IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE DAKAI CHAVIS, § § No. 402, 2019 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court of § the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID. No. 1806020079 STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: March 25, 2020 Decided: May 26, 2020
Before VAUGHN, TRAYNOR, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED and REMANDED.
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellant, Dakai Chavis. Kathryn J. Garrison, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Dover, Delaware for Appellee, State of Delaware.
VAUGHN, Justice: The Appellant, Dakai Chavis, appeals from his conviction in Superior Court
of Criminal Trespass in the First Degree. He raises one issue. He contends that the
Superior Court erred during his jury trial by admitting evidence of two prior
convictions under Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b). For the reasons which follow,
we agree that the evidence of his prior convictions should not have been admitted.
I. FACTS
After attending the first day of Firefly Festival during the June 15, 2018
weekend, Karen Eng and her brother, Brian Eng, checked into the Baymont Inn in
Newark, Delaware. In the early hours of the morning, while the Engs were asleep,
someone entered their room. Ms. Eng awoke, heard rustling in the room, sat up in
bed, and saw a man crawling at the foot of the bed near the door to the room. She
asked, “what are you doing?”1 The man replied that he was in the wrong room and
left. After the Engs checked personal property they had placed on a desk, Mr. Eng
found that roughly $50 was missing from his wallet.
Before they had a chance to report the incident to the front desk, the Engs
received a call on the hotel room phone. The caller identified himself as the hotel
manager and explained that a maintenance worker was just in their room. The caller
agreed to meet with the maintenance worker and Ms. Eng at the front desk. She
went down to the front desk, on her way finding the cash from her brother’s wallet
1 App. to Opening Br. at A106.
2 on the hallway floor outside their room. When she reached the front desk, she
described the situation to a female clerk on duty, who was surprised to hear what
Ms. Eng was telling her. The clerk called the maintenance worker on duty to the
front desk, and he stated that he was not the man who entered the Engs’ room. Ms.
Eng agreed that he was not the intruder. The Newark police were contacted, and
Detective William Anderson began an investigation.
Ms. Eng described the intruder as an African-American man, between 5’5”
and 5’7” tall, not heavy, and dressed in dark clothing. She informed Detective
Anderson, however, that she would not be able to identify the man in a lineup.
Detective Anderson obtained and reviewed surveillance footage from the hotel
lobby. He observed a man matching the description given by Ms. Eng enter the hotel
lobby at about 6:30 a.m., walk through the doorway to a stairwell, come back into
the lobby about 22 minutes later, and then exit through the doorway to the stairwell
again. Detective Anderson recalled that Chavis, who matched the appearance of the
man in the video and the description provided by Ms. Eng, had been involved in two
incidents at a Days Inn in Newark in November 2014. In the first incident, Chavis
was alleged to have opened a door to a hotel room and, when he realized the room
was occupied, to have told the occupant he was a maintenance employee and then
left. He pled guilty to criminal trespass for that incident. In the second incident,
Chavis was alleged to have used a stolen credit card that had been taken from a room
3 at the same motel two weeks later. As a result of that incident, Chavis pled guilty to
theft.
During his investigation, Detective Anderson also discovered that Chavis was
wearing a GPS monitor at the time of the incident in the Engs’ motel room. GPS
records placed Chavis at the hotel near the Engs’ room at the time Ms. Eng saw her
intruder.
As a result of his investigation, Detective Anderson arrested Chavis for
Burglary in the Second Degree and Misdemeanor Theft. Chavis was subsequently
indicted on those charges.
Prior to Chavis’ trial, the State filed a Motion in limine asking the court to
admit into evidence the convictions for the 2014 incidents at the Days Inn under
D.R.E. 404(b). In the motion, the State alleged that the two prior offenses were
“strikingly similar” to the charged offenses in this case and that it “would use those
convictions as proof of motive, plan, intent, and absence of mistake or accident.” 2
The motion further stated, in pertinent part:
In this case, the evidence is material in that it goes to the defendant’s motive, plan, intent, or absence of mistake in coming onto the property of the Baymont Inn. Specifically, the prior cases become relevant to show a specific modus operandi the defendant utilizes when he burglarizes hotel rooms in the early morning hours. He gains entry to the rooms and when confronted makes up a
2 Id. at A10.
4 story proclaiming to be a maintenance man and flees the scene.3
In addressing the “plain, clear and conclusive” factor of Getz v. State, the
motion stated that:
As to the third Getz factor, the evidence will be admitted by the testimony from the investigating officer. The police reports from both incidents, complaints 06-14-092532, and 06-14-095044, have been provided to defense as attachments to the instant motion. The defendant’s convictions for these offenses are plain, clear, and conclusive due to his guilty pleas. To the extent there is a witness to further that narrative, witness testimony is sufficient to support a finding of plain, clear, and conclusive evidence.4
The defense filed a written response. Among the arguments set forth in the
response was an argument that the State’s evidence did not satisfy Getz’s
requirement that proof of other crimes be by evidence which is “plain, clear and
conclusive.” Specifically, with regard to this factor, the defense argued that Chavis’
pleas of guilty, in and of themselves, were not plain, clear and conclusive proof of
all of the underlying, narrative facts of those offenses.
