Chemical Bank v. Miller

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Chemical Bank v. Miller

269 A.D.2d 220, 702 N.Y.S.2d 816, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1516

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 15, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 269 A.D.2d 220 (Chemical Bank v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Chemical Bank v. Miller, 269 A.D.2d 220, 702 N.Y.S.2d 816, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1516 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Emily Goodman, J.), entered on or about January 5, 1999, denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment dismissing defendant’s affirmative defense that the action was not timely commenced and dismissing the complaint as time-barred, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The instant action, commenced beyond the expiration of the applicable statutory period, was properly dismissed as time-barred. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, its action is not rendered timely by CPLR former 306-b (b) since that provision was no longer in effect at the time plaintiff commenced the action. Plaintiff had no vested right to the privilege afforded by CPLR former 306-b (b).

We have considered plaintiff’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur — Tom, J. P., Wallach, Rubin and Andrias, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Emily Goodman, J.), entered on or about January 5, 1999, denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment dismissing defendant’s affirmative defense that the action was not timely commenced and dismissing the complaint as time-barred, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The instant action, commenced beyond the expiration of the applicable statutory period, was properly dismissed as time-barred. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, its action is not rendered timely by CPLR former 306-b (b) since that provision was no longer in effect at the time plaintiff commenced the action. Plaintiff had no vested right to the privilege afforded by CPLR former 306-b (b).

We have considered plaintiff’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur — Tom, J. P., Wallach, Rubin and Andrias, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

269 A.D.2d 220, 702 N.Y.S.2d 816, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1516, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chemical-bank-v-miller-nyappdiv-2000.

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