CHETTY v. CITI BANK CORPORATION

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 13, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-02726
StatusUnknown

This text of CHETTY v. CITI BANK CORPORATION (CHETTY v. CITI BANK CORPORATION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CHETTY v. CITI BANK CORPORATION, (E.D. Pa. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LEE A. CHETTY, JR., : CIVIL ACTIO Plaintiff : : v. : NO. 22-CV-2726 : CITI BANK CORPORATION, : Defendant :

M E M O R A N D U M NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. SEPTEMBER 13, 2022

Plaintiff Lee A. Chetty, Jr., a convicted prisoner currently housed at SCI Frackville, brings this pro se civil action asserting a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Citi Bank Corporation (“Citi Bank”). Chetty seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Chetty leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Chetty’s allegations are brief. He asserts that he opened a savings account for his daughter at Citi Bank and deposited $500 into that account upon opening. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 2.) Chetty contends that the account was “fully operational” because he had access through an online website. (Id.) However, because Chetty failed to submit documentation to Citi Bank, which he claims he never received, Citi Bank closed the account in January 2020 and has refused to return his $500. (Id.) Chetty seeks a declaration that the acts and omissions of Citi Bank violated his rights “under the Constitution and laws of the United States.” (Id. at 3.) He also seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $500, as well as $100,000 in punitive damages. (Id.) II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court will grant Chetty leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.1 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether

a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). “At this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Chetty is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185

(3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). III. DISCUSSION “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Whether a private entity is acting under color of state law – i.e., whether the defendant is a state

1 However, as Chetty is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). actor subject to liability under § 1983 – depends on whether there is “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). “To answer that question, [the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has]

outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists: (1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and alteration omitted). “Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999). Rather, to support a finding of state action, “the government must be ‘responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.’” Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 870 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2017)

(quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)). The test imposed for determining whether a private party is exercising a traditionally exclusive public function is “a rigorous standard that is rarely satisfied for while many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been exclusively reserved to the State.” Robert S. v. Stetson Sch., Inc., 256 F.3d 159, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (holding that private school at which plaintiff was placed as a minor by the Department of Human Services was not a state actor). Chetty’s civil rights claims against Citi Bank are not plausible because Citi Bank is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. See McDonald v. Citibank N.A., Civ. A. No. 21-427, 2021 WL 5736437, at *7 (D. Colo. Dec. 2, 2021) (noting that banks are generally not state actors) (citing Silva v. US Bank, Nat’l Assoc., 294 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1131 (D. Colo. 2018) (“The Tenth Circuit has held that banks generally do not operate under color of state law, and therefore, cannot be held liable pursuant to § 1983.”); Mack v. California, Civ. A. No. 19-209, 2019 WL 7877391, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 8883453 (C.D. Cal.

Sept.

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Related

Blum v. Yaretsky
457 U.S. 991 (Supreme Court, 1982)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Leshko v. Servis
423 F.3d 337 (Third Circuit, 2005)
Kelley Mala v. Crown Bay Marina
704 F.3d 239 (Third Circuit, 2013)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Robert S. v. Stetson School, Inc.
256 F.3d 159 (Third Circuit, 2001)
Angela Borrell v. Bloomsburg University
870 F.3d 154 (Third Circuit, 2017)
Steven Vogt v. John Wetzel
8 F.4th 182 (Third Circuit, 2021)
Christopher Shorter v. United States
12 F.4th 366 (Third Circuit, 2021)

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Bluebook (online)
CHETTY v. CITI BANK CORPORATION, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chetty-v-citi-bank-corporation-paed-2022.