Chevron Mining Inc. v. Skanska USA Civil West Rocky Mountain District, Inc

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 San Francisco Division 11 CHEVRON MINING INC., et al., Case No. 19-cv-04144-LB

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING TETRA TECH’S EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY 13 v. ENFORCEMENT OF ORDER DIRECTING PRODUCTION OF 14 SKANSKA USA CIVIL WEST ROCKY SKANSKA/TETRA TECH MOUNTAIN DISTRICT, INC., ARBITRATION RECORDS 15 Defendant. Re: ECF No. 39 16 17 The court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the subject matter and procedural history of 18 this case. Briefly stated, the plaintiffs (collectively, “Chevron”) sought expedited discovery and an 19 order directing defendant Skanska USA Civil West Rocky Mountain District, Inc. to produce 20 transcripts of deposition and hearing testimony in connection with an arbitration between Skanska 21 and Tetra Tech EC, Inc., as well as any related settlement (the transcripts and settlement 22 collectively, the “Arbitration Materials”).1 The court ordered that Chevron could take expedited 23 discovery and ordered Skanska to produce the Arbitration Materials by September 13, 2019 at 24 25 26 1 Pls. Mot. for Prelim. Injunction or Expedited Discovery – ECF No. 7 at 5. Citations refer to material 27 in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 1 noon.2 Tetra Tech now moves for a stay to the order directing Skanska to produce the Arbitration 2 Records.3 That motion is denied for the reasons below. 3 “A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.” Nken v. 4 Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). “It is instead ‘an exercise of judicial discretion,’ and ‘[t]he 5 propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.’” Id. In 6 determining whether to issue a stay pending an interlocutory appeal, courts must consider: 7 (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a 8 stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. 9 10 Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). “The party requesting a stay bears the burden of 11 showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34. 12 “The first two factors . . . are the most critical,” and the last two steps are reached “[o]nce an 13 applicant satisfies the first two factors.” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 14 2017) (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35). 15 First, Tetra Tech has not made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits. Tetra 16 Tech argues that it entered into a confidentiality clause with Skanska to keep the settlement 17 confidential from Chevron. But the fact that Tetra Tech and Skanska might have decided amongst 18 themselves to enter into a confidentiality agreement does not bar the settlement from being 19 discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a litigation where Skanska is a 20 defendant. Cf. Valley Surgical Ctr. LLC v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 13-02265 DDP (AGRx), 21 2018 WL 2189458, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) (“[C]onfidentiality agreements do not bar 22 discovery, and a general interest in protecting confidentiality does not equate to privilege.”) (citing 23 cases).4 As the court previously held, the Arbitration Materials are relevant to Chevron’s claims in 24

25 2 Order – ECF No. 32; Order – ECF No. 38. 26 3 Tetra Tech Mot. to Stay – ECF No. 39. 27 4 Tetra Tech’s and Skanska’s agreement itself contemplates that the parties might have to produce the agreement notwithstanding the confidentiality provision. See Tetra Tech/Skanska Settlement 1 this suit and are discoverable, and Tetra Tech has not made a strong showing that it is likely to 2 succeed either on the merits of its intervention motion or, even if it were to intervene, on the 3 merits of its attempts to block discovery of the Arbitration Materials. This factor weighs in favor 4 || of denying the stay. 5 Second, Tetra Tech has not shown it will be irreparably harmed by the production of the 6 || Arbitration Materials. Beyond stating as a conclusion that production of the Arbitration Materials 7 || will irreparably injure its interests in the underlying arbitration, Tetra Tech has not demonstrated 8 || how it will suffer irreparable injury. Tetra Tech argues that “the information contained in the 9 || requested documents will provide Chevron with litigation strategy,”> but it does not explain how it 10 || will suffer irreparable injury, particularly given that the arbitration panel in the Chevron/Tetra 11 Tech arbitration envisioned that Chevron might be able to obtain the Arbitration Materials through 12 |} civil discovery.® This factor weighs in favor of denying the stay.

13 Accordingly, the court denies Tetra Tech’s motion for a stay.’

IT IS SO ORDERED. a 16 Dated: September 13, 2019

Oe LAUREL BEELER 18 United States Magistrate Judge 19 20 1 produce, testimony, transcripts, exhibits, or other documents arising from the Arbitration, including 7 the Award (‘Confidential Information’).”) (emphasis added). > Id. at 5. 23 ® Arbitration Panel Order on Mots. to Compel — ECF No. 20-1 at 69 (“As a threshold issue, the Panel 24 does not see this clause between Tetra Tech and Skanska being a bar to civil discovery of those materials in a civil action. Further, this clause would not necessarily result in the Skanska arbitration 25 proceeding being ‘confidential’ as to Chevron... .”). 7 Because Tetra Tech has not satisfied the first two stay factors, it is not necessary to address the 26 || remaining factors. Cf In re Pac. Fertility Ctr. Litig., No. 18-cv-01586-JSC, 2019 WL 2635539, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2019) (“The first two factors in the traditional stay test are the most important. 27 Indeed, a court need not consider the remaining factors unless it concludes that the moving party has made an adequate showing on the first two.”’) (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 435; Mount Graham Coalition 28 || v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 554, 558 (9th Cir. 1996)).