Cheryl Ringo v. Sharon Taylor
This text of 2021 Ark. App. 322 (Cheryl Ringo v. Sharon Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2021 Ark. App. 322 Elizabeth Perry ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS I attest to the accuracy and DIVISION IV integrity of this document No. CV-20-370 2023.07.07 10:05:17 -05'00' 2023.003.20215 Opinion Delivered September 8, 2021 CHERYL RINGO APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE V. INDEPENDENCE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT SHARON TAYLOR [NO. 32CV-13-278] APPELLEE HONORABLE TIM WEAVER, JUDGE
DISMISSED
RITA W. GRUBER, Judge
Cheryl Ringo, record title owner to a .09-acre triangular piece of land, appeals from
an order of the Independence County Circuit Court quieting title to the property in Sharon
and Gary Taylor. 1 The circuit court found that the Taylors had acquired title by adverse
possession and also by boundary by acquiescence. Ms. Ringo challenges the circuit court’s
order and alleges that the Taylors’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations; that they
failed to establish actual possession, notice, and exclusive possession on their claim of adverse
possession; and that the court erred in finding boundary by acquiescence because the parties’
properties were not adjoining and there was no mutual assent to the boundary. Because the
issues raised are moot, we dismiss the appeal.
1Upon notice of Gary Taylor’s death, we substituted Sharon Taylor as sole appellee. The Taylors have owned property north of Ms. Ringo’s property since 1971. Ms.
Ringo purchased her property south of the Taylors in 2006. The disputed strip of land is
bordered on the south by a well-maintained fence with a gate in one corner. The strip is
bordered on the north by a gravel road called Tiffany Lane. Record title to the disputed
strip of land lies with Ms. Ringo; the Taylors’ property lies to the north of Tiffany Lane and
the disputed strip of land; and Ms. Ringo owns the property to the south of the disputed
strip.
Ms. Ringo began using the gate at the north end of her property in 2010. The
Taylors filed a complaint against Ms. Ringo in 2013 to quiet title in the disputed strip of
land. Ms. Ringo filed counterclaims for trespass and outrage and a third-party complaint for
breach of contract against First Community Bank, which warranted title to the property. 2
On August 29, 2014, the circuit court entered an order finding that the Taylors had
established their claim for adverse possession of the disputed property because their
possession had been actual, open, visible, notorious, peaceful, continuous, undisturbed, and
undisputed for more than forty years. The court also found that a boundary by acquiescence
had been proved by virtue of a tacit agreement between the Taylors and their predecessors
in title and Ms. Ringo and her predecessors in title recognizing the fence as a dividing line
between their respective tracts. We dismissed Ms. Ringo’s appeal from that order because
we lacked jurisdiction over the nonfinal order.
2 First Community Bank was the custodian for Jerry Malone’s IRA, which owned the property.
2 After the case returned to the circuit court, it dismissed Ms. Ringo’s counterclaims
against the Taylors. Ms. Ringo also filed a motion for summary judgment against First
Community Bank on her third-party complaint for breach of contract. Ms. Ringo requested
damages of approximately $35,000, including $23,000 for the loss in market value of her
property with the remainder of damages attributed to costs and attorney’s fees. On February
12, 2020, the circuit court entered a consent judgment reflecting an agreement between
Ms. Ringo and First Community Bank, which provided that the parties had agreed Ms.
Ringo should have judgment in the amount of $10,752.37 on her third-party complaint,
specifically allocated as follows: (1) $8150 for attorney’s fees; (2) $606.70 for court costs; (3)
$1500 for the appraisal; and (4) “fair market value in the amount of $501.67 for the loss of
Real Property.” On March 4, 2020, Ms. Ringo filed a satisfaction of judgment with the
court stating that the consent judgment had been “fully satisfied.” Ms. Ringo filed a notice
of appeal on March 10, 2020, appealing the court’s order of August 29, 2014.
She contends on appeal that the court erred in finding that the Taylors established
either adverse possession or boundary by acquiescence and that both claims were barred by
the statute of limitations. We cannot reach the merits of Ms. Ringo’s claims, however,
because they are moot. As a general rule, the appellate courts of this state will not review
issues that are moot. State v. Fudge, 361 Ark. 412, 206 S.W.3d 850 (2005). Under Arkansas
law, a case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical effect on
an existing legal controversy. Shipp v. Franklin, 370 Ark. 262, 266, 258 S.W.3d 744, 748
(2007). Here, there is no existing legal controversy because Ms. Ringo entered into an
agreement with First Community Bank to resolve her claim for the property, the court
3 entered a consent judgment reflecting that agreement, and Ms. Ringo filed a satisfaction of
judgment. Thus, she has settled the issue of the loss of the disputed tract, which renders this
appeal moot.
Ms. Ringo cannot now pursue an appeal of the quiet-title action in an attempt to
retain the property. She chose instead to pursue the remedy of damages for the value of the
property. She entered into a settlement agreeing to the value of the contested property, and
those damages were approved by the court in its consent judgment. Subsequently, a
satisfaction of judgment was filed with the court stating that the consent judgment had been
“fully satisfied.” She may not now pursue an appeal to obtain the property when she has
received the value of the contested land. Therefore, we dismiss the case as moot. In light of
our disposition, we also dismiss the motion to strike portions of the reply brief.
Dismissed.
HARRISON, C.J., and MURPHY, J., agree.
Parker Law Firm, PLLC, by: Stephen C. Parker, Jr., for appellant.
Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, for appellee.
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