA Senior Executive Director Ababio-Fernandez, Deputy

Chancellor Robinson, and Senior Director of Operations Kazi Additionally,

Ababio-Fernandez routinely collected “post-session surveys” and regularly met

with her superior Deputy Chancellor Robinson after the implicit bias training

sessions as “part of conversations upwards so that [her] boss or the chancellor

was in the know of progress.” App’x at 1435. Her superior then conveyed the

findings to Carranza. It is a reasonable inference that complaints regarding the

sessions were conveyed upward. At this stage of the litigation, we draw all

reasonable inferences in Chislett’s favor. See Bey, 999 F.3d at 164.

Despite Chislett reporting the racial harassment, at no point did her

supervisors intervene. Her supervisors routinely dismissed the harassment and

in one instance, prevented her from having a private meeting regarding her

concerns. Far from curbing the harassment or disciplining the alleged abusers,

Winkfield told Chislett it was her “responsibility to ask people to stay in

protocol.” App’x at 154. In short, construing the evidence most favorably to

41 Chislett, a rational jury could find that the administration condoned the racial

harassment.

The district court held and Defendants argue on appeal that Chislett failed

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the purportedly hostile

work environment was attributable to a DOE policy because (1) Carranza did not

directly oversee the implicit bias trainings; (2) a number of the sessions were

sponsored by individual DOE departments and therefore occurred outside the

formal implicit bias training program; and (3) some of the statements were

expressed by other employees or pertained to general workplace disagreements

with Chislett. We reject these arguments. For Chislett to prevail, it is not

necessary that Carranza have been directly involved in each step of the implicit

bias trainings; rather, it is sufficient that he created or tolerated “a policy or

custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred.” Back, 365 F.3d at 127

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Herrera v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No.

1:21-CV-7555-MKV, 2024 WL 245960, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2024) (“Plaintiffs

are not required to show that Carranza personally demoted them, provided that

Plaintiffs can show that ‘a district employee’ demoted them ‘acting pursuant to’

42 an established policy or practice of racial discrimination.” (quoting Hurdle v. Bd.

of Educ. of City of N.Y., 113 F. App’x 423, 424 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order)).

Additionally, a reasonable juror could connect the racial hostility at the

DOE to a municipal policy even if some of the comments occurred outside the

formal implicit bias training program or were expressed by Chislett’s colleagues

in the context of workplace disagreements. First, as previously noted, the record

established by Defendants is unclear as to which trainings were part of the

formal implicit bias initiative, especially because the OEA was tasked with

developing, scaling, and helping to lead the trainings. Second, Chislett presented

evidence that racist sentiments spilled over from the trainings to other workplace

interactions as DOE employees directed language from the trainings at her.

Chislett has created a genuine dispute of material fact about whether such

“inaction and acquiescence to the harassment” enabled “the harassment to

become the custom and practice, if not the policy, of the [DOE].” Matusick, 757

F.3d at 63.

Thus, Chislett has shown a genuine dispute of material fact on the

question whether the alleged hostile work environment shown in her evidence

43 was attributable to a municipal policy. Accordingly, the district court erred in

granting summary judgment to Defendants on Chislett’s hostile work

environment claim, and we vacate this part of the district court’s ruling.

III. Plaintiff’s Claim of Constructive Discharge

A constructive discharge can be supported by a showing of an aggravated

case of a hostile work environment. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146

(2004). “Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an employer, rather

than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work

atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily.” Serricchio v. Wachovia

Sec. LLC, 658 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Green v. Town

of E. Haven, 952 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2020) (requiring that the employer’s actions

be “deliberate[]”). The inquiry is whether “working conditions bec[a]me so

intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt

compelled to resign.” Suders, 542 U.S. at 141. In this vein, the plaintiff’s working

conditions must be more than merely “difficult or unpleasant.” Stetson v. NYNEX

Serv. Co., 995 F.2d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 1993). At bottom, the standard for establishing

a constructive discharge “is higher than the standard for establishing a hostile

44 work environment.” Fincher v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 725

(2d Cir. 2010).

Chislett has not met the demanding standard for a constructive discharge

claim. Without doubt, Chislett’s evidence can support a rational jury finding that

her working conditions had been abusive and unpleasant, but it did not show

that the employer had intentionally created a workplace that would be so

intolerable that she “would have felt compelled to resign” such that it would

constitute a constructive discharge to her. Suders, 542 U.S. at 141.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly granted

summary judgment to Defendants on Chislett’s constructive discharge claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of Defendants is AFFIRMED as to Chislett’s claims of demotion and

constructive discharge, and VACATED as to Chislett’s claim of hostile work

environment. The matter is REMANDED for further proceedings.