Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Smith

210 F. 632, 1914 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1196
CourtDistrict Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedJanuary 20, 1914
DocketNos. 519, 554
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 210 F. 632 (Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 210 F. 632, 1914 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1196 (D.S.D. 1914).

Opinion

WIDLARD, District Judge.

The first of these cases relates to the 2%-cent passenger rate over the lines of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company in South Dakota, and the second one to the 2-cent passenger rate over the same lines.

On September 20, 1907, the Board of Railroad Commissioners of South Dakota promulgated an order declaring that the maximum passenger rate over certain lines in the state, including the lines of the Chicago & Northwestern Company, should be 2% cents per mile between points within the state. This order went into force on October 15, 1907.

[634]*634On or about October 3, 1907, separate bills in equity were filed against the board praying for injunctions against the putting into effect of' said order of September 20, 1907, as confiscatory and as denying the equal protection of the law, by the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, the Pierre & Fort Pierre Bridge Railway Company, the Pierre, Rapid City & Northwestern Railway Company,'the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railroad Company, the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, and the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Company.

Restraining orders were entered, and on or about January 13, 1908, temporary injunctions were issued in said causes, prohibiting the board from putting said order of September 20, 1907, into effect.-

In the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway case the present special master was appointed as such on October 8, 1908. Arrangements were made in the other causes to suspend further proceedings until the determination of said cause. The taking of testimony in that case began on December 8, 1908, and was four days thereafter, at the request of the Assistant Attorney General, adjourned to enable the officials of said railway company to furnish detailed information as to the original cost of construction of the company’s lines in South Dakota. Before the master had been advised that such information had been furnished, the Legislature of South Dakota on February 2, 1909, enacted chapter 6, which was approved February 2, 1909. That act fixed the maximum rate for passengers at 2 cents per mile, and was applicable to the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company.

On February 3, 1909, a bill in equity was filed in this court by Harold C. Smith against the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, the several members of the board, and sundry state’s attorneys, seeking to prevent the enforcement, because confiscatory and as denying the equal protection of the law of the said chapter 6.

On August 16; 1909, John H. Gates, Esq., of Sioux Falls, was appointed special master in chancery in said causes with power and direction “to take the testimony therein and from such testimony to find the facts proven 'by said testimony, and to report said facts to this court.” The taking of testimony began on December 29, 1909, was concluded on July 20, 1910, and the master filed his report September 23, 1911, returning therewith the evidence taken before him. Nothing more was done with the case until after the decision of the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, on June 13, 1913.

The way in which this case now comes before the court and the precise questions at this time to be decided should first be made clear. Exceptions to the master’s report were filed by both sides. Equity Rule 66 (33 Sup. Ct. xxxviii) provides:

“Tlie master, as soon as his report is ready, shall return the same into the clerk’s office and the day of the return shall be entered by the clerk in the equity docket. The parties shall have twenty days from the time of the ' filing of the report to file exceptions thereto, and if no exceptions are within that period filed by .either party, the report shall stand confirmed. If exceptions are filed, they shall stand for hearing before the court, if then in [635]*635session, or, if not, at the next sitting held' thereafter, by adjournment or otherwise.”

Former rule 83, which was in force when the report was filed, contained the same provision. Proceeding apparently under this rule, counsel for the state on. July 17, 1913, moved:

“That a day of hearing be appointed for the argument of the exceptions to the master’s report filed in the above-entitled causes, and that the report of the master in all things be confirmed.”

On July 18, 1913, the court set the said motion for. hearing on August 19, 1913. By agreement made on August 1, 1913, the hearing was continued' to September 25, 1913. On September 8, 1913, counsel for the state made a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, and the same was set down for hearing on September 25th. On September 13, 1913, the same counsel made a motion that the bills be dismissed on the merits, “on the ground and for the reason that the complainants in said original and supplemental bills had wholly failed to prove such a state of facts as would entitle them or either of them to the relief demanded in said bills, and for the further reason that there is an entire failure of proof on the part of the complainants to sustain the allegations contained in the original bills and in the supplemental bill.” By order of September 15th this motion was set down for hearing on September 25, 1913. On that day the case came on for hearing, was argued orally, and subsequently briefs were filed by both parties.

It is apparent that the motion to dissolve the temporary injunction is improper at this time, or, in any event, superfluous. The case is now for final hearing. The result of this hearing will be either a dismissal of the bills, in which case the injunction necessarily falls; or the granting of some relief to the plaintiffs, in which case the injunction necessarily stands.

The other motion, namely, to dismiss the bills, may have been made on the theory that after the master’s report had been confirmed it was still necessary for the state to move for a decision in its favor. That, however, is a mistaken theory, for after such a final hearing the court will proceed to a decree for one party or the other, and no motion to that effect is necessary. However, part one of the state’s brief is, with the exception of Hillman’s testimony as to the gross earnings theory, taken up entirely with a discussion of the plaintiffs’ evidence. It may be therefore that the motion is made on the theory that the court will now examine the plaintiffs’ evidence to see if it made out a case, and if it did not will dismiss the bills without ^considering whether the testimony of the defendants has aided the plaintiffs. It is apparent that such a motion made on that theory now comes too late. The master decided the case on all of the evidence, and has reported what the. facts are. It is upon these facts, and others which may appear from all of the evidence, that the court will decide the case. It will' not now. stop to inquire whether or not the plaintiffs have made out a prima 'facie case. The only question therefore before the court is whether or not, .upon the master’s report and all of the evidence in the case, the decree should be for the plaintiffs or for the defendants.

[636]*636[1]

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Bluebook (online)
210 F. 632, 1914 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1196, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chicago-n-w-ry-co-v-smith-sdd-1914.