Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Cowles

74 N.W. 579, 54 Neb. 269, 1898 Neb. LEXIS 58
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 17, 1898
DocketNo. 7922
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 74 N.W. 579 (Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Cowles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Cowles, 74 N.W. 579, 54 Neb. 269, 1898 Neb. LEXIS 58 (Neb. 1898).

Opinion

Ryan, C.

This action ivas brought by William D. Pel liner in the district court of Jefferson county for the recovery of damages alleged to have been sustained by him while in the employ of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. There ivas a verdict, on which judgment was rendered for plaintiff in the sum of $2,500. During the pendency of this error proceeding in this court Felkner died and there was a revivor of the action against his administrator. The parties hereinafter will bé desig[270]*270nated plaintiff and defendant according to the status of each when the case was in the district court.

The negligence of the defendant charged in the petition was, in substance, as follows: February 12, 1894, and for a long period prior' thereto, plaintiff was a wiper in defendant’s employ and as such he was under the sole control, directions, and orders of the night foreman of defendant’s engine-house at Fairbury. On the date above mentioned plaintiff was ordered by said night foreman to take certain engines in defendant’s yards to coal chutes in said yards and fill the tenders thereof with coal and return the same to the engine-house to be placed in stalls therein. Pursuant to said orders, at about 10 o’clock P. M., on said day, plaintiff took one of defendant’s engines from the side track on which it stood and caused it to be propelled to defendant’s .coal chutes and thereupon filled the tender with coal. In the performance of the work required of him to be performed it became necessary for plaintiff to climb from the cab of said engine to the top of the tender or tank thereof and, by the use of a shovel provided by defendant for that purpose, to remove the coal or a part thereof from the apron of the coal chute into the tender and to scatter the same around therein, to permit said apron to be elevated to its proper place. Plaintiff alleged further that he, for the purpose aforesaid, did climb from the cab to the top of the tank, and, after having hoisted the apron and adjusted the coal, attempted to climb back from the top of said tender into the ca.b, in order to start said engine and move the same to the place to which, by the defendant’s said foreman, he had been directed to return it. While plaintiff was climbing from the top of the tender into the cab of the engine he was, as he alleged in his petition, thrown violently from the top of said tank or tender, a distance of twelve feet, to the ground and seriously and permanently injured. The agencies which caused his being thus thrown were at considerable length described in the petition, and, summarized, are as fol[271]*271lows: (1) The failure of the defendant to light the yards in the vicinity of the coal chutes; (2) the failure of defendant to provide plaintiff with a lantern or light of any kind; (3) the failure of defendant to provide any steps, holds, or other means by which plaintiff could safely climb from the top of the tank or tender to the floor of the cab, when so required to do in the performance of the work required of him; (4) that défendant bad -knowingly and negligently permitted the iron strap, by which .the tool-box on the right side of said tank or tender was fastened and locked in its place, to become broken’ and out of repair and to stick up over the top of said tool-box; (5) that the work plaintiff was then performing was entirely outside his duties as a wiper and a work he was not accustomed to perform, and that defendant neglected and failed to give plaintiff any instructions regarding the proper and safe manner of performing the work; (6) that defendant should have required an hostler to run said engine to and from the coal chutes, and if this had been done, it would not have been necessary for plaintiff to attempt to climb from the top of the tank to the floor of the cab at said time and place, but defendant carelessly and negligently failed to cause its engine hostler to run said engine to and from the coal chutes, but required plaintiff to do this in addition to the work of loading the tender with coal, thereby requiring the plaintiff to do the work of two men.

In considering the evidence we should bear in mind the fact that the jury found for the plaintiff, and that from this circumstance it is presumable that' the testimony of plaintiff was accepted as true, rather than such as was in conflict therewith. The fifth and sixth of the above assignments of negligence should be rejected from consideration, for the reason that the injury complained of cannot, either upon the averments of the petition, or upon plaintiff’s own testimony, be attributed to the fact that plaintiff ran the engine to the coal chute, or to the fact that he was not accompanied by an hostler. The [272]*272accident happened, according to his own theory, after the coal had been emptied from the chute into the tender and while the engine was not in motion. Whether the movements of this engine, while coming to the chute had been under the control of an hostler or of some other person was therefore immaterial, for the injury was not attributed to the engine’s movement and we cannot consider the proposition that, if there had been an hostler in charge, the plaintiff might have done differently. The other assignments of negligence may be grouped under three heads, of which the first was the failure to furnish proper light; the second was the failure to provide steps, holds, or other means, by which plaintiff could safely climb from the top of the tank to the floor of the cab; and, third, that defendant knowingly permitted the strap on the tool-box to become broken and to project above the .top of said box. There was no evidence that this strap ever was broken, but the testimony of plaintiff was that he thought that, in the darkness, he stumbled upon it. What importance should be attached to the existence of this strap is therefore properly referable to the importance to be attached to the claim that there was an insufficiency of light and of means for furnishing light. There was no attempt to show that the tender could have been provided with steps, holds, or other means whereby plaintiff, with safety, might have descended from the top of the tender or tank to the floor of the cab. There is, therefore, to be considered but one general proposition, and that is the want of light to enable plaintiff from the top of the tank to reach the floor of the cab. This general proposition is divisible into two elements — the failure to light the yards and the failure to provide a lantern, but these need not be considered separately. From the averments of the petition it has already been made to appear that before the accident happened plaintiff had safely taken the engine to the chute, filled its tender with coal, and necessarily had gone to the top of the tank. He was provided with a [273]*273torch which, while he was filling.tlie tender, rested on the cab oí the engine. This torch was extinguished before plaintiff had completed the distribution of coal in the tender and he was thereafter left in darkness to shovel the coal-as best he could. He testified that after he had' put up the chute he went. to get liis torch and get down, and, in climbing on the right hand side of the tender, he slipped on something and fell to the frozen ground. After testifying as above plaintiff was again interrogated concerning the accident, and testified as follows:

Q. How did it happen that you fell?
A. Because I did not have any light to see Avith.
Q. You stated something about stumbling. What did you say about that?
A.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
74 N.W. 579, 54 Neb. 269, 1898 Neb. LEXIS 58, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chicago-rock-island-pacific-railway-co-v-cowles-neb-1898.