On the day of trial, the trial judge heard the motion and ruled that the evidence
of the two prior crimes would be admitted:
[I]t’s pretty clear to me in my mind what happened and that it specifically took place at the hotel, and so I think that both of these overcome the Getz factor. I think you
3 Id. at A12. 4 Id. at A13.
5 can use this as part of a plan and I think this is relevant, I don’t think there’s undue prejudice here. So I’m going to allow that testimony.5
During the course of his direct examination at trial, Detective Anderson
discussed Chavis’ prior convictions. Testifying from the police reports of those
incidents, he informed the jury that in the first incident Chavis pled guilty to
“trespassing after opening a door to an occupied hotel room and telling the occupant
that he was a maintenance employee.”6 With regard to the second incident,
Detective Anderson testified that “[t]he defendant pled guilty to taking a credit card
out of an occupied hotel room.”7 On cross-examination, Detective Anderson added
that both incidents occurred at the same Days Inn in Newark, nine days apart; that
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE DAKAI CHAVIS, § § No. 402, 2019 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court of § the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID. No. 1806020079 STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: March 25, 2020 Decided: May 26, 2020
Before VAUGHN, TRAYNOR, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED and REMANDED.
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellant, Dakai Chavis. Kathryn J. Garrison, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Dover, Delaware for Appellee, State of Delaware.
VAUGHN, Justice: The Appellant, Dakai Chavis, appeals from his conviction in Superior Court
of Criminal Trespass in the First Degree. He raises one issue. He contends that the
Superior Court erred during his jury trial by admitting evidence of two prior
convictions under Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b). For the reasons which follow,
we agree that the evidence of his prior convictions should not have been admitted.
I. FACTS
After attending the first day of Firefly Festival during the June 15, 2018
weekend, Karen Eng and her brother, Brian Eng, checked into the Baymont Inn in
Newark, Delaware. In the early hours of the morning, while the Engs were asleep,
someone entered their room. Ms. Eng awoke, heard rustling in the room, sat up in
bed, and saw a man crawling at the foot of the bed near the door to the room. She
asked, “what are you doing?”1 The man replied that he was in the wrong room and
left. After the Engs checked personal property they had placed on a desk, Mr. Eng
found that roughly $50 was missing from his wallet.
Before they had a chance to report the incident to the front desk, the Engs
received a call on the hotel room phone. The caller identified himself as the hotel
manager and explained that a maintenance worker was just in their room. The caller
agreed to meet with the maintenance worker and Ms. Eng at the front desk. She
went down to the front desk, on her way finding the cash from her brother’s wallet
1 App. to Opening Br. at A106.
2 on the hallway floor outside their room. When she reached the front desk, she
described the situation to a female clerk on duty, who was surprised to hear what
Ms. Eng was telling her. The clerk called the maintenance worker on duty to the
front desk, and he stated that he was not the man who entered the Engs’ room. Ms.
Eng agreed that he was not the intruder. The Newark police were contacted, and
Detective William Anderson began an investigation.
Ms. Eng described the intruder as an African-American man, between 5’5”
and 5’7” tall, not heavy, and dressed in dark clothing. She informed Detective
Anderson, however, that she would not be able to identify the man in a lineup.
Detective Anderson obtained and reviewed surveillance footage from the hotel
lobby. He observed a man matching the description given by Ms. Eng enter the hotel
lobby at about 6:30 a.m., walk through the doorway to a stairwell, come back into
the lobby about 22 minutes later, and then exit through the doorway to the stairwell
again. Detective Anderson recalled that Chavis, who matched the appearance of the
man in the video and the description provided by Ms. Eng, had been involved in two
incidents at a Days Inn in Newark in November 2014. In the first incident, Chavis
was alleged to have opened a door to a hotel room and, when he realized the room
was occupied, to have told the occupant he was a maintenance employee and then
left. He pled guilty to criminal trespass for that incident. In the second incident,
Chavis was alleged to have used a stolen credit card that had been taken from a room
3 at the same motel two weeks later. As a result of that incident, Chavis pled guilty to
theft.
During his investigation, Detective Anderson also discovered that Chavis was
wearing a GPS monitor at the time of the incident in the Engs’ motel room. GPS
records placed Chavis at the hotel near the Engs’ room at the time Ms. Eng saw her
intruder.
