Cherry v. Van Meter

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedAugust 6, 2025
Docket4:25-cv-04023
StatusUnknown

This text of Cherry v. Van Meter (Cherry v. Van Meter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cherry v. Van Meter, (W.D. Ark. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS TEXARKANA DIVISION

RONALD CHERRY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:25-cv-04023

JOHN VAN METER, et al DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Texarkana Arkansas Police Department (“TAPD”) Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff has responded. ECF No. 11. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making this Report and Recommendation. 1. Background: Plaintiff Ronald Cherry filed suit against Defendant TAPD, along with John Van Meter, in his individual and official capacities as a former officer with the TAPD, Christine Knouse, in her individual and official capacities as an officer with the TAPD, Marcos Luna, in his individual and official capacities as an officer with the TAPD, Whataburger #475, and the City of Texarkana, Arkansas. ECF. No. 1. Plaintiff alleges the Defendants violated his constitutional rights and committed acts of negligence, assault, and battery. Id. 2. Applicable Law: When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a federal district court should accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true. See Young 1 v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir.2001). Further, any reasonable inferences from the complaint are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See id. A motion to dismiss is properly granted when, based on the plaintiff's own allegations, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Young, 244 F.3d at 627. “Though pro se

complaints are to be construed liberally, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976), they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 3. Discussion: Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant acted under color of state law and that (2) he or she violated a right secured by the constitution.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999). Defendant TAPD argues they are a police department that is simply a department of a city, not an entity that is subject to suit, and as such, Plaintiff’s Complaint against them should be dismissed. ECF No. 7. The TAPD is not considered to be a person or legal entity subject to suit. See e.g., Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (police department not an entity subject to § 1983 liability); In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1163 n. 1 (D. Minn.

2 1987) (sheriff's department is not a legal entity subject to suit), aff'd, Myers v. Scott County, 868 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff’s claims against the TAPD are subject to dismissal. 4. Conclusion: Accordingly, I recommend Defendant TAPD’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7)

be GRANTED and Plaintiff's case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE against them. The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court. DATED this 6th day of August 2025. Barry A. Bryant /s/ HON. BARRY A. BRYANT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
In Re Scott County Master Docket
672 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Minnesota, 1987)
Ketchum v. City of West Memphis
974 F.2d 81 (Eighth Circuit, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
Cherry v. Van Meter, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cherry-v-van-meter-arwd-2025.