1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 FROYLAN MEDINA CHIPREZ, 4 Case No. 20-cv-00307-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL; v. AND DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO 6 AMEND XAVIER BECERRA, et al., 7 Defendants. 8
9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at the 11 California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) and proceeding pro se, filed the 12 above-titled civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has will grant Plaintiff’s 13 motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate written Order. 14 Plaintiff’s fifty-seven-page complaint raises multiple allegations with respect to events that 15 occurred at two different prisons: Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) from January 2018 16 through May 2018; and CSATF from May 2018 through November 2019. The Court now 17 conducts its initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 Plaintiff asserts multiple claims for relief against a total of twenty-four defendants, from 20 whom he seeks both injunctive relief as well as monetary and punitive damages. As mentioned 21 above, the allegations in the complaint cover a span of time from January 2018 through November 22 2019, during which period Plaintiff was incarcerated at two different prisons. 23 Having reviewed the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds the following pleading 24 deficiencies require that the complaint be DISMISSED with leave to amend. 25 A. Misjoined Claims Against CSATF Defendants 26 A plaintiff may properly join as many claims as he has against an opposing party. Fed. R. 27 Civ. P. 18(a). Nevertheless, while multiple claims against a single party may be alleged in a single 1 See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding, under Rule 18(a), prisoner 2 improperly brought complaint raising fifty distinct claims against twenty-four defendants). 3 Further, parties may be joined as defendants only if “there is asserted against them jointly, 4 severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same 5 transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact 6 common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). As a practical matter, 7 this means that claims involving different parties cannot be joined together in one complaint if the 8 facts giving rise to the claims were not factually related in some way—that is, if there was not 9 “similarity in the factual background.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). 10 General allegations are not sufficient to constitute similarity when the specifics are different. Id. 11 The court, on its own initiative, may dismiss misjoined parties from an action, and any claim 12 against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 13 Here, the relevant allegations (and the claims filed in the proper venue, as explained 14 below) in Plaintiff’s complaint concern his claims of injury with respect to constitutional 15 violations that allegedly occurred while he was incarcerated at SVSP from January 2018 through 16 May 2018. Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has improperly 17 joined the CSATF defendants, and the claims against them (that took place from May 2018 18 through November 2019), to his claims against the SVSP defendants. Specifically, while Plaintiff 19 asserts that prison officials at SVSP and CSATF violated his constitutional rights, the allegations 20 against each group of defendants set forth distinct facts concerning alleged injuries that arose at 21 separate prisons in different time-frames. Thus, the claims that arose at SVSP from January 2018 22 through May 2018 did not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 23 occurrences as the claims asserted against the CSATF defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). 24 Accordingly, all of the CSATF defendants, and the claims against them, will be dismissed from 25 this action without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing separate actions asserting those claims in the 26 United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, which is the proper venue for 27 claims based on acts and omissions at CSATF. B. Claims Against SVSP Defendants 1 When the allegations in the complaint concerning Plaintiff’s confinement at SVSP are 2 liberally construed, Plaintiff states the following claims for relief: deliberate indifference to safety; 3 failure to remove Plaintiff due to safety concerns; mail tampering; forgery of legal mail; failure to 4 protect Plaintiff from harassment; failure to protect Plaintiff from being intimidated and prevented 5 from filing a federal habeas petition; and obstruction of mail to courts. Dkt. 1 at 5-7.1 Venue is 6 proper because the events giving rise to the aforementioned claims are alleged to have occurred at 7 SVSP, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Plaintiff names eight 8 SVSP defendants in connection with the noted claims. 9 1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 10 A question which must be answered before Plaintiff can proceed with his claims is whether 11 he has exhausted available administrative remedies with respect to each claim. 12 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) 13 (“PLRA”), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect 14 to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 15 any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 16 exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under this section, an action must be dismissed unless the 17 prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies before he filed suit, even if the prisoner 18 fully exhausts while the suit is pending. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 19 2002). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, 20 whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege 21 excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of 22 all “available” remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must 23 they be “plain, speedy and effective.” Id. at 524; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5 24 (2001). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably 25 money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id. at 741.
