Cheers v. Archer

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedSeptember 3, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00671
StatusUnknown

This text of Cheers v. Archer (Cheers v. Archer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cheers v. Archer, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RICKY D. CHEERS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-671-bhl

DWILETTE ARCHER, et al.,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Ricky D. Cheers, who is currently serving a state prison sentence at the Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Cheers’ motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and to screen the complaint. Dkt. Nos. 1 & 2. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE Cheers requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). Dkt. No. 2. A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). Cheers has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $14.41. Accordingly, the Court will grant Cheers’ motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, and dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,”

that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’

but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT Cheers is an inmate at the Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants

are Health Services Manager (HSM) Dwilette Archer, Dr. Buono, Warden Steven Johnson, Probation Officer (PO) Erika Smith, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Martha Carlson, Administrator Brian Hayes, and State Public Defender (SPD) Eric Hailstock. Id. at 1. On July 9, 2024, Cheers had a “Spontaneous Coronary Artery Dissection” that was so serious he thought he was going to die. Id. at 2. Emergency Room doctors performed a “stent procedure” that left Cheers immobile and hospitalized for over 14 days. Id. Following the hospitalization, when Cheers returned to the institution, HSM Archer and Dr. Buono failed to acknowledge or treat his complaints of pain; and they refused to order the recommended treatment of “cardiac rehabilitation.” Id. at 1-2. They essentially acted like nothing had happened to him even though he had just been hospitalized for 14 days. Id. Cheers claims that the failure to provide

follow-up medical care and/or order cardiac rehabilitation has caused significant pain, increased chest congestion, and difficulty breathing. Id. Cheers claims that he complained about his heart condition to Warden Johnson, but the warden did not act to secure proper medical care. Id. at 2. Cheers also complained about his heart condition to PO Smith, ALJ Carlson, and Administrator Hayes during his revocation proceedings, but they too did not act to help secure proper medical care. Id. at 2-4. PO Smith, ALJ Carlson, and Administrator Hayes allegedly indicated that his medical care/heart condition has nothing to do with the revocation process; and that the relevant question before them was whether or not he committed a violation. Id. at 2-3. They refused to consider his heart condition during his revocation proceedings or act to secure the “cardiac rehabilitation” he needed. Id. Cheers states that SPD Hailstock did not represent him properly in his revocation appeal because he was “unprofessional.” Id. at 4. For relief, Cheers seeks monetary damages and “review of my revocation decision to reflect a fair and proper punishment that is not excessive.” Id.

THE COURT’S ANALYSIS “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when he or she acts with deliberate indifference to the serious medical need of an incarcerated individual. Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720-21 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)). To state a claim, Cheers must allege an objectively serious

medical condition and an official’s deliberate indifference to that condition. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015).

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Cheers v. Archer, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cheers-v-archer-wied-2025.