Chen v. Blanche
This text of Chen v. Blanche (Chen v. Blanche) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 24 2026
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
LONGCAI CHEN, No. 23-878
Petitioner, Agency No. A209-871-411
v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 31, 2026** San Francisco, California
Before: NGUYEN, MILLER, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Longcai Chen, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review
of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding an order of
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum and withholding of
removal. We have jurisdiction under § 242(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the agency’s legal conclusions de
novo and “both [its] underlying factual findings and [its] application of the INA to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). those findings” for substantial evidence. Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845,
851 (2026); see Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the
latter standard, the agency’s determinations “are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Urias-Orellana, 146 S. Ct. at 852–53 (holding that this
same standard applies to “the persecution determination”). We deny the petition.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Petitioner’s
testimony was not credible. See Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020)
(holding that adverse credibility determinations are reviewed for substantial
evidence). Petitioner’s asylum and withholding claims are based on alleged
persecution on account of his religion (Christianity) and his political opinion
(opposition to China’s policy of coercive population control). Relying on the IJ’s
factual determinations, the BIA upheld the IJ’s conclusion that Petitioner made
several misrepresentations and false statements in a 2016 visa application, which
was submitted years after his wife’s alleged tubal ligation and before his alleged
religious persecution by the Chinese government began. These included
misrepresentations about his education, prior employment, whether he had
relatives in the United States, and whether he received help preparing the
application. “[L]ies and fraudulent documents when they are no longer necessary
for the immediate escape from persecution do support an adverse [credibility]
2 inference.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1272 (9th Cir. 2011). Indeed, a
deliberate lie to immigration authorities “always counts as substantial evidence
supporting an adverse credibility finding, unless the lie falls within the narrow . . .
exception” for lies necessary to avoid persecution. Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d
1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (simplified).
The BIA also observed that Petitioner’s admitted return to China, which
occurred after his wife’s alleged surgery, supported the inference that his testimony
was not credible. See Loho v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that such an inference is warranted). The BIA further noted that
Petitioner testified inconsistently about his church attendance following his release
from detention, an issue central to his religious-persecution claim. See Singh, 643
F.3d at 1180 (“An applicant will naturally be more likely to remember and relate
the facts that are important to his claim.”). Ultimately, “our cases have allowed IJs
to make adverse credibility determinations based on the maxim falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus—false in one thing, false in everything.” Ani v. Bondi, 155 F.4th
1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2025). Nothing in the record compels a contrary
determination here.
Even absent credible testimony, an applicant for asylum or withholding of
removal may establish a meritorious case based on documentary evidence alone.
See Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 889–90 (9th Cir. 2001). But substantial
3 evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to do so here. See
Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner’s principal
documentary evidence of past persecution is a 2017 letter from his wife, addressed
to the IJ, stating that the Chinese government coerced her into undergoing tubal
ligation surgery and describing her husband’s alleged religious persecution. But
the IJ found this letter to be insufficiently reliable, concluding that Petitioner’s wife
may have lied about whether the surgical procedure was coerced and whether it
occurred at all. The BIA upheld that conclusion, and the record does not compel a
contrary one. As to future persecution, Petitioner’s country conditions evidence
does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner has a well-founded fear that he will
be subjected to mistreatment rising to the level of persecution.
PETITION DENIED.
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