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 FROYLAN MEDINA CHIPREZ, 4 Case No. 20-cv-00307-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL; v. AND DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO 6 AMEND XAVIER BECERRA, et al., 7 Defendants. 8
9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at the 11 California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) and proceeding pro se, filed the 12 above-titled civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has will grant Plaintiff’s 13 motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate written Order. 14 Plaintiff’s fifty-seven-page complaint raises multiple allegations with respect to events that 15 occurred at two different prisons: Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) from January 2018 16 through May 2018; and CSATF from May 2018 through November 2019. The Court now 17 conducts its initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 18 II. DISCUSSION 19 Plaintiff asserts multiple claims for relief against a total of twenty-four defendants, from 20 whom he seeks both injunctive relief as well as monetary and punitive damages. As mentioned 21 above, the allegations in the complaint cover a span of time from January 2018 through November 22 2019, during which period Plaintiff was incarcerated at two different prisons. 23 Having reviewed the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds the following pleading 24 deficiencies require that the complaint be DISMISSED with leave to amend. 25 A. Misjoined Claims Against CSATF Defendants 26 A plaintiff may properly join as many claims as he has against an opposing party. Fed. R. 27 Civ. P. 18(a). Nevertheless, while multiple claims against a single party may be alleged in a single 1 See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding, under Rule 18(a), prisoner 2 improperly brought complaint raising fifty distinct claims against twenty-four defendants). 3 Further, parties may be joined as defendants only if “there is asserted against them jointly, 4 severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same 5 transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact 6 common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). As a practical matter, 7 this means that claims involving different parties cannot be joined together in one complaint if the 8 facts giving rise to the claims were not factually related in some way—that is, if there was not 9 “similarity in the factual background.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). 10 General allegations are not sufficient to constitute similarity when the specifics are different. Id. 11 The court, on its own initiative, may dismiss misjoined parties from an action, and any claim 12 against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 13 Here, the relevant allegations (and the claims filed in the proper venue, as explained 14 below) in Plaintiff’s complaint concern his claims of injury with respect to constitutional 15 violations that allegedly occurred while he was incarcerated at SVSP from January 2018 through 16 May 2018. Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has improperly 17 joined the CSATF defendants, and the claims against them (that took place from May 2018 18 through November 2019), to his claims against the SVSP defendants. Specifically, while Plaintiff 19 asserts that prison officials at SVSP and CSATF violated his constitutional rights, the allegations 20 against each group of defendants set forth distinct facts concerning alleged injuries that arose at 21 separate prisons in different time-frames. Thus, the claims that arose at SVSP from January 2018 22 through May 2018 did not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 23 occurrences as the claims asserted against the CSATF defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). 24 Accordingly, all of the CSATF defendants, and the claims against them, will be dismissed from 25 this action without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing separate actions asserting those claims in the 26 United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, which is the proper venue for 27 claims based on acts and omissions at CSATF. B. Claims Against SVSP Defendants 1 When the allegations in the complaint concerning Plaintiff’s confinement at SVSP are 2 liberally construed, Plaintiff states the following claims for relief: deliberate indifference to safety; 3 failure to remove Plaintiff due to safety concerns; mail tampering; forgery of legal mail; failure to 4 protect Plaintiff from harassment; failure to protect Plaintiff from being intimidated and prevented 5 from filing a federal habeas petition; and obstruction of mail to courts. Dkt. 1 at 5-7.1 Venue is 6 proper because the events giving rise to the aforementioned claims are alleged to have occurred at 7 SVSP, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Plaintiff names eight 8 SVSP defendants in connection with the noted claims. 9 1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 10 A question which must be answered before Plaintiff can proceed with his claims is whether 11 he has exhausted available administrative remedies with respect to each claim. 12 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) 13 (“PLRA”), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect 14 to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 15 any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 16 exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under this section, an action must be dismissed unless the 17 prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies before he filed suit, even if the prisoner 18 fully exhausts while the suit is pending. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 19 2002). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, 20 whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege 21 excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of 22 all “available” remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must 23 they be “plain, speedy and effective.” Id. at 524; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5 24 (2001). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably 25 money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id. at 741. The purposes of the exhaustion 26 27 1 requirement include allowing the prison to take responsive action, filtering out frivolous cases and 2 creating an administrative record. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 525. 3 A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal, so long as no 4 exception to exhaustion applies. