Childers v. Duvall

63 S.W. 802, 69 Ark. 336, 1901 Ark. LEXIS 83
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedJune 1, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 63 S.W. 802 (Childers v. Duvall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Childers v. Duvall, 63 S.W. 802, 69 Ark. 336, 1901 Ark. LEXIS 83 (Ark. 1901).

Opinion

Battle, J.

TJpon the supposition that Lawrence county, in this state, contained over 15,000 inhabitants, the democratic party in March, 1900, held a primary election, and nominated T. M. Duvall for county clerk; and C. 0. Childers for circuit clerk, of that county. In June, 1900, the federal census of Lawrence county was taken by the enumerators appointed for that purpose. On the third day of September, 1900, at a general election held on that day, C. C. Childers was elected circuit clerk, and T. M. Duvall, county clerk, of said county. On the third day of October, 1900, the director of the census published a bulletin in which he stated that the population of Lawrence county, according to the federal census of 1900, exceeded 15,000 inhabitants. On the 31st day of October, 1900, the governor of this state appointed Duvall clerk of the county and probate courts of that county to fill a vacancy occasioned by the last federal census showing that the inhabitants of that county exceeded 15,000. Duvall qualified and entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office. The question is, who is the county clerk of Lawrence county ? The Lawrence circuit court held that Duvall is.

Section 19 of article 7 of the constitution of this state provides how the office of the clerk of the county and probate courts shall be filled. It declares that it shall be filled by the clerk of the circuit court. The constitutional convention of 1874 evidently did not intend that this should continue longer than the affairs of the county should require, and believed that the county would need two clerks when its population exceeded 15,000 inhabitants. Hence it provided in this section “that in any county having a population exceeding 15,000 inhabitants, as shown by the last federal census, there shall be elected a county clerk, in like manner as clerk of the circuit court, who shall be ex officio clerk of the probate court• ofosdid.1county. 'This i& the condition upon which the'county is allowed two Clerks. It- (the ■ convention) did not in tend that the federal e'enSus of 1870., which was the-last census at the time the constitution.. of 1874 was adopted, should for. all time determine when the condition for which’ it provided existed. It provided for counties having a population in excess of 15,000 inhabitants. This is a condition, present and future, for which it provided. There was and is no reason for discrimination in favor of one’ county against another -of the same population. Coilnfies acquiring the requisite population after the adoption of the constitution would doubtless need, and be entitled to, two clerks, as much as those whose population already exceeded 15,000 inhabitants. The federal census was adopted as the guide to determine .when the condition provided for shall arise, and the last one made was to be the criterion to govern, as it would more accurately furnish the information needed. We therefore conclude that, whenever a county acquires the necessary population, according to the last federal census, it is entitled to a clerk of the county and pro-late courts; that the clerk of the circuit court no longer holds the same ex officio; and that the two offices become separate and independent. Treating the office of clerk of the county court as vacant, 'as á consequence of its separation from that of clerk of the circuit court, the convention provided that it should be filled by election, the same provision that was then made for the filling of other •vacancies in office. There was no other provision made for the .filling of it until the next general election. Indeed, there is no more reason why there should be than in cases where it becomes vacant by the death of the occupant. But this provision of the constitution, in this respect, has been changed by a subsequent amendment, which declares: “The governor shall, in case a vacancy occurs in any state, district, county or township office in •the state, either by death, resignation or otherwise, fill.the same '•by appointment, such appointment to be in force and effect until the next - general election thereafter.” Under this amendment a ■ vacant office Should be filled by the appointment of the governor ’.until the next general election, so much of the constitution as authorized special elections being abrogated.

When, under the constitution, was the clerk of the county :court- of Lawrence county to be elected1 or appointed? Evidently, ■ not until so much of the census of 1900 as related to its popula- - tioñ wás complete and ready to be officially'promulgated. ■ So long as the enumeration of its inhabitants for that year was subject to 'the examination and revision of an- officer,-it was hot the census. ’The -work that was to- make- it such was not finished!' Until the law authorized'the announcement of the enumeration as the censusj ho- official notice of it as such could be taken; and,- iintil official notice could be taken 6f it, no election or appointment could- b'e "based ripon it.: When'was the last federal- eensus^-the- census' of ‘1900 — complete, and 'when could official notice have -been taken of it? • ' -

■ By an act of congress entitled, “An act to provide for taking dhe twelfth and subsequent censuses,” approved’ March 3; 1899, it ‘was provided that a census of the population of the United States should be taken in 1900, under the supervision of an officer to- be •appointed by the president of the United States, by and with the 'advice of the senate, and to he known as the “director of the cen•sus.” The information required by the act was to be collected, ’under the direction of the director of the census, by supervisors, enumerators, and special agents. The supervisors were to be appointed by the director,-and they were to employ, with the consent of the director, the enumerators in their respective districts, and 'were to examine and scrutinize the returns of the enumerators, and, in the event of discrepancies or deficiencies appearing in the returns for their respective'districts, to use all diligence in causing ’the same to be corrected and supplied, and were to forward to 'the director the complete returns for their respective' districts in such time and manner as the director should prescribe. It was the duty of each enumerator to obtain all the information required by the act as to population in his subdivision as of the date of June 1st, 1900, and to forward his original schedule, duly certified, to the supervisor of census of his district, as his return, on 'or before the 1st day of the following July. If any portion of the 'enumeration or census appeared to have been negligentlj or improperly taken, ancl'was by reason thereof incomplete or erroneous, the director was authorized to cause the same to be amended or made anew under such methods as was in his discretion practicable. 'ISTo supervisor, supervisor’s clerk, enumerator,- special agent, or other employee had or has - authority, without the permission of ‘the director, to conamunicate any information gained by him in •the-performance’of his duties to any person- except the officers in the census-department-authorized'by-the-act-to receive the samé. The director of the census was authorized to.

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Bluebook (online)
63 S.W. 802, 69 Ark. 336, 1901 Ark. LEXIS 83, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/childers-v-duvall-ark-1901.