Cheslik v. Madera County Sheriff's Department

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 17, 2025·No. 1:23-cv-01754·Unknown

Opinion

1 ROB BONTA, State Bar No. 202668 Attorney General of California 2 NORMAN D. MORRISON, State Bar No. 212090 Supervising Deputy Attorney General 3 ASHLEY REYES, State Bar No. 312120 Deputy Attorney General 4 2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 Fresno, CA 93721-2271 5 Telephone: (559) 705-2312 Fax: (559) 445-5106 6 E-mail: Ashley.Reyes@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Defendants, State of California, acting 7 by and through the California Highway Patrol, and Officer Efrain Jimenez 8 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 DOUGLAS CHESLIK, Case No. 1:23-cv-01754-JLT-BAM 13 Plaintiff, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER 14 v.

15 MADERA COUNTY SHERIFF'S 16 DEPARTMENT, COUNTY OF MADERA, MADERA COUNTY DOE RN, STATE OF 17 CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, SHERIFF TYSON J. POGUE, 18 DEPUTY K. BEHE, CHP OFFICER EFRAIN JIMENEZ, 19 Trial Date: April 27, 2027 Defendant. Action Filed: January 23, 2024 20 21 1. INTRODUCTION 22 1.1 Purposes and Limitations. Discovery in this action is likely to involve production 23 of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public 24 disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. 25 Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the court to enter the following Stipulated 26 Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on 27 all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure 28 and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment 1 under the applicable legal principles. 2 1.2 Good Cause Statement. This action is likely to involve information protected by 3 the Peace Officer Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) and Public Safety Officers Bill of Rights Act as set 4 forth in California Government Code section 3300 et. seq. and Penal Code section 832.7 and 5 832.8 for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than 6 prosecution of this action is warranted. 7 Defendants may be producing documents that contain personal and confidential 8 information regarding individuals which information is generally unavailable to the public, 9 including peace officer personnel records. The disclosure of this information to the public may 10 violate those individuals’ privacy rights. Defendants contends that peace officers have a federal 11 privilege of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein 12 that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure of 13 California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 14 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) 15 (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving 16 federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent 17 significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Cal. Penal Code 18 §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. The uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel 19 file information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their 20 families/associates. 21 Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure 22 by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 23 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the 24 collection of third-party witness information and statements and related legitimate law 25 enforcement investigations/interests. 26 Defendants also contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights as other 27 private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary to the fundamental principles 28 of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally 1 Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 2 Defendants contend that law enforcement agencies have federal deliberative-executive 3 process privilege, federal official information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and 4 federal attorney-client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the 5 personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel 6 files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or 7 evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or 8 analysis – potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs 9 type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or 10 reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal 11 advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest 12 Serv., 108 F.3d 1 089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668- 13 671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th 14 Cir. 1988). Additionally, Defendants may be producing reports obtained from the California Law 15 Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), which reports are generally unavailable to 16 the public and the disclosure of which is subject to state and federal laws and regulations 17 restricting and/or limiting disclosure or dissemination. The disclosure of this information to the 18 public may jeopardize the security of CLETS, the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts that 19 rely on CLETS, and the safety of law enforcement officers using CLETS. Defendants may also be 20 producing documents concerning confidential internal policies, which documents are generally 21 unavailable to the public. The disclosure of this information may jeopardize the security of the 22 State’s operations and jeopardize the safety of peace officers. Finally, Defendants may be 23 producing investigation reports which are generally unavailable to the public, the disclosure of 24 which could violate individuals’ privacy rights and jeopardize the safety of officers. 25 The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need for protection as to 26 any medical or psychotherapeutic records, because of the privacy interests at stake. Because of 27 these sensitive interests, a court order should address these documents rather than a private 28 agreement between the parties. 1 Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of 2 disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties 3 are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses 4 of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end 5 of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified 6 in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential 7 for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been 8 maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be 9 part of the public record of this case. 10 1.3 Acknowledgment of Procedure for Filing Under Seal.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cheslik v. Madera County Sheriff's Department, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Cheslik v. Madera County Sheriff's Department (Cheslik v. Madera County Sheriff's Department) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Pintos v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS'N
605 F.3d 665 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Knight v. Spencer
447 F.3d 6 (First Circuit, 2006)
Providence School Department v. Ana C., a Minor
108 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 1997)
Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Makar-Wellbon v. Sony Electronics, Inc.
187 F.R.D. 576 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1999)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)