Chinn v. City of Spokane

157 Wash. App. 294
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedAugust 3, 2010
DocketNo. 40104-5-II
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 157 Wash. App. 294 (Chinn v. City of Spokane) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chinn v. City of Spokane, 157 Wash. App. 294 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

Bridgewater, J.

¶1 West Central Development LLC (West) appeals the superior court’s decision to grant Brad Chinn’s land use petition. Chinn filed the petition because he disagreed with the Spokane City Council’s (Council) decision to grant West a rezone. We hold that the Council misinterpreted the law in concluding that the rezone would not change the underlying land use. We further hold that the Council erroneously applied the law to the facts. We reverse the Council’s decision and reinstate the hearing examiner’s decision consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

¶2 West applied to rezone a block, consisting of eight city lots (Property) in Spokane, Washington, from “Office” to “Office Retail.”1 Certified Appeal Board Record (CABR) § 1, at 9; Spokane Municipal Code (SMC) 17C. 120.030(A), (B). Except for the county courthouse,2 which borders the Property’s eastern boundary, the land surrounding the Property is zoned Office and is developed with small scale offices, many of which are in former residences.

¶3 After West applied for the rezone, the city planning services recommended that the hearing examiner approve West’s rezone application with certain conditions. During the comment period before the hearing, several neighboring landowners, including Chinn, wrote letters opposing the rezone.

[297]*297¶4 The hearing examiner denied West’s rezone application. The hearing examiner concluded that because Office Retail is a higher intensity office use and because the Property was not within a city center, the rezone was inconsistent with the Spokane comprehensive plan policy of directing higher intensity office uses to centers.

¶5 West appealed to the Council, which reversed the hearing examiner and approved West’s rezone application. The Council found that the comprehensive plan permitted office uses outside of a center if the use was within the boundaries of existing office designations. Because the Property was currently zoned for office use and because West applied for a rezone that included office use, the Council concluded that the underlying land use did not change in a rezone from Office to Office Retail.

¶6 Chinn disagreed with the Council’s decision and filed a petition under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW, to challenge the decision in superior court. The superior court reversed the Council’s decision because the Council failed to consider the “retail aspect” of rezoning from Office to Office Retail. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 118. The city of Spokane and West now appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶7 Under LUPA, we stand in the shoes of the superior court and limit our review to the record before the Council. Pinecrest Homeowners Ass’n v. Glen A. Cloninger & Assocs., 151 Wn.2d 279, 288, 87 P.3d 1176 (2004). As the party seeking relief from the land use decision, Chinn bears the burden of meeting one of RCW 36.70C.130(1)’s six standards. Pinecrest, 151 Wn.2d at 288. Given the facts of this case, the relevant standards of review are whether the Council’s land use decision is (1) an erroneous interpretation of the law or (2) a clearly erroneous application of law to the facts. RCW 36.70C.130(1)(b), (d).3

[298]*298¶8 We accord deference to the Council’s expertise and review de novo any claimed error of law in how the Council interpreted city ordinances. Pinecrest, 151 Wn.2d at 290. We are also deferential to the factual findings of the highest forum below that exercised fact-finding authority. Citizens to Pres. Pioneer Park, LLC v. City of Mercer Island, 106 Wn. App. 461, 473, 24 P.3d 1079 (2001). And under the “clearly erroneous application” test, we apply the law to the facts and will overturn the land use decision only if we have a “definite and firm conviction” that the decision maker committed a mistake. Citizens to Pres. Pioneer Park, 106 Wn. App. at 473.

¶9 Chinn argues that the Council erred in rezoning the Property from Office to Office Retail because the Property is not within the area designated for higher intensity use in the downtown plan. West counters that because the Property was already zoned for office use, the Council had authority under both the comprehensive plan and the SMC to rezone the Property from Office to Office Retail. We hold that although Office Retail may exist outside the areas designated for higher intensity use, the Council misinterpreted the law in concluding that a rezone under the SMC zoning code from Office to Office Retail does not change the underlying use. We further hold that the Council’s decision was a clearly erroneous application of law to the facts because, while the SMC allows Office Retail only in higher intensity areas, the facts demonstrate that the Property is not located in a higher intensity area.

¶10 The SMC requires the Council to consider five factors when reviewing an application to rezone. SMC [299]*29917G.060.120; SMC 17G.060.170(C).4 The rezone must meet all five factors. SMC 17G.060.170(B). At issue in this case are the three of those factors: (1) whether the rezone is allowed under the SMC, (2) whether the rezone is consistent with the comprehensive plan, and (3) whether the proposal will have a significant adverse impact on the environment or the surrounding properties. SMC 17G.060-.170(C)(1), (2), (5).

¶11 Under the comprehensive plan’s land use (LU) 1.5 policy, the main objective is to “[d]irect new office uses to centers and corridors designated on the land use plan map.” CP at 96 (containing a copy of the relevant portion of Spokane’s comprehensive plan). Not all office use must exist in a center, however, as the following language explains:

To ensure that the market for office use is directed to centers, future office use is generally limited in other areas. The Office designations located outside centers are confined to the boundaries of existing office designations. Office use within these boundaries is allowed outside of a center.

CP at 96 (emphasis added). Thus, even though the overall goal of LU 1.5 is to direct new or “future” office uses to centers, those office uses may exist outside the centers so [300]*300long as the office use is within the boundary of an existing office designation. The Council was correct in making this finding. But the analysis does not end with finding that an office use can exist outside a center, as some office uses are allowed only in certain areas:

Uses such as freestanding sit-down restaurants or retail are appropriate only in the office designation located in higher intensity office areas around downtown Spokane in the North Bank and Medical Districts shown in the Downtown Plan.

CP at 96. Accordingly, LU 1.5 not only limits office use outside the center to existing boundaries but also limits the higher intensity uses to certain areas. West maintains that this language is irrelevant because LU 1.5 limits only “freestanding”

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Related

Chinn v. City of Spokane
293 P.3d 401 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
157 Wash. App. 294, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chinn-v-city-of-spokane-washctapp-2010.