Cherie Pellum v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJune 23, 2022
DocketDA-0752-17-0028-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Cherie Pellum v. Department of the Army (Cherie Pellum v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cherie Pellum v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CHERIE L. PELLUM, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-17-0028-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: June 23, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Cherie L. Pellum, San Antonio, Texas, pro se.

Kristina Letcher, Esquire, Joint Base San Antonio, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for the agency.

Casey W. Hinson, Esquire, Falls Church, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed the appeal of her removal based on a settlement agreement. For the

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and VACATE the initial decision. We RESCIND the settlement agreement, REINSTATE the removal appeal, and FORWARD the case to the Board’s Dallas Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Final Order.

BACKGROUND ¶2 The appellant was removed from her position as a GS-6 Vocational Nurse, effective September 14, 2016, based on her inability to perform her duties. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 33, 36, 186. The specification supporting the action indicated that the appellant could not perform her essential duties because she had been barred from accessing the agency’s information systems, including but not limited to accessing the electronic medical record system and the electronic healthcare record system. Id. at 186. The proposal notice also indicated that, on July 25, 2012, before she entered on duty with the agency in the position at issue and while she was on active duty, she was notified of a preliminary decision to deny her security clearance due to a series of delinquent debts; that her security clearance was in fact denied on or about November 3, 2012; that she was nonetheless appointed to her current civilian position on April 6, 2015, although placed on administrative leave on April 21, 2015; that the agency unsuccessfully sought a waiver for her continued access to unclassified information systems to allow her to perform her duties; and that, as the agency advised the appellant, while her position did not require a security clearance, she remained barred from accessing the information systems she needed to perform her essential duties, including accessing patient records or charts, documenting patient records, accessing physician orders or notes, and accessing or inputting patient drugs. Id. ¶3 The appellant filed an appeal of her removal with the Board, IAF, Tab 1, and requested a hearing, id. at 2, which was duly set, IAF, Tab 16. On January 6, 2017, the last work day before the scheduled hearing, the parties sub mitted to the administrative judge a signed settlement agreement. IAF, Tab 17. In pertinent 3

part, the agency agreed to pay the appellant $1,500.00 and, within 20 days, request the cancelation of her removal, provide her with a clean personnel record, and remove from her Official Personnel File all matters related to the removal action. Id. For her part, the appellant agreed that her signature on the agreement would constitute a request to resign for personal reasons, effective September 14, 2016, and that she would withdraw her appeal with prejudice. Id. The administrative judge canceled the hearing, IAF, Tab 18, and , on January 9, 2017, issued a decision dismissing the appeal as settled, IAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision at 2. ¶4 The following day, January 10, 2017, the appellant filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. With her petition, she enclosed a January 10, 2017 memorandum for the record with the subject , “Security Clearance Verification,” indicating that her security clearance was granted by the Department of Defense Central Adjudication Facility on January 5, 2017. Id. at 4. The appellant stated that, had she known about this information on that date, she would not have entered into the settlement agreement because the impediment to her performing her duties had been lifted. Id. at 3. The agency has responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

ANALYSIS ¶5 It is well settled that a settlement agreement is a contract between the parties that may be set aside or voided only on the basis of certain , limited grounds, inter alia, fraud or a mutual mistake of material fact under which both parties acted. See, e.g., Harris v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 142 F.3d 1463, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Hamilton v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 92 M.S.P.R. 467, ¶ 7 (2002). A mutual mistake of fact is a shared, mistaken belief of the parties regarding a material assumption of fact underlying their agreement. Brown v. Department of the Army, 108 M.S.P.R. 90, ¶ 5 n.1 (2008); Garcia v. 4

Department of the Air Force, 83 M.S.P.R. 277, ¶ 10 (1999) (citing As’Salaam v. U.S. Postal Service, 65 M.S.P.R. 417, 421 (1994)). ¶6 Further, implicit in any contract is the requirement that the parties fulfill their respective obligations in good faith, and acting in bad faith may constitute breach. Adams v. U.S. Postal Service, 72 M.S.P.R. 6, 11 (1996). The Board has defined “bad faith” as “the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose of moral obliquity.” Id. ¶7 As described above, the parties’ January 6, 2017 settlement agreement was premised on the basic assumption that the appellant’s security clearance, and attendant access to information necessary to the performance of her duties, had been denied in 2012, and that the propriety of that agency action remained pending before the appropriate authority. The memorandum the appellant submitted to the Board with her petition for review indicates that, in fact, on the day before the parties signed the agreement, her security clearance was granted. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Thus, the parties may have executed the agreement under a mutual mistake of fact, i.e., by virtue of the fact that her security clearance had been granted, the appellant now had access to the information she needed to perform her duties. Cf. Woodjones v. Department of the Army, 89 M.S.P.R. 196, ¶ 12 (2001) (holding that a shared misunderstanding about whether a decision on the appellant’s disability retirement application had been made, and the ti me to challenge it had passed, would be a mutual mistake of fact). ¶8 On the other hand, if the individuals who negotiated the agreement on behalf of the agency knew or had reason to know that the appellant’s security clearance had been granted, then, at the very least, the agency would have negotiated the agreement in bad faith, keeping to itself the knowledge th at the impediment to the appellant’s performing her duties had been lifted. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate whether, at the time the parties executed 5

the settlement agreement, either one knew or had reason to know that the appellant’s security clearance had been granted. 2 ¶9 Nonetheless, either under the theory of mutual mistake or bad faith on the part of the agency in negotiating the settlement agreement, it must be set aside. Vance v.

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Wayne B. Harris v. Department of Veterans Affairs
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Cherie Pellum v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cherie-pellum-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2022.