Cheslik v. Madera County Sheriff's Department

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 17, 2025·No. 1:23-cv-01754·Unknown

Opinion

ROB BONTA, State Bar No. 202668 Attorney General of California NORMAN D. MORRISON, State Bar No. 212090 Supervising Deputy Attorney General ASHLEY REYES, State Bar No. 312120 Deputy Attorney General 2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 Fresno, CA 93721-2271 Telephone: (559) 705-2312 Fax: (559) 445-5106 E-mail: Ashley.Reyes@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Defendants, State of California, acting by and through the California Highway Patrol, and Officer Efrain Jimenez DOUGLAS CHESLIK, Case No. 1:23-cv-01754-JLT-BAM Plaintiff, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER v.

MADERA COUNTY SHERIFF'S MADERA COUNTY DOE RN, STATE OF PATROL, SHERIFF TYSON J. POGUE, EFRAIN JIMENEZ, Trial Date: April 27, 2027 Defendant. Action Filed: January 23, 2024 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purposes and Limitations. Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. 1.2 Good Cause Statement. This action is likely to involve information protected by the Peace Officer Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) and Public Safety Officers Bill of Rights Act as set forth in California Government Code section 3300 et. seq. and Penal Code section 832.7 and 832.8 for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecution of this action is warranted. Defendants may be producing documents that contain personal and confidential information regarding individuals which information is generally unavailable to the public, including peace officer personnel records. The disclosure of this information to the public may violate those individuals’ privacy rights. Defendants contends that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. The uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests. Defendants also contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. Defendants contend that law enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1 089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668- 671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Additionally, Defendants may be producing reports obtained from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), which reports are generally unavailable to the public and the disclosure of which is subject to state and federal laws and regulations restricting and/or limiting disclosure or dissemination. The disclosure of this information to the public may jeopardize the security of CLETS, the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts that rely on CLETS, and the safety of law enforcement officers using CLETS. Defendants may also be producing documents concerning confidential internal policies, which documents are generally unavailable to the public. The disclosure of this information may jeopardize the security of the State’s operations and jeopardize the safety of peace officers. Finally, Defendants may be producing investigation reports which are generally unavailable to the public, the disclosure of which could violate individuals’ privacy rights and jeopardize the safety of officers. The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need for protection as to any medical or psychotherapeutic records, because of the privacy interests at stake. Because of these sensitive interests, a court order should address these documents rather than a private agreement between the parties. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. 1.3 Acknowledgment of Procedure for Filing Under Seal. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Rule 141 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause must be shown to support a filing und

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