Chicago, B. & Q. R. v. Attorney General

5 F. Cas. 594, 9 West. Jur. 347, 2 Cent. Law J. 335, 1875 U.S. App. LEXIS 1286
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Iowa·Decided May 12, 1875·Published

Opinion

DILBON, Circuit Judge.

Whatever rights the complainant corporation has are deriv•ed from the Burlington and Missouri River '.Railroad Company. It will be conceded for the purposes of the present application that the complainant possesses all the franchises, rights and powers of the Burlington Company, and is entitled to the relief here sought if the last named company would have been entitled thereto, if it were its.elf using and operating its road. An enquiry into the rights of the Burlington Company as respects compensation for services rendered by it, becomes necessary. This company was incorporated in 1852. The constitution of the state then in force provided that “corporations, except for political or municipal purposes, shall not be created by special laws, but the general assembly shall provide, by general laws for the organisation of all other corporations.” • Under this provision of the constitution the legislature, in 1851, passed a general act for the creation of corporations for pecuniary profit, including railway corporations. No express power to alter or annul the articles of association of companies organized under the act, was reserved. Code 1851, art. 43, pp. 10S, 109. It was under this general incorporation act that the Burlington Company was organized in 1S52. By this act it was provided (Code 1851, § 673), that “any number of persons may associate themselves and become incorporated for the transaction of any lawful business, including the establishment of ferries, the construction of canals, railways, bridges, or other works of internal improvement; but such incorporation confers no power or privilege • not possessed by natural persons, except as hereinafter provided.” The next section (074) enumerates the powers of corporations organized under this act as follows: “(1) To have perpetual succession. (2) To sue and be sued by its corporate name. (3) To have a common seal which it may alter at pleasure. (4) To render the interests of the stockholders transferable. (5) To exempt the private property of its members from liability for corporate debts except as herein otherwise declared. (C) To make contracts, acquire and transfer properly, possessing the same powers in such respects as private individuals now enjoy. (7) To establish bylaws and make all rules and regulations deemed expedient for the management of their affairs, in accordance with law, and not incompatible with an honest purpose.” This, then, is the extent of the corporate powers and franchises of the company; and they are but little greater than those which the law “tacitly, and without any express provision, considers inseparable from every corporation.” created for a like purpose. Ang. & A. Corp. § 110; 2 Kent, Comm. 224. The complainant seeks an injunction in this ease, not on the ground that the maximum rates of charges allowed by the act of 1S74 are unreasonable, but on the ground distinctly asserted in the argument, that the company has the exclusive power to fix the measure of its own compensation, and con[596] sequently that such an enactment as that of 1S74 is a violation of its chartered rights.

In considering this claim of the company, it cannot fail to arrest attention that the statute nowhere in terms confers upon railway corporations organized under it, the power to fix or regulate their-charges. We have, then, to deal with a case where the legislature has not expressly delegated to the company the power to fix its own tolls or compensation. When we consider the rule of construction, as it is definitely settled in Great Britain and by the courts of this country, that any ambiguity or fair doubt in the charters of corporations, operates in favor of the public, and that a corporate body can claim nothing not clearly granted, it is quite plain that the general power “to make contracts, the same as individuals,” cannot be held to amount to a contract between the state and the company, that the latter should exclusively and permanently prescribe and regulate its own charges. The surrender of legislative power beyond recall, in so important a matter, can not, in my judgment, be implied from any such general language, Undoubtedly the railroad company may demand compensation for its services. It can not be imagined that the legislature supposed the capital necessary to construct and operate railroads would be invested therein except for the hope of profit to be thereby realized, and there is no source of profit to a railway company except its earnings for the transportation of persons and property. I have no difficulty, therefore, in holding that the legislature, either by the express .power “to make contracts,” or, what seems the more satisfactory ground, by just and necessary implication, did authorize railway corporations to demand and receive compensation for their services; but this is far short of conferring upon them an exclusive power in this respect, and one beyond future legislative control.

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Chicago, B. & Q. R. v. Attorney General, 5 F. Cas. 594, 9 West. Jur. 347, 2 Cent. Law J. 335, 1875 U.S. App. LEXIS 1286 (circtdia 1875).

5 F. Cas. 594 (Chicago, B. & Q. R. v. Attorney General) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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