Chavolla-Sierra v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: 23-275
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VICTOR CHAVOLLA-SIERRA, No. 23-275 Agency No. Petitioner, A088-660-024 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 13, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and S.R. THOMAS and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Victor Chavolla-Sierra, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming an order of an

immigration judge denying his application for cancellation of removal. We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), see Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S.

209, 217 (2024), and we deny the petition.

To qualify for cancellation of removal, an applicant must establish that his

removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship to a

qualifying relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). “[T]he hardship must be out of the

ordinary and exceedingly uncommon. It must deviate, in the extreme, from the

norm.” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2025).

We review the Board’s assessment of “exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship” for substantial evidence. Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1005. Under that

standard, the Board’s determination is “conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. at 1002 (quoting

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

1. Chavolla-Sierra argues that the Board committed legal error “by assessing

the case with an ‘unconscionable’ hardship standard,” instead of the “exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship” standard prescribed in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). Although he admits that the Board “articulate[d] the correct

hardship standard,” he argues that, “[e]valuated under the correct standard, it is

clear that the Petitioner’s case presented exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship to qualifying relatives.” That is merely another way of saying that he

objects to the Board’s determination that he did not meet the exceptional and

2 23-275 extremely unusual hardship standard. As noted, we review that determination for

substantial evidence.

2. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that Chavolla-

Sierra did not demonstrate the required hardship. Chavolla-Sierra sought

cancellation of removal to Mexico based on potential hardship to his two U.S.-

citizen children, who were twelve and eight years old at the time of the

immigration judge’s decision. Chavolla-Sierra testified that if he were removed,

his partner and their children would move to Mexico with him.

Chavolla-Sierra testified that both children have had some difficulties in

school but are “not too bad, a little bit normal for a child.” In addition, his daughter

had a heart problem when she was born and continues to take medication for the

condition. But Chavolla-Sierra provided no evidence that either of his children has

“very serious health issues” or any “compelling special needs in school” that will

not be addressed adequately in Mexico. Fernandez v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 965, 966

(9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56,

63 (B.I.A. 2001)).

Nor is there evidence that Chavolla-Sierra will lack assistance in providing

for his qualifying children. Chavolla-Sierra’s partner suffered a stroke about a year

before the hearing, and although she testified that she still feels weak on her right

side, she also testified that doctors told her that “with time,” she would “regain

3 23-275 strength in [her right] arm.” She previously worked at a plant nursery, and

Chavolla-Sierra testified that “[s]he probably could start to work there again.”

There is no evidence that her recovery or ability to support her children would be

worse in Mexico than in the United States. Furthermore, both Chavolla-Sierra and

his partner have family in Mexico who are employed. Cf. In re Gonzalez Recinas,

23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 469–71 (B.I.A. 2002) (finding exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship where single-mother applicant had no immediate family in

Mexico and was the sole support for her six children).

Although his qualifying relatives may suffer educational, medical, and other

difficulties in Mexico, the evidence does not compel the conclusion that Chavolla-

Sierra has met the high burden of demonstrating a hardship that would “deviate[],

in the extreme, from the hardship that ordinarily occurs in removal cases.”

Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1007.

The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 4) is denied.

PETITION DENIED.

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