Chiprez v. Adame

District Court, N.D. California·Decided July 27, 2020·No. 4:20-cv-00307·Unknown

Opinion

FROYLAN MEDINA CHIPREZ, Case No. 20-cv-00307-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL; v. AND DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO XAVIER BECERRA, et al., Defendants.

On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate written Order. Plaintiff’s fifty-seven-page complaint raises multiple allegations with respect to events that occurred at two different prisons: Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) from January 2018 through May 2018; and CSATF from May 2018 through November 2019. The Court now conducts its initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff asserts multiple claims for relief against a total of twenty-four defendants, from whom he seeks both injunctive relief as well as monetary and punitive damages. As mentioned above, the allegations in the complaint cover a span of time from January 2018 through November 2019, during which period Plaintiff was incarcerated at two different prisons. Having reviewed the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds the following pleading deficiencies require that the complaint be DISMISSED with leave to amend. A. Misjoined Claims Against CSATF Defendants A plaintiff may properly join as many claims as he has against an opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Nevertheless, while multiple claims against a single party may be alleged in a single See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding, under Rule 18(a), prisoner improperly brought complaint raising fifty distinct claims against twenty-four defendants). Further, parties may be joined as defendants only if “there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). As a practical matter, this means that claims involving different parties cannot be joined together in one complaint if the facts giving rise to the claims were not factually related in some way—that is, if there was not “similarity in the factual background.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). General allegations are not sufficient to constitute similarity when the specifics are different. Id. The court, on its own initiative, may dismiss misjoined parties from an action, and any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Here, the relevant allegations (and the claims filed in the proper venue, as explained below) in Plaintiff’s complaint concern his claims of injury with respect to constitutional violations that allegedly occurred while he was incarcerated at SVSP from January 2018 through May 2018. Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has improperly joined the CSATF defendants, and the claims against them (that took place from May 2018 through November 2019), to his claims against the SVSP defendants. Specifically, while Plaintiff asserts that prison officials at SVSP and CSATF violated his constitutional rights, the allegations against each group of defendants set forth distinct facts concerning alleged injuries that arose at separate prisons in different time-frames. Thus, the claims that arose at SVSP from January 2018 through May 2018 did not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the claims asserted against the CSATF defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). Accordingly, all of the CSATF defendants, and the claims against them, will be dismissed from this action without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing separate actions asserting those claims in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, which is the proper venue for claims based on acts and omissions at CSATF. B. Claims Against SVSP Defendants When the allegations in the complaint concerning Plaintiff’s confinement at SVSP are liberally construed, Plaintiff states the following claims for relief: deliberate indifference to safety; failure to remove Plaintiff due to safety concerns; mail tampering; forgery of legal mail; failure to protect Plaintiff from harassment; failure to protect Plaintiff from being intimidated and prevented from filing a federal habeas petition; and obstruction of mail to courts. Dkt. 1 at 5-7.1 Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the aforementioned claims are alleged to have occurred at SVSP, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Plaintiff names eight SVSP defendants in connection with the noted claims. 1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies A question which must be answered before Plaintiff can proceed with his claims is whether he has exhausted available administrative remedies with respect to each claim. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under this section, an action must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies before he filed suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all “available” remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy and effective.” Id. at 524; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5 (2001). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id. at 741. The purposes of the exhaustion requirement include allowing the prison to take responsive action, filtering out frivolous cases and creating an administrative record. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 525. A prisoner’s concession to n

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