Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Vesera

237 S.W. 349, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 198
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided January 18, 1922·No. No. 1890.·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

HALL, J.

The appellee, Vesera, sued the appellant company to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been inflicted upon him while he was engaged in interstate commerce, in the employment of the defendant as a section hand. He alleges in substance that at the end of the day’s work the tools'were gathered and placed on a motor car, at the direction of the section foreman, to he carried back to the section house; that while proceeding to the section house on the motor car, at a speed of about 20 miles por hour, a crowbar fell from the front of the car and derailed it, throwing the plaintiff to the ground, and injuring him; that he had nothing to do with the loading of the tools on the car, except that he shoved the car along the track while the tools were being loaded upon it by other section men, under the supervision and direction of the foreman. He alleges- that the defendant was negligent in the following respects: (1) The car was improperly constructed, in that the place where the tools were to be kept when hauled was only a few inches deep, without edge gates in the ends sufficiently high to hold the tools on the car, the said gates being only 5 to 6 inches in height when they should have been 16 to 18 inches; (2) that the roadbed over which the car was proceeding at the time the crowbar fell off was rough, and on account of this the crowbar was shaken or jolted out of the ear; (3) that under the circumstances the car was propelled at a dangerous rate of speed.

Defendant answered, denying that the ear was improperly constructed or unstable, and averred that it was of standard construction, properly arranged and equipped to carry the tools and to transport employees; that the plaintiff was an experienced section hand, and had instructions as to the proper method of loading the tools upon the car, and had been instructed that the crowbar should be placed within and .at the bottom of the troughs at each side of the car, specially arranged to hold them; that shovels and other small working tools should be put on top of the crowbars; that plaintiff assisted in loading the tools and negligently loaded them at the time in question in disobedience to his instructions and his knowledge of how they should be loaded and that his negligence proximately caused his injury; that the plaintiff was barred from recovery on account of the fact that he had assumed the risk, in that he knew and understood how the bars should be placed on the car, and *350 had assisted in loading the tools on the car, and, with full knowledge of whatever danger-there was, was riding upon the car, thereby assuming all risks of such a situation; that since the accident on December 6, 1920; the defendant company made a settlement with the plaintiff, and paid him the valuable and reasonable consideration of $100, and received from plaintiff a release fully discharging defendant from all liability on account of the injury.

By supplemental petition plaintiff alleged that he was a Mexican, and could not speak or understand the English language; that the defendant’s claim agent, through an interpreter, informed him that the $100 to be paid him was merely a payment for the time that he would lose on account of his injury; that the plaintiff did not know the contents and meaning of the release, and believed at the time he executed the release that it was only a receipt for the inoney paid him for his lost time, and had he known that he was signing anything more than this he would not have executed the release; also at the time and before he signed the release the claim agent told him he was not seriously injured and that the doctor who was attending the” plaintiff, and who was acting for the defendant, said that he would be well and able to return to work soon, and the claim agent estimated' and stated to the plaintiff that he would be able to return to work in about 5 weeks’ time and said that the $100 was paid him for such time so estimated; that such representations were fraudulently made, were believed by plaintiff, and he was thereby induced to execute the release. A trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $1,400.

[1] Under appropriate assignments the appellant insists that the court erred; (1) In submitting the issue as to whether or not the motorcar was in a reasonably safe condition at the time of the accident; (2) in submitting the question whether defendant was guilty of negligence in undertaking to haul plaintiff on the car with the tools loaded thereon as they were in the then condition of the track; (3) in submitting the issue as to whether defendant was guilty of negligence in running the car at the rate of speed it was being run at the time-; (4) in submitting the issue as to whether the claim agent, at the time the execution of the release made the false representations for the purpose alleged since there was no evidence upon which to base the submission of any such issues. It is further insisted that, even if there is any evidence to support the verdict upon said issues, the testimony as a whole is overwhelmingly against the verdict upon each issue. A consideration of these propositions requires a review of the entire statement of facts. The statement in appellant’s brief referring to these contentions is not “a clear and accurate statement of the record” bearing upon the propositions, and does not set out the evidence in accordance with rule 31 (230 S. W. vii), which requires such statement to be “entire.” K. C., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Whittington & Sweeney, 153 S. W. 689.

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Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Vesera, 237 S.W. 349, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 198 (Tex. Ct. App. 1922).

237 S.W. 349 (Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Vesera) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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