Chen v. District of Columbia

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 8, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-0474
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MAY CHEN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00474 (UNA) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court

grants plaintiff’s IFP application and, for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses the complaint,

and this matter, without prejudice.

Plaintiff, who resides in the District of Columbia, sues “District of Columbia (All Black

People),” “State of Maryland (All Black People),” “State of California (All Black People),” and

“State of Texas (Black People).” See Compl. at 1–2. The complaint is vague and difficult to

follow. Plaintiff broadly alleges, without context or detail, that, for nearly 30 years, “Black people

in [ ] Texas, California, Maryland, [and] District of Columbia repeatedly obstruct and bully [her]

employment[,]” intentionally conspiring to “ruin [her] clearance to lose employment eligibility

and age disadvantage,” and by conducting “unfair hiring and predatory activities to cause

significant economic losses.” See id. at 5. Plaintiff’s grievances appear to arise from her

dissatisfaction with the outcome of unspecified “EEOC hearings” and “employment litigation”

that she has filed in “federal courts.” See id. She demands quintillion dollars in damages, “criminal

prosecution,” and a “barring notice, injunctive relief forever.” See id. Federal Rule 8(a) requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that

defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive

answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown

v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Notably, “[a] confused and rambling narrative of

charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort

Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). And when a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly

nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and

personal comments [,]” it also fails to fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. See Jiggetts v. D.C., 319

F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737

(D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017).

The instant complaint falls squarely within this category. Plaintiff presents mere

conclusory statements within a mess of tangled assertions, failing to provide defendants or the

court with notice of any viable claim. Although plaintiff invokes a litany of different laws, largely

related to employment discrimination, see Compl. at 3–4, she fails to make out a cognizable claim

under any of the authority cited, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not sufficient to state a claim);

see also id. at 682 (“bare assertions” of a “discrimination claim” are “not entitled to be assumed

true.”). Furthermore, the complaint paragraphs are conflated and are not limited “to a single set of

circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order accompanies

this memorandum opinion.

Date: April 8, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge