Cheri Winstead, Administratrix of the Estate of Landon Nokes v. Patricia Morris

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: December 19, 2024
• Docket: 2023-SC-0515
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.” PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. RENDERED: DECEMBER 19, 2024 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2023-SC-0515-MR

CHERI WINSTEAD, ADMINISTRATRIX APPELLANT OF THE ESTATE OF LANDON NOKES

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. NO. 2023-CA-1017 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 23-CI-004105

HONORABLE PATRICIA MORRIS, APPELLEE JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

AND

PROFIRIO CRUZ HERNANDEZ REAL PARTY IN INTEREST / APPELLEE

OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT

DISMISSING AS MOOT

Appellant Winstead filed a civil suit against Appellee Hernandez for

wrongful death arising from a drunk driving collision. Winstead propounded

discovery requests asking Hernandez to identify the bar where he was drinking

before the collision. Hernandez faced related criminal charges, and the

Jefferson Circuit Court therefore stayed Hernandez’s obligations to respond to

Winstead’s discovery requests.

Facing a one-year statute of limitations on a possible dram shop claim,

Winstead then brought this original action in the Court of Appeals for a writ

directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to require Hernandez to respond to the discovery requests under seal and without disclosure of his responses to

prosecuting authorities. The Court of Appeals denied the requested writ and

Winstead now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 115.

After Winstead filed the present appeal, Hernandez pled guilty in the

underlying criminal case. Hernandez also identified the bar at issue to

Winstead, who has now also filed an Amended Complaint that includes that

entity as a defendant. As such, we conclude the matter is moot and therefore

dismiss this appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 18, 2022, Landon Nokes was killed in an automobile

collision with Hernandez. Hernandez had a blood alcohol level of 0.192 at the

time of the collision. A grand jury later handed down an indictment charging

Hernandez with murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, operating without

a license, and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol.

Winstead contends that her counsel contacted Hernandez’s counsel to

find out whether Hernandez would provide information about where he was

drinking before the collision so that Winstead could file wrongful death and

other dram shop liability claims before expiration of the one-year statute of

limitations. Hernandez declined to provide the requested information.

Winstead then filed a civil suit against Hernandez and propounded

discovery requests asking Hernandez to identify where he consumed alcohol

before the collision. Hernandez responded with a motion to stay the discovery

requests pending resolution of the criminal case against him. Winstead moved

2 for a protective order allowing the discovery but prohibiting disclosure of any

incriminating evidence to anyone outside the civil case and prohibiting use of

disclosed incriminating evidence in the criminal proceeding. The trial court

granted Hernandez’s request for a stay and denied Winstead’s requested

protective order.

Winstead then filed this original action in the Court of Appeals for a writ

of prohibition and mandamus requiring Hernandez to provide the requested

discovery. The Court of Appeals held that Winstead lacked an adequate

remedy by way of appeal because the one-year statute of limitations for the

dram shop claim would likely expire before such an appeal could be

adjudicated. The Court of Appeals also found that Winstead’s potential loss of

her dram shop claim due to expiration of the statute of limitations likewise

constituted irreparable injury.

However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly stayed

Hernandez’s discovery obligations pending resolution of his criminal case. The

Court of Appeals found that requiring Hernandez to respond would violate his

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and that Winstead’s

proposed protective order prohibiting disclosure and use of Hernandez’s

discovery responses in the criminal proceeding was insufficient to protect those

rights. The Court of Appeals therefore declined to grant Winstead’s requested

writ, and Winstead now appeals to this Court as a matter of right.

After Winstead’s filing of this appeal, Hernandez pled guilty and was

sentenced in the underlying criminal case on January 30, 2024. Hernandez

3 shortly thereafter provided Winstead the identity of the bar where he drank

before the collision. Winstead filed an Amended Complaint against the bar on

February 12, 2024.

Given that Hernandez’s Fifth Amendment rights are no longer at issue

and because Winstead now knows the identity of the bar where Hernandez

drank before the collision, this Court issued an Order on September 24, 2024

requiring the parties to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as

moot. Winstead responds that Hernandez identified the bar only after the one-

year statute of limitations on the dram shop claim expired, and thus the trial

court’s stay of discovery infringed on Winstead’s rights under the Kentucky

Constitution to protect property, to an open court, to seek remedy for injuries,

and to recover for wrongful death. See Ky. Const. §§ 1, 14, & 241. Winstead

maintains we should therefore apply the public interest exception to the

mootness doctrine and consider the proper balancing of a civil litigant’s right to

obtain discovery to pursue a timely claim against a criminal defendant’s right

to remain silent. Hernandez responds that the appeal is moot and does not

object to dismissal. We conclude that the appeal is moot and that the public

interest exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply, and therefore

dismiss the appeal as moot.