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 5 540 U.S. 810 (2003). Therefore, a claim may be dismissed without prejudice if it is clear from the 6 record that the prisoner has conceded that he did not exhaust administrative remedies. Id. 7 Here, the relevant claims raised in Plaintiff’s complaint appear not to have been exhausted 8 through the administrative grievance procedure at SVSP. In the “Exhaustion of Administrative 9 Remedies” section of the complaint form, Plaintiff answers “No” to the question, “[D]id you 10 present the facts in your complaint for review through the grievance procedure?” Id. at 1. He also 11 puts “N/A” next to all the levels of grievance review. Id. When asked to explain why he did not 12 present his claims for review through the grievance procedure, Plaintiff states: “Due to the severity 13 of the allegations and on-going harassment and provocation by state officials, [Plaintiff] feels it is 14 crucial and prudent for courts to know of [the] circumstances before state officials.” Id. at 2 15 (citing Rodriguez v. City of L.A., 891 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018)). 16 Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiff’s relevant claims against the SVSP defendants may 17 be unexhausted and subject to dismissal. Therefore, his complaint is DISMISSED with leave to 18 amend in order to prove that he exhausted all of his claims against each SVSP defendant before he 19 filed this action. If Plaintiff did exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to any or all of 20 those claims before filing this action, he may amend his complaint to so allege, as set forth below. 21 2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 22 As explained above, Plaintiff’s contains multiple legal claims and names eight SVSP 23 defendants. The complaint is extraordinary broad, and appears to touch upon everything Plaintiff 24 found objectionable during his incarceration at SVSP between January 2018 through May 2018. 25 As the Court has already determined above, the complaint alleges several claims against 26 SVSP defendants and CSATF defendants that are not properly joined under Federal Rule of Civil 27 Procedure 20(a) concerning joinder of claims and defendants. However, even the claims against 1 the course of approximately four months. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff may only allege 2 claims that (a) arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 3 occurrences and (b) present questions of law or fact common to all defendants named therein. 4 Plaintiff may not include in a single complaint everything that has happened to him over the four- 5 month period that he finds objectionable. He must choose what claims he wants to pursue that 6 meet the joinder requirements; if he asserts improperly joined claims in his Amended Complaint, 7 they will be dismissed. 8 3. Rule 8 9 As mentioned above, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the 10 complaint set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 11 relief.” Additionally, Rule 8(e) requires that each averment of a pleading be “simple, concise, and 12 direct.” See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of 13 complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”). 14 While the federal rules require brevity in pleading, a complaint nevertheless must be sufficient to 15 give the defendants “fair notice” of the claim and the “grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. 16 Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (quotation and citation omitted). A complaint that fails to 17 state the specific acts of the defendant that violated the plaintiff’s rights fails to meet the notice 18 requirements of Rule 8(a). See Hutchinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (9th Cir. 19 1982). However, under section 1983, liability may be imposed on an individual defendant only if 20 the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally 21 protected right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). As explained above, a 22 supervisor may be liable under section 1983 only upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in 23 the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 24 wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446. Under no 25 circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 26 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 27 Here, Plaintiff’s claims cannot proceed as pleaded because he has not directly linked all of 1 against numerous defendants, some of whom either are not mentioned in his statement of facts, or 2 are linked only in a conclusory manner to his claims. Further, some of the named SVSP 3 defendants are supervisory officials, against whom liability is alleged solely in their respondent 4 superior capacity, which is improper. Id. 5 4. Summation 6 In sum, even when Plaintiff’s claims are liberally construed, he has failed to provide 7 adequate information for the Court to determine whether the allegations in the complaint state 8 cognizable claims for relief with respect to each of the eight SVSP defendants who were allegedly 9 responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries at the time he was incarcerated at SVSP. Furthermore, Plaintiff 10 has failed to allege that he has properly exhausted his claims and that they meet proper joinder 11 requirements. Plaintiff also has failed to provide a simple, concise, narrative that sets forth all of 12 the injuries attributed to each individual defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff will be given leave to 13 file an Amended Complaint in which he clearly links each SVSP defendant to the alleged injury, 14 or injuries, for which that SVSP defendant is alleged to be responsible. While Plaintiff must, in 15 filing his Amended Complaint, provide sufficient information to give the SVSP defendants fair 16 notice of the nature of the claims against them, Plaintiff need not provide a lengthy narrative with 17 respect to each SVSP defendant to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8. Instead, Plaintiff 18 should provide a concise statement identifying each SVSP defendant and the specific action or 19 actions the SVSP defendant took, or failed to take, that allegedly caused the deprivation of 20 Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, as well as the injury resulting therefrom. Additionally, Plaintiff 21 should not name any SVSP defendant who is linked solely in his respondent superior capacity or 22 against whom Plaintiff cannot allege facts that would establish supervisorial liability. 23 C. Claim Against Attorney General Becerra and Other Government Lawyers 24 Plaintiff has named Attorney General Xavier Becerra as well as other government lawyers 25 from the Attorney General’s Office, including former Attorney General Kamala Harris and six 26 other former and present deputy attorney generals. Dkt. 1 at 11. When sued in official and 27 individual capacities, the Ninth Circuit has held that an attorney general or deputy attorney general 1 or outside of their official duties.” