Cheung Tai Poon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

Sixth Circuit

Cheung Tai Poon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

707 F.2d 258, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 27486

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

DecidedMay 20, 1983

Docket80-3300

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 707 F.2d 258 (Cheung Tai Poon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cheung Tai Poon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 707 F.2d 258, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 27486 (6th Cir. 1983).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner in this case entered the United States in 1977 as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. Poon was authorized to stay in the United States until January 5, 1978. Shortly after his authorized visit expired, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, hereafter Service, issued him an order to show cause and notice of hearing, charging that he was subject to deportation pursuant to § 241(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976), because he had been convicted of a violation of a law prohibiting the possession of a dangerous drug under the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance of Hong Kong.

At the hearing, Poon admitted two Hong Kong convictions for drug possession but claimed that the offenses in Hong Kong were based upon a strict liability statute *259 such as that involved in Lennon v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.1975). This case held that immigrant Lennon should prevail because the British statute there concerned, as applied by the British courts, made possession without guilty knowledge a crime. The question posed by our instant appeal is whether the law of Hong Kong, under which Poon had been twice convicted on guilty pleas was similarly a strict liability statute. The statute in question reads:

(1) Any person who is proved to have had in his possession or custody or under his control—

(a) Anything whatsoever containing a dangerous drug,

shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have had such drug in his possession

ij< Sfc * Sfc * ifc

(3) Any person who is proved or presumed to have had a dangerous drug in his possession shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have known the nature of such drug.

It is clear to us, both from the cases cited by the parties from Hong Kong and from the opinion of the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress, which was sought by the Service and introduced at the initial hearing of this case, that the Hong Kong courts require not only proof of possession but proof of knowledge of possession. The presumption arising from possession may be overcome by proof of lack of knowledge.

The order of the Board of Immigration Appeals is affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner in this case entered the United States in 1977 as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. Poon was authorized to stay in the United States until January 5, 1978. Shortly after his authorized visit expired, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, hereafter Service, issued him an order to show cause and notice of hearing, charging that he was subject to deportation pursuant to § 241(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976), because he had been convicted of a violation of a law prohibiting the possession of a dangerous drug under the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance of Hong Kong.

At the hearing, Poon admitted two Hong Kong convictions for drug possession but claimed that the offenses in Hong Kong were based upon a strict liability statute *259 such as that involved in Lennon v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.1975). This case held that immigrant Lennon should prevail because the British statute there concerned, as applied by the British courts, made possession without guilty knowledge a crime. The question posed by our instant appeal is whether the law of Hong Kong, under which Poon had been twice convicted on guilty pleas was similarly a strict liability statute. The statute in question reads:

(1) Any person who is proved to have had in his possession or custody or under his control—

(a) Anything whatsoever containing a dangerous drug,

shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have had such drug in his possession

ij< Sfc * Sfc * ifc

(3) Any person who is proved or presumed to have had a dangerous drug in his possession shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have known the nature of such drug.

It is clear to us, both from the cases cited by the parties from Hong Kong and from the opinion of the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress, which was sought by the Service and introduced at the initial hearing of this case, that the Hong Kong courts require not only proof of possession but proof of knowledge of possession. The presumption arising from possession may be overcome by proof of lack of knowledge.

The order of the Board of Immigration Appeals is affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

707 F.2d 258, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 27486, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cheung-tai-poon-v-immigration-and-naturalization-service-ca6-1983.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack