Cherry v. Saul

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Washington
DecidedFebruary 23, 2021
Docket4:20-cv-05047
StatusUnknown

This text of Cherry v. Saul (Cherry v. Saul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cherry v. Saul, (E.D. Wash. 2021).

Opinion

2 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

3 Feb 23, 2021

4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6

7 JENNIFER C.,1 No. 4:20-CV-5047-EFS

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S 10 ANDREW M. SAUL, the Commissioner SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION of Social Security, 11 Defendant. 12 13 14 Before the Court are the parties’ cross summary-judgment motions.2 15 Plaintiff Jennifer C. appeals the denial of benefits by the Administrative Law 16 Judge (ALJ). She alleges the ALJ erred by 1) improperly determining that the 17 impairments did not meet or equal Listing 11.02, 2) discounting Plaintiff’s 18 symptom reports, 3) failing to properly consider Plaintiff’s functional capabilities in 19

20 1 To protect the privacy of the social-security Plaintiff, the Court refers to her by 21 first name and last initial or by “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 22 2 ECF Nos. 13 & 14. 23 1 the absence of alcohol use, 4) failing to properly consider lay statements, and 5) 2 improperly assessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity and therefore relying 3 on an incomplete hypothetical at step five. In contrast, Defendant Commissioner of 4 Social Security asks the Court to affirm the ALJ’s decision finding Plaintiff not 5 disabled. After reviewing the record and relevant authority, the Court grants 6 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 13, and denies the 7 Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14. 8 I. Five-Step Disability Determination 9 A five-step sequential evaluation process is used to determine whether an 10 adult claimant is disabled.3 Step one assesses whether the claimant is currently 11 engaged in substantial gainful activity.4 If the claimant is engaged in substantial 12 gainful activity, benefits are denied.5 If not, the disability-evaluation proceeds to 13 step two.6 14 Step two assesses whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment, 15 or combination of impairments, which significantly limits the claimant’s physical 16 17 18

19 3 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). 20 4 Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). 21 5 Id. § 416.920(b). 22 6 Id. 23 1 or mental ability to do basic work activities.7 If the claimant does not, benefits are 2 denied. 8 If the claimant does, the disability-evaluation proceeds to step three.9 3 Step three compares the claimant’s impairment(s) to several recognized by 4 the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.10 If an 5 impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is 6 conclusively presumed to be disabled.11 If an impairment does not, the disability- 7 evaluation proceeds to step four. 8 Step four assesses whether an impairment prevents the claimant from 9 performing work she performed in the past by determining the claimant’s residual 10 functional capacity (RFC).12 If the claimant is able to perform prior work, benefits 11 are denied.13 If the claimant cannot perform prior work, the disability-evaluation 12 proceeds to step five. 13 Step five assesses whether the claimant can perform other substantial 14 gainful work—work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy— 15

16 7 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 17 8 Id. § 416.920(c). 18 9 Id. 19 10 Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). 20 11 Id. § 416.920(d). 21 12 Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). 22 13 Id. 23 1 considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.14 If so, 2 benefits are denied. If not, benefits are granted.15 3 The claimant has the initial burden of establishing entitlement to disability 4 benefits under steps one through four.16 At step five, the burden shifts to the 5 Commissioner to show that the claimant is not entitled to benefits.17 6 If there is medical evidence of drug or alcohol addiction (DAA), the ALJ must 7 then determine whether DAA is a material factor contributing to the disability.18 8 To determine whether DAA is a material factor contributing to the disability, the 9 ALJ evaluates which of the current physical and mental limitations would remain 10 if the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol and then determines whether any or 11 all of the remaining limitations would be disabling.19 Social Security claimants 12 may not receive benefits if the remaining limitations without DAA would not be 13 14 15

16 14 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 17 1497-98 (9th Cir. 1984). 18 15 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). 19 16 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). 20 17 Id. 21 18 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(a). 22 19 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b)(2). 23 1 disabling.20 The claimant has the burden of showing that DAA is not a material 2 contributing factor to disability.21 3 II. Factual and Procedural Summary 4 Plaintiff filed a Title XVI application, alleging a disability onset date of 5 January 1, 2018.22 Her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration.23 A 6 video administrative hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Marie 7 Palachuk.24 8 In denying Plaintiff’s disability claim, the ALJ made the following findings: 9 • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 10 since January 1, 2018, the alleged onset date; 11 • Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable severe 12 impairments: chronic urinary tract infections, endometriosis, episodic 13 migraines, depressive disorder with anxiety, alcohol abuse disorder, 14 and alcohol induced mood disorder; 15 16

17 20 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935(b); Sousa v. Callahan, 18 143 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1998). 19 21 Parra, 481 F.3d at 748. 20 22 AR 93. 21 23 AR 106 & 123. 22 24 AR 40-77. 23 1 • Step three: without alcohol use, Plaintiff did not have an impairment 2 or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the 3 severity of one of the listed impairments; 4 • RFC: Plaintiff had the RFC to perform medium work, if Plaintiff 5 stopped alcohol use, with the following limitations: 6 [Plaintiff] is unable to understand, remember, and comprehend at least simple, repetitive tasks; she is able to maintain concentration, 7 persistence, and pace for two hour intervals between regularly scheduled breaks; she can adapt to occasional and routine changes; 8 she can make only simple routine judgments; she cannot perform at a fast-paced production rate of pace. 9

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Cherry v. Saul, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cherry-v-saul-waed-2021.