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001); 2 see also Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1991) (government lawyers absolutely 3 immune for actions “intimately” or “closely” associated with judicial process). “Whether the 4 government attorney is representing the plaintiff or the defendant, or is conducting a civil trial, 5 criminal prosecution or agency hearing, absolute immunity is necessary to assure that . . . 6 advocates . . . can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.” Id. 7 (citation omitted). 8 The Court notes that it is not clear how Plaintiff’s claims against the named Defendants 9 from the Attorney General’s Office are linked to his relevant claims against the SVSP Defendants. 10 Thus, his claims against the named Defendants from the Attorney General’s Office are dismissed 11 with leave to amend for Plaintiff to explained how they are properly joined under Federal Rule of 12 Civil Procedure 20(a) with his claims against the SVSP Defendants. If Plaintiff is able to establish 13 this, then he must identify these specific defendants from the Attorney General’s Office and 14 describe how they violated his constitutional rights. If Plaintiff seeks relief against the Attorney 15 General or any of the past and former government lawyers named above, then Plaintiff must 16 demonstrate why immunity does not apply. Plaintiff should also describe where the alleged 17 incidents occurred. If these events occurred while Plaintiff has been incarcerated in CSATF, then 18 those claims will also be dismissed without prejudice to raising in the Eastern District. 19 D. Claims Against Doe Defendants 20 Plaintiff mentions he wishes to name a number of Doe Defendants whose names he 21 apparently intends to learn through discovery. See Dkt. 1 at 11. Where the identity of alleged 22 defendants cannot be known prior to the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff should be given an 23 opportunity through discovery to identify them. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 24 1980). Failure to afford the plaintiff such an opportunity is error. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 25 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against these Doe 26 Defendants are DISMISSED. Should Plaintiff learn the identities of the unnamed defendants, he 27 may move for leave to amend to add them as named defendants. See Brass v. County of Los III. CONCLUSION 1 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 2 1. All of the CSATF defendants, and the claims against them, are DISMISSED from 3 this action without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing separate actions asserting those claims in the 4 United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, which is the proper venue for 5 claims based on acts and omissions at CSATF. 6 2. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in order to give him the 7 opportunity to file a simple, concise and direct Amended Complaint which: 8 a. States clearly and simply each claim he seeks to bring in federal court as 9 required under Rule 8, and he should: 10 i. Set forth each claim in a separate numbered paragraph; 11
12 ii. Identify each SVSP defendant and the specific action or actions each SVSP defendant took, or failed to take, that allegedly 13 caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and
14 iii. Identify the injury resulting from each claim; 15 b. Explains how he has exhausted his administrative remedies as to each 16 claim as against each SVSP defendant before he filed this action; 17 c. Only alleges those claims that are properly joined under Rule 20(a) 18 (concerning joinder of claims and Defendants) or, stated differently, because Plaintiff may not list 19 everything that has happened to him over a two-year period in prison that he finds objectionable, 20 the Amended Complaint may only allege claims that:
21 i. Arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 22 transactions or occurrences; and
23 ii. Present questions of law or fact common to all SVSP defendants; 24 d. Does not make conclusory allegations linking each SVSP defendant by 25 listing them as having “direct involvement” to his claims without specifying how each SVSP 26 defendant was linked through their actions; 27 e. Does not name any SVSP defendant who did not act but is linked solely in 1 establish either supervisorial or municipal liability; and 2 f. Does not name Doe Defendants. 3 3. Plaintiff’s claim against the named Defendants from the Attorney General’s Office 4 are DISMISSED with leave to amend to link these Defendant to his claims of constitutional 5 violations at SVSP and to demonstrate why immunity does not apply, if applicable. 6 4. Plaintiff’s claims against the Doe Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice to 7 Plaintiff moving for leave to amend to add them as named defendants once he learns their 8 identities. 9 5. Within twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall file his 10 Amended Complaint as set forth above. Plaintiff must use the attached civil rights form, write the 11 case number for this action—Case No. C 20-0307 YGR (PR)—on the form, clearly label the 12 complaint “Amended Complaint,” and complete all sections of the form. Because the Amended 13 Complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he 14 wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 15 915 (1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. If Plaintiff 16 wishes to attach any additional pages to the civil rights form, he shall maintain the same format as 17 the form, i.e., answer only the questions asked in the “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies” 18 section without including a narrative explanation of each grievance filed. Plaintiff’s failure to 19 file his Amended Complaint by the twenty-eight-day deadline or to correct the 20 aforementioned deficiencies outlined above will result in the dismissal of this action without 21 prejudice. 22 6. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 23 informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 24 Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 25 while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 26 address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 27 directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and 1 se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 2 7. The Clerk shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights form along with a copy of this 3 Order. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 || Dated: July 27, 2020 ° ra Ag ROGERS 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 q 12 wou wo cc: Blank civil rights form mailed to plaintiff. clerk
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