As a result of his investigation, Detective Anderson arrested Chavis for
Burglary in the Second Degree and Misdemeanor Theft. Chavis was subsequently
indicted on those charges.
Prior to Chavis’ trial, the State filed a Motion in limine asking the court to
admit into evidence the convictions for the 2014 incidents at the Days Inn under
D.R.E. 404(b). In the motion, the State alleged that the two prior offenses were
“strikingly similar” to the charged offenses in this case and that it “would use those
convictions as proof of motive, plan, intent, and absence of mistake or accident.” 2
The motion further stated, in pertinent part:
In this case, the evidence is material in that it goes to the defendant’s motive, plan, intent, or absence of mistake in coming onto the property of the Baymont Inn. Specifically, the prior cases become relevant to show a specific modus operandi the defendant utilizes when he burglarizes hotel rooms in the early morning hours. He gains entry to the rooms and when confronted makes up a
2 Id. at A10.
4 story proclaiming to be a maintenance man and flees the scene.3
In addressing the “plain, clear and conclusive” factor of Getz v. State, the
motion stated that:
As to the third Getz factor, the evidence will be admitted by the testimony from the investigating officer. The police reports from both incidents, complaints 06-14-092532, and 06-14-095044, have been provided to defense as attachments to the instant motion. The defendant’s convictions for these offenses are plain, clear, and conclusive due to his guilty pleas. To the extent there is a witness to further that narrative, witness testimony is sufficient to support a finding of plain, clear, and conclusive evidence.4
The defense filed a written response. Among the arguments set forth in the
response was an argument that the State’s evidence did not satisfy Getz’s
requirement that proof of other crimes be by evidence which is “plain, clear and
conclusive.” Specifically, with regard to this factor, the defense argued that Chavis’
pleas of guilty, in and of themselves, were not plain, clear and conclusive proof of
all of the underlying, narrative facts of those offenses.
On the day of trial, the trial judge heard the motion and ruled that the evidence
of the two prior crimes would be admitted:
[I]t’s pretty clear to me in my mind what happened and that it specifically took place at the hotel, and so I think that both of these overcome the Getz factor. I think you
3 Id. at A12. 4 Id. at A13.
5 can use this as part of a plan and I think this is relevant, I don’t think there’s undue prejudice here. So I’m going to allow that testimony.5
During the course of his direct examination at trial, Detective Anderson
discussed Chavis’ prior convictions. Testifying from the police reports of those
incidents, he informed the jury that in the first incident Chavis pled guilty to
“trespassing after opening a door to an occupied hotel room and telling the occupant
that he was a maintenance employee.”6 With regard to the second incident,
Detective Anderson testified that “[t]he defendant pled guilty to taking a credit card
out of an occupied hotel room.”7 On cross-examination, Detective Anderson added
that both incidents occurred at the same Days Inn in Newark, nine days apart; that
he had no involvement in either of the prior incidents; and that his only knowledge
of those incidents came from reading the police reports.
The jury found Chavis guilty of Criminal Trespass in the First Degree, as a
lesser-included offense to Burglary Second Degree, and acquitted him of
Misdemeanor Theft.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the Superior Court’s decision to admit evidence under D.R.E.
5 Id. at A69. 6 Id. at A88. 7 Id. at A89.
6 404(b) for abuse of discretion.8
III. DISCUSSION
D.R.E. 404(b)(1) prohibits the use of evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act
“to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.” D.R.E. 404(b)(2) provides an
exception to that rule. It permits the use of such evidence “for another purpose, such
as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”9
In Getz v. State,10 this Court discussed Rule 404(b) at length. Among the
criteria we noted for admission of other crimes or bad act evidence is that such
evidence must have “independent logical relevance,” meaning that it must have
probative relevance which is independent of its relevance as character evidence, and
its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.11 In addition, we established five guidelines to govern the admissibility
of such evidence.12
Chavis contends that the evidence of his two prior convictions did not have
independent relevance to the charged offenses. If the evidence was independently
8 Morse v. State, 120 A.3d 1, 8 (Del. 2015). 9 D.R.E. 404(b)(2). 10 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988). 11 Id. at 730. 12 Id. at 734.
7 relevant, he argues, the prejudicial effect of its admission substantially outweighed
its relevance. Finally, he contends, the evidence did not satisfy Getz’s third
guideline, which is that the proof of the prior crimes must be “plain, clear and
conclusive.”
