Cheney Talking Mach. Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.

278 F. 445, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 1967
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedDecember 15, 1921
DocketNos. 3534, 3535
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 278 F. 445 (Cheney Talking Mach. Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cheney Talking Mach. Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 278 F. 445, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 1967 (6th Cir. 1921).

Opinion

DENISON, Circuit Judge.

This is the usual infringement suit brought by the Victor Company against the Cheney Company, based upon claims 42 of patent No. 814,786, and 7 and 11 of patent No. 814,848, both issued March 3, 1906, to E. R. Johnson, and assigned to the Victor Company. The District Court held that claims 7 and 11 were not infringed, but that claim 42 was valid and infringed. Both parties appeal.

[1] Passing by other questions, we have thought proper to devote our attention chiefly to the issue of infringement of claim 42. That disposed of, the issues under claims 7 and 11 give less trouble. Claim 42 is of that type which seems to be simple and clear enough as applied to the particular structure described and shown in the patent, but which becomes thoroughly ambiguous when application is sought to the variant structure of a future defendant. It is also of that type where, without distortion of any word beyond the common meaning, the language may be read upon defendant’s structure, but where many things warn against the breadth of construction necessary to such application. Since the case presents an unusually complicated instance of the typical difficulties, and since our conclusion is superficially— [446]*446though we think not substantially — not in accord with some results reached in other courts, it seems fitting to discuss the issue more in detail than we commonly do.

In 1903 there were two classes of sound recording and reproducing machines. One, which may be called the Edison type, used a record of cylindrical form, and the stylus followed a spiral path around the surface of the revolving cylinder by reason of a positive mechanical feed which caused relative motion longitudinally of the cylinder between it and the stylus-carrying parts. The other, which may be called the Berliner form, used a fiat disc, upon the upper surface of which the stylus traveled in a spiral path. In reproducing, the stylus point would tend to remain in the prepared groove, and thus to cause the stylus and its attached parts to travel from the outside of the disc towards the center. Each form was provided with a diaphragm operated by the stylus and communicating with an amplifying horn.

Johnson devised a sectional horn, the preferred and illustrated form of which was adapted particularly for use in the Berliner machines. He filed his application February 12, 1903, upon a talking machine. In February,. 1904, using identical drawings and generally the specification of the first ■ application, he filed a divisional application directed to the amplifying horn. Both patents issued on the same day, the one based upon the original application being No. 814,786, and the one based upon the divisional application being No. 814,848. The structure is shown in the following sketch, which is Fig. 1 of the drawings of each patent:

[447]*447Claim 42 reads as follows:

“A talking machine, comprising a tapering sound-conveyor, moans for attaching sound-reproducing moans to the small end thereof, and horn-coupling and supporting means with which the other end of said conveyor is movably connected.”

The defendant manufactures a form fully enough shown by the following sketch:

As we approach the question whether claim 42 may, consistently with its validity, have a reading broad enough to cover defendant’s form, we do so in an atmosphere colored by two unusual things. The first is that plaintiff declined defendant’s offer to submit its machine to plaintiff soon after it carne oh the market, so as to be advised whether plaintiff would consider it an infringement of any patent, but later brought and prosecuted an infringement suit substantially the same as the present one, yet, when that suit was about to be heard, voluntarily discontinued it without prejudice to a new suit, and some three years later brought the present action. In this course of conduct we do not find the estoppel which defendant urges; but plaintiffs do not commonly take such action in clear cases, and its presence here strongly suggests that the right to recover in the first suit was doubted by the plaintiff.

The other colorful thing is that this patent application was prosecuted by skillful counsel for nearly three years, through repeated rejections and through the'presentation and urging of about 100 varying claims, resulting in a final sifting by which 40 claims were agreed upon [448]*448between examiner and solicitor as covering the varying aspects of the invention, all before any claim occurred to the solicitor which would reach defendant’s structure. Just as the case was ready for issue claims 41 and 42 were added. This' suit is not planted on claim 41, although it is broader than 42. We do not suggest that the applicant may not, at any time before issue, broaden his claims in any way justified by his disclosure and by the state of the art; indeed, matters which develop during the period of prosecution often demonstrate or call attention to the fact that earlier claims are not as broad as they should be; but such a course of conduct as here occurred strongly supports an inference that the claim thus added was intended only to reach some anticipated, possible variations of the general conception already described and claimed, rather than a distinct and largely inconsistent conception which had never so far been suggested. Only in the latter view can the claim reach the defendant here.

Returning to the patented structure, we see that its primary elements are three: (1) The stylus with its diaphragm and diaphragm frame, which, in some form, is drawn down to a central opening opposite to the center of the diaphragm and constituting the beginning of a conduit for the sound waves which have been produced by the diaphragm vibrations. These parts, grouped in this way, seem to be what the pat-entee means when he speaks, in specification and claims, of a sound box. (2) The sound conveyor or tube which forms' a continuation of the conduit and carries the sound waves away from the production point in order to reach the amplifying hom. (3) The amplifying hom itself. Johnson makes his conduit (2) of expanding tapered form, and thus causes elements (2) and (3) to constitute together one continuous amplifying hom. In addition to these three primary, he has two secondary, elements. These are: (4) Connecting means between the sound box and the small end of the tapered tube giving relative movability, whereby the sound box can be raised or lowered for replacing a needle or starting or stopping and without moving the tapered tube. (5) Supporting and connecting means applied to the joint between the large end of the tapered tube and the small end of the hom proper, whereby either the tube or the horn may swing horizontally, and yet the weight of both is carried, and the two are coupled together into a unitary hom.

In order to reach the defendant’s form, elements 4 and 5 must be considered to cover all known means of operative connection between (1) and (2) and between (2) and (3). Defendant attaches its sound box to the small end of its sound tube by a bayonet joint. There is detachability but no adjustability of any kind. No method of attachment has been suggested which would escape the claim, if this one does not. At the other end of the sound tube defendant, who uses the now familiar cabinet style, supports the horn by permanently and rigidly fastening to the cabinet top, depending therefrom, another sound tube which at its other and lower end rigidly carries the hom proper.

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Bluebook (online)
278 F. 445, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 1967, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cheney-talking-mach-co-v-victor-talking-mach-co-ca6-1921.