Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano

198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7086, 2002 WL 649402
CourtDistrict Court, D. Hawaii
DecidedApril 1, 2002
DocketCIVIL NO. 97-00933 SOM
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Hawaii primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7086, 2002 WL 649402 (D. Haw. 2002).

Opinion

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

MOLLWAY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION.

This case is a challenge to a state law that caps the rent an oil company may charge someone who leases a service station owned by the oil company. Plaintiff Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (“Chevron”), argues that Act 257, passed by the Hawaii legislature in 1997, unconstitutionally effects a regulatory taking because it fails to substantially further a legitimate state interest. The rent cap was instituted as part of the State of Hawaii’s response to high gasoline prices. High prices caused the State of Hawaii to file a separate lawsuit, alleging that oil companies had conspired to keep the prices high. While the parties to the antitrust lawsuit reached a settlement, the present rent cap dispute went to trial. The' court held a one-day bench trial on February 26, 2002, then ordered evidence reopened and received limited additional testimony on March 25, 2002. Having examined the evidence provided by economists, who were the only witnesses at trial, this court agrees with Chevron that the rent cap in Act 257 is unconstitutional.

This case has had a long history. Filed in 1997, this case was initially assigned to a different district judge, who granted summary judgment for Chevron on the grounds that Act 257 faded to substantially advance a legitimate state interest and therefore effected an unconstitutional tak-

ing. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F.Supp.2d 1003 (D.Haw.1998). Defendants (collectively “the State”) appealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir.2000)(“Chevron Appeal”). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Act 257 effected an unconstitutional taking by failing to substantially advance its purpose of lowering gasoline prices for consumers. See id. at 1038-1041. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for resolution of questions of fact, including: (1) whether oil companies would offset the benefits of Act 257 by raising the wholesale price of gasoline, and (2) whether incumbent lessee-dealers would sell their leaseholds at a premium representing the increased value resulting from the rent cap, so that new dealers who had to pay that premium would receive no net benefit from the rent cap to pass on to consumers. Id. at 1042.

Based on the evidence presented at the trial held on February 26, 2002, this court 1 finds that Act 257 will not decrease retail gasoline prices. In fact, it will cause retail gasoline prices to increase. Act 257 will also discourage oil companies from investing in lessee-dealer stations. It will create no incentive for lessee-dealers to continue operating their stations through lower operating costs. Instead, Act 257 will create a premium that lessee-dealers can recognize upon selling their leases. Act 257 will not advance the goal of lowering gasoline prices.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT.

Whenever, in the following discussion, this court has mistakenly designated as conclusions of law what are really findings of fact, and vice versa, the court’s state- *1184 merits shall have the effect they would have had if properly designated.

This bench trial was conducted in accordance with this court’s trial procedures for civil nonjury trials, which are reproduced, in substantially the same form followed here, in Appendix A to this court’s decision in Kuntz v. Sea Eagle Diving Adventures Corp., 199 F.R.D. 665 (D.Haw.2001). The court heard testimony from two expert witnesses: John Umbeck, Ph.D. (“Prof.Umbeck”), who testified on behalf of Chevron, and Keith Leffler, Ph.D. (“Prof.Leffler”), who testified on behalf of the State. Direct examinations of both witnesses were submitted to this court in the form of written declarations. Both witnesses appeared live for cross-examination and redirect examination. The court admitted into evidence three exhibits: Defendant’s Ex. 1 (Prof. Leffler’s direct testimony by declaration), Plaintiffs Ex. 14 (Prof. Umbeck’s direct testimony by declaration), and Plaintiffs Ex. 15 (pages A2-A5 of Exhibit A attached to the Stipulation Re: Adoption of Stipulation of Facts for Trial, filed Feb. 22, 2002).

For ease of reference by the parties and the court, the following findings are presented in numbered paragraphs.

Background.

1. On June 21, 1997, the State of Hawaii enacted Act 257. Stip. of Facts ¶ 1. Act 257 regulates the maximum rent an oil company may charge a dealer that leases a service station from the oil company. The rent is capped at 15 percent of the dealer’s gross margin on actual gasoline sales. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 486H-10.4(c)(2) (1998). Act 257 does not apply to any dealer lease in effect on August 1, 1997. Stip. of Facts ¶ 40.

2. In passing Act 257, the legislature was concerned about the level of concentration at the wholesale level in the gasoline industry. Trial Testimony by Keith Leffler, Tr. at 89:7-14, 96:18-24. The legislature passed Act 257 to reduce gasoline prices for Hawaii’s consumers. See Chevron Appeal, 224 F.3d at 1033 n. 3.

3. Hawaii’s gasoline market is an oligopoly at the wholesale level but very competitive at the retail level. An oligopoly is a market with few sellers. Decl. of Keith Leffler (Ex. 1) ¶ 9. A competitive market, by contrast, is one with many sellers. Decl. of Keith Leffler (Ex. 1) ¶ 9.

4. In a competitive market, no one seller is individually significant enough to have a measurable impact on the industry supply. Sellers therefore act independently of each other. A market with only a few sellers is a “highly concentrated” market. In such a market, each seller recognizes that its decisions will significantly affect the market and its competitors. Each seller therefore takes into account how its competitors will react to its decisions about marketing, supply, and price. The sellers are interdependent, rather than independent, competitors. Reduced competition is likely when the market is highly concentrated. In an oligopoly, an individual firm pursuing its own individual interests will not “rock the boat” and will try to avoid price wars and battles for market share. High concentration may have the anticompetitive effect of causing what few firms there are to cooperate tacitly, resulting in high prices to consumers. Decl. of Keith Leffler (Ex. 1) ¶ 10.

5. The level of concentration in an industry may be measured by the Herfin-dahl Hirschman Index, or HHI. The HHI is calculated by adding the squared values of the market shares of each company in the industry. Trial Testimony by Keith Leffler, Tr. at 90:22-91:1. If the HHI in a market exceeds 1,800, that market is considered highly concentrated. Trial Testimony by Keith Leffler, Tr. at 91:6-9. The HHI is used by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, *1185

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Bluebook (online)
198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7086, 2002 WL 649402, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chevron-usa-inc-v-cayetano-hid-2002.