4 ANALYSIS

Under the mootness doctrine, an appellate court “must, of course,

dismiss an appeal ‘when a change in circumstance renders that court unable

to grant meaningful relief to either party.’” Lehmann v. Gibson, 482 S.W.3d

375, 381 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth, Kentucky Bd. of Nursing v.

Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc., 433 S.W.3d 341, 344 (Ky. 2014)). However, under the

public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, the court may rule upon an

otherwise moot issue if the following three elements are met:

(1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers; and (3) there is a likelihood of future recurrence of the question.

Id. (quoting Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 102 (Ky. 2014)).

Here, the question regarding the proper balance between a civil litigant’s

interests and a criminal defendant’s right to remain silent is of a public nature

and there is a likelihood of future recurrence. See id. at 382 (“This is surely a

question of public importance, involving the rights not only of criminal

defendants but also those of civil plaintiffs. It seems likely that criminal and

civil cases will again arise out of the same events such that the instant

discovery issue will reappear.”). However, the public interest exception

nonetheless does not apply because we have previously addressed the

balancing of a civil litigant’s rights against those of a criminal defendant. As

such, there is no “need for an authoritative determination” of the issue “for the

5 future guidance of public officers” as our case law already sets forth that

guidance.

In Barnes v. Goodman, this Court was asked to consider the same

question presented here, namely how trial courts should balance a civil

litigant’s interest in conducting discovery against a criminal defendant’s right

to remain silent. 626 S.W.3d 631 (Ky. 2021). Barnes was a criminal defendant

charged with abusing an elderly woman in a nursing home. Id. at 634. The

victim’s family brought a civil suit against Barnes and a number of other

employees and entities. Id. In the civil suit, Barnes sought a motion to stay

discovery in order to preserve her right to remain silent, which the trial court

denied. Id. at 633. The Court of Appeals denied Barnes’ request for a writ, and

she appealed to this Court.

In our published Opinion affirming the Court of Appeals, we set forth the

relevant considerations for trial courts to weigh in balancing the interests of a

civil litigant against a criminal defendant’s right to remain silent. We began by

noting that a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right does not necessarily

prevail over a civil litigant’s need for discovery. Id. at 639. We also noted that

“staying a civil case is not constitutionally mandated when a parallel criminal

case is pending.” Id. at 640. We held that trial courts should “be flexible and

not use granting a stay as a ‘default position.’” Id. (quoting Lehmann, 482

S.W.3d at 384).

We further pointed out the numerous tools available for trial courts to

employ in allowing civil discovery to proceed while also protecting a criminal

6 defendant’s right to remain silent. For example, we explained that trial courts

may use protective orders to prevent an improper use of civil discovery in the

prosecution of a criminal defendant. Id. at 639. We also pointed to other

options available such as “staying depositions, limiting topics [and] sealing

interrogatories.” Id. at 640. We further noted the additional option of “limiting

depositions to identified terms, conditions, matters, and witnesses while being

conducted in the presence of court-designated individuals; sealing a deposition

upon completion and permitting review only upon court order; and, placing an

embargo on disclosure.” Id.

In short, Barnes plainly sets forth the relevant considerations,

parameters, and procedures for trial courts to use in balancing a civil litigant’s

interest in conducting discovery against a criminal defendant’s right to remain

silent. It leaves no question as to how a trial court should approach that task.

Its holding and guidance apply equally when, as here, a civil plaintiff is

concerned with the possible expiration of a statute of limitations. As such,

there is no need for us to again issue guidance on the issue, given that we have

already done so in plain and comprehensive terms set forth in a published

Opinion. Moreover, because the issues presented in this case are moot, there

is also no need for us to consider whether the trial court erred in applying our

existing law. Accordingly, because there is no need for authoritative guidance,

the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply. We

therefore conclude this appeal should be dismissed as moot.

7 ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is hereby dismissed as moot.

All sitting. All concur.

ENTERED: December 19, 2024

______________________________________ CHIEF JUSTICE