In response, the State argues that the evidence of Chavis’ prior crimes was (1)
relevant to prove his identity, intent, motive and plan in entering the Engs’ hotel
room; (2) proven by “plain, clear and conclusive” evidence; and (3) not too remote
in time and was not unduly prejudicial. The State also contends that the trial court
properly instructed the jury that the evidence could be used only for the limited
purpose of determining the defendant’s identify, intent, motive and plan. Finally, the
State argues that, if there is any error, it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We believe the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the evidence of the
prior crimes was sufficiently “plain, clear and conclusive.” The State argues that
Chavis’ pleas of guilty satisfy the requirement that the evidence be “plain, clear and
conclusive.” We agree that a plea of guilty is “plain, clear and conclusive” evidence
of a defendant’s participation in that crime.13 With regard to the trespass case, the
record indicates that Chavis pled guilty to remaining unlawfully in a building,
specifically, Room 221 at the Days Inn Motel. With regard to the theft case, the
13 See Harden v. State, 712 A.2d 475, 1998 WL 309841, at *3 (Del. May 29, 1998) (ORDER) (“A conviction is clear and convincing evidence of a defendant’s participation in that crime.”).
8 record appears to indicate that he pled guilty to unlawfully using a stolen credit card.
Chavis’ pleas of guilty establish those facts by “plain, clear and conclusive”
evidence.
The other crimes evidence, however, goes beyond the facts encompassed in
the guilty pleas and includes significant underlying facts, specifically that Chavis
posed as a maintenance man in the trespassing case and that he entered the motel
room at Days Inn to steal the credit card. Such underlying narrative facts must also
satisfy Getz’s requirement that other crimes evidence be “plain, clear and
We have previously recognized that the testimony of an eyewitness or other
witness with personal knowledge typically satisfies the “plain, clear and conclusive”
requirement. 14 Detective Anderson, however, had no personal knowledge that
Chavis had pretended to be a maintenance worker in the trespassing case or had
entered a motel room in the theft case. His knowledge of those facts came from
police reports he did not prepare and involved investigations in which he did not
participate. Such secondhand knowledge does not satisfy Getz’s requirement that
14 See Johnson v. State, 983 A.2d 904, 934 (Del. 2009) (en banc) (“Eyewitness testimony is normally deemed sufficient to satisfy the plain, clear and convincing standard utilized for admission of other crimes evidence under Rule 404(b). [The victim’s] testimony as to what [the defendant] stated to her personally and what she observed satisfies this evidentiary standard.” (footnote omitted)).
9 proof of other crimes be by evidence which is “plain, clear and conclusive.” 15 The
trial judge erred by permitting the officer to testify about facts contained in the police
reports about which the officer had no personal knowledge.
Stripped of the above-discussed underlying facts, the other crimes have no
independent logical relevance. Without such facts, they simply become evidence of
other crimes of the same or similar character as the charged offenses without
evidentiary value apart from their relevance as character evidence, which makes
them inadmissible under D.R.E. 404(a).
Finally, we do not believe that the decision to admit this evidence can be said
to be harmless.16 The evidence of the two prior convictions, and in particular the
15 See Renzi v. State, 320 A.2d 711, 712-13 (Del. 1974) (finding that evidence of defendant’s prior sale of narcotics was not “plain, clear and conclusive” where the confidential informant that completed the transaction did not testify, the allegedly purchased drugs and money used in the sale were not admitted into evidence, and the only evidence offered at trial regarding the drug sale was the testimony of an officer who did not witness the transaction); D.R.E. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”); see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 10 (8th ed. Jan. 2020) (“The common law system of evidence embodies a strong preference for admitting the most reliable sources of information. This preference is reflected in the hearsay rule, the documentary original doctrine, and the opinion rule. . . . For example, by virtue of the opinion rule, the law prefers that a witness testify to facts, based on personal knowledge, rather than opinions inferred from such facts. . . . This requirement can easily be confused with the rule barring the in-court repetition of out-of-court statements considered hearsay. Technically, if on its face the witness’s testimony purports to describe observed facts but the testimony rests on statements of others, the objection is that the witness lacks firsthand knowledge. In contrast, when on its face the testimony indicates the witness is repeating out-of-court statements, a hearsay objection is appropriate.” (footnotes omitted)). 16 See Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1, 13 (Del. 2018) (en banc) (“Not all errors call for reversal. But to deem an error harmless—and safely disregard it—we must have a ‘fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ That is necessarily a case-specific inquiry;’ one that requires us to ‘scrutinize[] the record’ to evaluate ‘both the importance of the error and the strength of the other evidence presented at trial.” (alteration and omission in
10 singularity of the maintenance worker ruse, could well have been significant to the
jury. We cannot conclude with fair assurance that the jury was not substantially
swayed by the admission of the two prior convictions.
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
original) (footnotes omitted)); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 52(a) (“Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” (emphases omitted)).