Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Vesera

237 S.W. 349, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 198
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 18, 1922
DocketNo. 1890.
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 237 S.W. 349 (Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Vesera) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Vesera, 237 S.W. 349, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 198 (Tex. Ct. App. 1922).

Opinion

HALL, J.

The appellee, Vesera, sued the appellant company to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been inflicted upon him while he was engaged in interstate commerce, in the employment of the defendant as a section hand. He alleges in substance that at the end of the day’s work the tools'were gathered and placed on a motor car, at the direction of the section foreman, to he carried back to the section house; that while proceeding to the section house on the motor car, at a speed of about 20 miles por hour, a crowbar fell from the front of the car and derailed it, throwing the plaintiff to the ground, and injuring him; that he had nothing to do with the loading of the tools on the car, except that he shoved the car along the track while the tools were being loaded upon it by other section men, under the supervision and direction of the foreman. He alleges- that the defendant was negligent in the following respects: (1) The car was improperly constructed, in that the place where the tools were to be kept when hauled was only a few inches deep, without edge gates in the ends sufficiently high to hold the tools on the car, the said gates being only 5 to 6 inches in height when they should have been 16 to 18 inches; (2) that the roadbed over which the car was proceeding at the time the crowbar fell off was rough, and on account of this the crowbar was shaken or jolted out of the ear; (3) that under the circumstances the car was propelled at a dangerous rate of speed.

Defendant answered, denying that the ear was improperly constructed or unstable, and averred that it was of standard construction, properly arranged and equipped to carry the tools and to transport employees; that the plaintiff was an experienced section hand, and had instructions as to the proper method of loading the tools upon the car, and had been instructed that the crowbar should be placed within and .at the bottom of the troughs at each side of the car, specially arranged to hold them; that shovels and other small working tools should be put on top of the crowbars; that plaintiff assisted in loading the tools and negligently loaded them at the time in question in disobedience to his instructions and his knowledge of how they should be loaded and that his negligence proximately caused his injury; that the plaintiff was barred from recovery on account of the fact that he had assumed the risk, in that he knew and understood how the bars should be placed on the car, and *350 had assisted in loading the tools on the car, and, with full knowledge of whatever danger-there was, was riding upon the car, thereby assuming all risks of such a situation; that since the accident on December 6, 1920; the defendant company made a settlement with the plaintiff, and paid him the valuable and reasonable consideration of $100, and received from plaintiff a release fully discharging defendant from all liability on account of the injury.

By supplemental petition plaintiff alleged that he was a Mexican, and could not speak or understand the English language; that the defendant’s claim agent, through an interpreter, informed him that the $100 to be paid him was merely a payment for the time that he would lose on account of his injury; that the plaintiff did not know the contents and meaning of the release, and believed at the time he executed the release that it was only a receipt for the inoney paid him for his lost time, and had he known that he was signing anything more than this he would not have executed the release; also at the time and before he signed the release the claim agent told him he was not seriously injured and that the doctor who was attending the” plaintiff, and who was acting for the defendant, said that he would be well and able to return to work soon, and the claim agent estimated' and stated to the plaintiff that he would be able to return to work in about 5 weeks’ time and said that the $100 was paid him for such time so estimated; that such representations were fraudulently made, were believed by plaintiff, and he was thereby induced to execute the release. A trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $1,400.

[1] Under appropriate assignments the appellant insists that the court erred; (1) In submitting the issue as to whether or not the motorcar was in a reasonably safe condition at the time of the accident; (2) in submitting the question whether defendant was guilty of negligence in undertaking to haul plaintiff on the car with the tools loaded thereon as they were in the then condition of the track; (3) in submitting the issue as to whether defendant was guilty of negligence in running the car at the rate of speed it was being run at the time-; (4) in submitting the issue as to whether the claim agent, at the time the execution of the release made the false representations for the purpose alleged since there was no evidence upon which to base the submission of any such issues. It is further insisted that, even if there is any evidence to support the verdict upon said issues, the testimony as a whole is overwhelmingly against the verdict upon each issue. A consideration of these propositions requires a review of the entire statement of facts. The statement in appellant’s brief referring to these contentions is not “a clear and accurate statement of the record” bearing upon the propositions, and does not set out the evidence in accordance with rule 31 (230 S. W. vii), which requires such statement to be “entire.” K. C., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Whittington & Sweeney, 153 S. W. 689.

J. R. McCurdy, who was section foreman at the time and place of the accident, testified that the crew, of which appellee was a member, in their work at the time of the accident, had been using a track jack, track level, track shovels, and lining bars; that the motorcar upon which the section crew went to and from their work had two engines, was about 6 feet long, with a frame about 2 feet high through the center for the men to sit on, and a trough on each side for the tools; that just prior to the accident the five Mexicans, composing the crew, were riding on the frame in the center of the -car, and the tools were in the troughs on the sides; that there were at least five shovels, two or three lining bars, one claw bar, one track level, one track gauge, one spike maul, one track jack, and a few other tools. He stated that just prior to the accident the car was running east; that he was on the north side of the car, and was adjusting the carbu-reter on the motor; that appellee was on.the front end of the north side, or left-hand side, of the car, about 2 feet from him; that while he was working with the carbureter he felt a jar, and saw the car leaving the track, and was thrown off. The front end of the car went up, and then tumbled off the track. As soon as he recovered from the fall he saw appellee on the south side of the car, lying on the ground and seemingly unconscious. He noticed one lining bar in the middle of the track, slightly bent. All the tools were thrown off the car, but the others did not appear to be injured. At one place it looked as though the lining bar had stuck in the ground between the ties. There was a hole in the ground between the rails and the cross-ties, something near the center of the track. The bent crowbar was in the center of the track, about where the car left the rails, and was bent something like the center of the bar, not a short bend, but in an oval shape — bent more in the form of a circle; that he had not noticed such mark or bend before the accident.

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Bluebook (online)
237 S.W. 349, 1922 Tex. App. LEXIS 198, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chicago-r-i-g-ry-co-v-vesera-texapp-1922.