Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Brown

221 So. 2d 82, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1485
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedApril 7, 1969
DocketNo. 45291
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 221 So. 2d 82 (Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Brown, 221 So. 2d 82, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1485 (Mich. 1969).

Opinion

JONES, Justice:

This Workmen’s Compensation case comes to us from the Circuit Court of Washington County. Appellee was a fireman. The proof showed that he worked alone at night, firing three steam boilers in the plant of appellant, Chicago Mill and Lumber Company; that there was in use a conveyer chain which occasionally slipped from its sprocket and had to be replaced; that on two occasions in 1965, to-wit: April 8 and August 5, claimant was injured while undertaking to replace the moderately heavy chain, the exertion which was .required, causing at least a strain on his back.

On hearing, the attorney-referee held that as a result of the injury of August 5, combined with his preexisting condition, claimant was and would be permanently and totally disabled, with sixty percent of his disability attributable to the previous condition, and forty percent thereof having a direct causal relationship to his employment and the injury of August 5.

This finding was unanimously approved by the Commission, and on appeal to the Circuit Court of Washington County, was affirmed.

Here, appellant argues: (1) no substantial evidence to support a finding of causal connection; (2) no disability attributable to a back strain; (3) the allowance of forty percent attributed to the injury was excessive; and (4) it was error to delay commencement of the apportionment until the date of the attorney-referee’s order and to decline to apportion the maximum allowable under the Act.

The theme of appellant’s appeal is that there is no corroboration of the injury of claimant, and that the evidence of the doctors is not based upon findings by them, but is based solely upon statements of the claimant.

[83]*83Both injuries were reported to the employer and medical aid was furnished by Dr. Jerome Hirsch the company physician.

The office manager of appellant testified that the claimant was employed continuously from 1952 until the accident in August of 1965; that he then left the employment claiming to be unable to work because of a back injury; that after the injury in April, he was off from work from April 12 until May 10, when he returned and worked through August 8. For the April injury, claimant was sent to Dr. Jerome Hirsch who released him to return to work on May 10. The manager did not have a final medical report from Dr. Hirsch as to the August injury.

The claimant testified that he did not return to work after the August injury because he was disabled; that the company sent him to Dr. Hirsch who gave him some medicine to apply to his back and a corset-like back brace; that he was still wearing the brace on the day of the hearing, practically a year after the second injury. He had signed a release for the first injury but not for the second. He had also been sent to or had seen other doctors, including Dr. Tutor in Jackson, Dr. Unkauf in New Orleans, and Dr. N. R. Frisby of Greenville.

Appellant accepted the claim of appellee for the injury received in August, and entered into an agreement for the payment of compensation at the rate of $35 per week to be paid during disability. These payments were continued until December, at which time the appellant offered claimant $1,800 as a lump-sum settlement. The offer was declined, and thereupon the weekly payments were stopped; this stopping of payments was the reason for the allowance of penalties, as provided by the Act.

There were introduced several of claimant’s friends, and acquaintances living in his neighborhood, each of whom testified; that they recalled him hurting his back in April and August; that before the injuries he was normal, and went about his regular routine as a normal man would, but since the August injury, particularly, he had not been doing anything but staying around home; and that he used a cane in walking; that he “kinda limps” and that you never see him without his cane; that prior to the injury, he was active and needed no cane. One of the neighbors said he had difficulties now when he sat down. Witness said that there was certain seats in which he had to sit, and if he did not, someone would have to- help him arise.

Dr. Frisby was duly qualified as a licensed physician in Greenville. He said that claimant came to see him complaining of pain in the lower back extending from the neck to the limbs. Dr. Frisby made the following objective findings:

Well, first, he walked with a cane, bent over, and his gait was somewhat impaired and he complained on twisting from side to side and bending his legs, and there was muscle spasm when pressure was applied to the lower part of his back. The muscle spasm was moderately severe.

He gave him various medicine for pain, including a narcotic, which was given, the doctor said, “because the pain was severe.” His diagnosis was that the patient had a strained and pulled muscle of the lower back with possible ruptured vertebral disc. When asked if that condition was permanent, he stated, “I would say ninety percent of the cases are permanent.” He further stated that his prognosis was grave, and when asked whether he had an opinion as to any causal relationship between the accidents that he described and the doctor’s findings, his answer was, “I’m of the opinion that his condition was caused by injuries that he received, providing that the history given is correct.”

The record discloses no dispute of the history given, and so it must be assumed that the history was correct. On cross-examination, the doctor said that it was his opinion that the claimant had a strained and pulled muscle in his back, with probable injury to the vertebral disc. When further asked on cross-examination whether, looking only at the strained and pulled muscle, which the doctor definitely found, it was a [84]*84permanent or temporary condition, the doctor said, “I’m basing it on the treatment. I’ve treated him and it still exists, so I’m of the opinion it will be there unless something else is done.” Further, “The condition, the pain is permanent there. Whether it’s caused by the pulled muscle or vertebral disc, the pain is still there, in spite of the treatment.”

The doctor further testified that the muscle could be strained to the extent that it was torn, in which case the injury would last for years; and that he had seen a strained and pulled muscle which caused pain for years; and that this claimant’s condition was not any better in spite of the treatment.

Dr. Frisby, on further questioning, stated that there was muscle spasm when he pressed on the claimant’s back. The muscle spasm was in the lumbar, or lower back, level. When asked as to what he related the enlargement of the abdomen, and pain when pressure was applied, his answer was, to nerves from the spinal cord, but the accident did not directly contribute to this condition. As shown by the doctor’s statement of account, he had had fourteen office visits from the claimant.

Dr. Byron M. Unkauf of New Orleans, an orthopedic specialist, was examined by written interrogatories. He examined claimant February 17, 1966, six months after the August injury.

He made x-rays of the claimant which revealed the lowest intervertebral disc space had narrowed and there was some lipping of the fourth and fifth lumbar vertebral bodies.

His objective findings were:

The examination revealed that he stands with a flat back with some paravertebral muscular spasm of the lumbar area, with a limited range of movement with pain in the low back area.

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Stuart's, Inc. v. Brown
543 So. 2d 649 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
221 So. 2d 82, 1969 Miss. LEXIS 1485, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chicago-mill-lumber-co-v-brown-miss-1969.