Chevron Corporation v. Donziger

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 31, 2020·No. 1:11-cv-00691·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

-versus- 19-CR-561 (LAP) 11-CV-691 (LAK) STEVEN DONZIGER, ORDER Defendant.

LORETTA A. PRESKA, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: Before the Court is the Government’s motion to permit live, two-way video testimony of a prosecution witness, David Zelman, at the upcoming trial. (Dkt. no. 134.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. I. Background1 Starting on September 9, Mr. Donziger will be tried on six counts of criminal contempt as charged in the July 30, 2019 Order to Show Cause. (See Dkt. no. 1.) Count VI of the Order to Show Cause charges Mr. Donziger with willfully violating paragraph five of the RICO judgment entered in the underlying civil case, Chevron v. Donziger, No. 11-CV-691 (LAK), dkt. no. 1875 (S.D.N.Y.), which prohibits Mr. Donziger from “undertaking any acts to monetize or profit from the [Ecuador] Judgment . . . by selling, assigning, pledging, transferring or encumbering any

1 The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts and only sets forth details necessary to resolve this motion. interest therein.” (Dkt. no. 1 ¶¶ 19-21.) Mr. Donziger is alleged to have violated that provision by pledging a portion of his personal interest in the Ecuador Judgment to Mr. Zelman, the witness at issue in this motion, in exchange for Mr. Zelman’s executive coaching services. (See dkt. no. 134 at 2.) The Government served Mr. Zelman with a trial subpoena on

March 26, 2020, when trial was scheduled for June 15, and then again on July 17, after trial was adjourned to September 9. On July 22, Mr. Zelman’s attorney emailed the Government to raise concerns about Mr. Zelman--who is 72 years old and resides in

Dallas, Texas--traveling to New York given his age and the

COVID-19 pandemic. (Dkt. no. 134, Ex. D.) Specifically, Mr. Zelman’s attorney informed that Mr. Zelman was not “willing to fly commercial for any reason,” noted the burden to Mr. Zelman of quarantining in New York before trial,2 and requested that Mr. Zelman “be allowed to testify via zoom.” (Id.) In follow-on discussions with the Government, Mr. Zelman’s attorney continued to express concerns about his client’s ability to travel to New

2 New York Executive Order #205 requires travelers to New York from any state with a positive COVID-19 test rate higher than 10 per 100,000 residents or higher than a 10% positive rate, over a seven-day rolling average, to quarantine for fourteen days upon arriving in New York. See Executive Order #205, available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/no-205- quarantine-restrictions-travelers-arriving-new-york. Since Executive Order #205 was issued, Texas, where Mr. Zelman lives, has been on the list of states whose residents must quarantine upon entering New York. York for trial and also shared that Mr. Zelman has . Mr. Zelman’s attorney has submitted letters from Mr. Zelman’s physician noting that Mr. Zelman’s age and put him at a heightened risk of life-threatening complications if he were to contract COVID-19. (Dkt. no. 134, Exs. E-G.) Specifically, Mr. Zelman’s physician has advised Mr. Zelman “not to travel in the

US at this time” given Mr. Zelman’s age, which puts him at an “increased risk of significant morbidity or even mortality should [he] contract COVID,” and his , which places him “at significantly increased risk of being hospitalized or dying if [he] contract[s] COVID.” (Dkt. no. 134, Ex. G.) Given Mr. Zelman’s age and health condition and quarantine obligations under Executive Order #205, the Government proposes that rather than travel to New York City to testify, he testify from the U.S. Courthouse in Dallas, Texas, via live two-way video conferencing. (Dkt. no. 134.) The Government notes that video equipment could be set up so that the Court, counsel, and

Mr. Donziger could all see Mr. Zelman, and vice versa, while Mr. Zelman testified. The Government states that before Mr. Zelman testified, it would inform the Court and the defense of the exhibits that would be used during direct examination and that a Court Security Officer could be present with Mr. Zelman in Texas when testimony begins and to administer the oath. II. Discussion While the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause gives defendants the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against [them],” U.S. Const. amend. VI, the Supreme Court made clear in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), that it does not “guarantee[]” defendants “the absolute right to a face-to-

face meeting” with accusatory witnesses. Id. at 844 (emphasis in original). Rather, “the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, a preference that must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” Id. at 849 (emphasis in original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Craig held that “a defendant’s right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face- to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise

assured.” Id. at 850. Notably, Craig involved the use of one-way video testimony. For two-way video testimony, which is what the Government proposes for Mr. Zelman, the Court of Appeals has not adopted the Craig standard, observing that, unlike one-way video, two- way video “preserve[s] the face-to-face confrontation” required by the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals has authorized the use of two-way video testimony “[u]pon a finding of exceptional circumstances” and when it “furthers the interests of justice.” Id. In determining whether to permit testimony by two-way video, courts in this Circuit have applied the rules used in connection with Rule 15 depositions and

allowed video testimony “only when (1) the witness’s testimony is material; (2) the Government has made good-faith and reasonable efforts to obtain the witness’s presence and is unable to do so (that is, the witness is ‘unavailable’ within the meaning of the case law), and (3) allowing testimony by such means furthers the interests of justice.” United States v. Mostafa, 14 F. Supp. 3d 515, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); accord United States v. Buck, 271 F. Supp. 3d 619, 622-623 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). Here, the Court finds that permitting Mr. Zelman to testify using the two-way video procedures proposed by the Government would satisfy the requirements of both Gigante and Craig, to

whatever extent the latter applies in the two-way video context. With respect to the Craig standard, there is no question that limiting the spread of COVID-19 and protecting at-risk individuals from exposure to the virus are critically important public policies. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 (finding that the policy of “protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case” justified an exception to the ordinary “face-to-face confrontation” requirement”); United States v. McKown, No. 16 Cr. 178, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1293, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2020) (“[T]here is an important public interest in allowing witnesses to testify who cannot travel because of age or health.”). Nor is there any question that allowing Mr. Zelman--who is in his 70s and suffers from

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Related

Maryland v. Craig
497 U.S. 836 (Supreme Court, 1990)
United States v. Laron Carter
907 F.3d 1199 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
United States v. Mostafa
14 F. Supp. 3d 515 (S.D. New York, 2014)
United States v. Buck
271 F. Supp. 3d 619 (S.D. New York, 2017)