Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Brinkman

47 Ill. App. 287, 1892 Ill. App. LEXIS 82
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedMarch 3, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 47 Ill. App. 287 (Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Brinkman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Brinkman, 47 Ill. App. 287, 1892 Ill. App. LEXIS 82 (Ill. Ct. App. 1893).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Phillips.

The appellant instituted proceedings for condemnation of right of way over certain lands owned by appellee in Madison County before a circuit judge and jury of that county and t circuit. In that proceeding appellee filed a cross-petition for injury to lands not taken. The jury returned a verdict finding compensation for the land actually taken for right of way at $902.50, and further found the damage sustained by appellee to contiguous lands not taken and described in the cryss-petition to be $1,037.50. The petition filed by appellant described the land to be taken and, on the hearing, a profile of the road as it crossed the land of appellee was offered in evidence to the jury, and was considered by them both on the hearing and on their inspection of the premises as a jury. By permission of the court the owner of the premises and an engineer of the company were permitted to accompany the jury and describe the profile and the route of the road and to show how the lands belonging to appellee were-used. A judgment was-rendered on the verdict of the jury and $2,000, the aggregate amount of the verdict, was paid by appellant to appellee, and appellant constructed the road across said lands on the line of the survey as made before condemnation. The condemnation proceedings were had about July 1, 1890.

After the construction of the road by appellant, appellee brought suit in the Circuit Court of Madison County in an action on the case on about March 3,1891. Appellee, in his declaration so filed, set forth the fact of proceedings being instituted for condemnation and set forth the further fact that damage to lands not taken and contiguous to the right of way were assessed and paid, and then avers: “ And the plaintiff avers that in said proceeding and trial the defendant represented that its railroad upon said right of way would be constructed along and over said public highway where the same separates said improvements, as aforesaid, and adjacent thereto, on a level with the natural surface of said highway and without cut or fill in said highway, and that the plaintiff’s use of said highway there in connection with said improvement's and premises would not be interfered with or obstructed by any cut or fill in said highway. And the plaintiff avers that said damages, assessed as aforesaid, were assessed and determined under the supposition and belief that said railroad would be constructed over and along said highway in accordance with the representation aforesaid and upon the basis that there would be no cut or fill in said property to damage or interfere with the use and enjoyment of said premises and improvements.”

But the plaintiff avers that “the defendant, in violation and disregard of said representation and understanding aforesaid as to the manner in which said railroad was to be constructed along and across said highway, afterward proceeded to construct the same along and across said highway at a depth of four feet and over, and of a width of twenty-eight feet or thereabout, and piling up the earth excavated along the side of said cut in large quantities, by means whereof the plaintiff has been greatly injured, and in effect deprived of all the use of said highway in connection with said premises and improvements, and all communication between the said improvements upon one side of said highway and those on the other, and the danger and inconvenience in the use of said premises and improvements to have been greatly enhanced, none of which were anticipated or considered in the assessment of the damages aforesaid in said condemnation proceeding.” A demurrer to this declaration was filed and overruled by the court. To this declaration appellant pleaded not guilty, and on trial a verdict and judgment was rendered for appellee in the sum of 8800, and from that judgment the appellant brings the record to this court by appeal.

The whole theory on which appellee’s right of recovery was based was that Sublette, an assistant engineer of the company, while going over the right of way with the jury for the purpose of examination, stated that when the ties and rails were laid the railroad would be substantially on a level with the public highway, and on the witness stand stated “ that there would be a slight cut of eight, ten or twelve inches, but the height of the ties and rails would substantially make it on a grade with the road; that is, after the railroad had been made it would be on a level with the public highway.” The evidence shows that the road as constructed is a cut of four feet or over, between appellant’s house and barn. On the trial of the condemnation proceedings a profile was offered in evidence, and as shown by the testimony, was explained to the jury, and the evi- • dence further discloses the fact that the railroad was constructed in strict accordance with the profile and plans in evidence and on the line of survey. The profile and plan for the construction of the road was proper and material evidence of the utmost importance to enable the jury to come to a correct conclusion. It was held in the J. & S. R. R. Co. v. Kidder, 21 Ill. 131, as follows:

“ Indeed it seems to us that the plan upon, which the road was to be built and the mode of construction were of the utmost importance to enable the jury to come to a correct conclusion, and that it was not only the right but it was the duty of the railroad company to furnish full plans, profiles and estimates of that part of the road, and if they failed or neglected to do so, then the jury were authorized to presume that the road would be constructed in the mode the most injurious within the bounds of reasonable probability.”

It was further held in P. & R. I. Ry. Co. v. Birkett, 62 Ill. 332: “ The company must construct the road as indicated by its maps and plans introduced upon the trial. If these should be changed the land owner could recover any damages resulting from the change.” To the same effect is St. L., J. & C. R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 47 Ill. 165.

It is further held in L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. C. & W. I. R. R. Co., 97 Ill. 506, that “ where the petition failed to state the mode of use proposed, the railroad company ought, on the trial, to show by its plans and profiles the manner of use proposed as a basis for fixing a just compensation in such case.” From the rule thus established by the Supreme Court it would follow that the profile of the road is an important element in determining the damage, and is, where in evidence, the controlling evidence as to the plan of construction of the road, and if this be changed so as to inflict greater injury on the land owner he could recover for the increased damages. St. L., J. & C. R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, supra; I. & S. R. R. Co. v. Kidder, supra.

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Bluebook (online)
47 Ill. App. 287, 1892 Ill. App. LEXIS 82, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chicago-peoria-st-louis-railway-co-v-brinkman-illappct-1893.