Chavis v. Northrop Grumman Corp.

798 So. 2d 1217, 1 La.App. 3 Cir. 175, 2001 La. App. LEXIS 2182, 2001 WL 1241873
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 17, 2001
DocketNo. 01-175
StatusPublished

This text of 798 So. 2d 1217 (Chavis v. Northrop Grumman Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chavis v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 798 So. 2d 1217, 1 La.App. 3 Cir. 175, 2001 La. App. LEXIS 2182, 2001 WL 1241873 (La. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

1WOODARD, Judge.

On January 27, 1999, Ms. Connie Chavis filed a disputed claim for workers’ compensation benefits for injuries from her fall while working at the Northrop Grumman Corporation (Northrop) facility in Lake Charles, Louisiana. After a trial, the WCJ held that she had proved that her fall precipitated fibromyalgia but had not proved that she was unable to return to light duty work. Ms. Chavis appeals the latter part of the decision, which we reverse, holding that she is disabled from employment, while Northrop appeals the former part, which we affirm.

Northrop employed Ms. Chavis at the time of her fall on October 16, 1997. While walking across a concrete floor there, she tripped and fell, injuring her right shoulder. After physical therapy proved to be unsuccessful, she underwent rotator cuff surgery on her right shoulder on December 2,1997.

In the next months and years, several doctors saw her for her generalized complaints of pain. Ultimately, a specialist in the field diagnosed her as suffering from fibromyalgia/chronic fatigue syndrome and linked it to her fall. Fibromyalgia is defined as a chronic condition characterized by fatigue and widespread pain in the fibrous tissues in your muscles, ligaments and tendons.1

On January 27, 1999, Ms. Chavis filed a disputed claim for workers’ compensation benefits, seeking an electric wheelchair scooter, prescription drugs, travel costs to visit Dr. Patricia Salvato in Houston, Texas, and penalties and attorney’s fees. When Northrop answered the claim, it admitted that there was a work-related accident, which caused a right shoulder injury, but denied that the accident had caused her other health problems. In fact, it later filed a supplemental answer, stating that she had recovered sufficiently from her job-related injuries to return to work and was no longer entitled to weekly benefits. The parties then conducted discovery. The WCJ heard the case on July 19, 2000, ruling on October pl7, 2000. She held that Ms. Chavis had proved that her fall at work had precipitated her fibromyalgia but that she had failed to prove that she was unable to return to light duty work.

Ms. Chavis appeals the finding that she is capable of returning to light duty work. Northrop appeals the holding that a work-related injury caused fibromyalgia/chronic fatigue syndrome.

This is a manifest error case. In Clophus v. Taco Bell Corp./Hot ‘N’ Now, [1219]*1219Inc.2 this court explained:

The supreme court recently discussed the standard to be applied in reviewing factual findings in a workers’ compensation case in Chaisson v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 97-1225, p. 8-9 (La.3/4/98); 708 So.2d 375, 380-381 (citations omitted) as follows:
Factual findings in worker’s compensation cases are subject to the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of appellate review. In applying the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, the appellate court must determine not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the fact-finder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, a factfin-der’s choice between them can never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

Under the manifest error standard, the record supports the WCJ’s finding that Ms. Chavis was suffering from fibromyalgia/chronic fatigue syndrome, which her work related injury (the fall) precipitated. However, the record does not support the holding that she could return to light duty work. Therefore, that finding is manifestly erroneous. Important to our analysis is the fact that our jurisprudence accords superior weight to Ms. Chavis’ treating physicians over those who examined her for litigation purposes only3 and that, obviously, those who are experts in a particular specialty are more qualified to diagnose a condition in their area of expertise than are those who are not experts in that field.

l3We chronicle Ms. Chavis’ diagnoses and treatment, beginning immediately with Dr. Kevin Schlamp’s treatment, which followed her October 16, 1997 fall. He placed her arm in a sling and referred her for an orthopedic assessment. Subsequently, an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Nathan P. Cohen, examined her on October 16, 1997. She complained of pain with any attempted motion. He testified that he had been unable to perform a thorough examination when he first saw her, because of her pain. He asked her to return in five days, which she did on October 21, 1997. However, x-rays did not reveal anything. Following that visit, Dr. Cohen reported to the employer that if a light duty job were available and she could sit comfortably at a desk and not use her right arm, he thought she could return to work anytime. He believed that she would benefit from physical therapy, which she attended. When he saw her on October 29, 1997, he found that she was still symptomatic and continued her on physical therapy. Her pain was global, but he could not pinpoint it. She complained of elbow problems, but the evaluation did not reveal anything. However, he explained that immobilizing the shoulder could have caused it. He also, scheduled an MRI, which revealed an abnormal signal in the supras-pinatus tendon, compatible with a tear; a marked increased signal in the biceps tendon sheath region, which may represent a tear or degenerative change; joint effusion with marked distention of capsule; and an abnormal signal in the greater tuberosity, which may represent degenerative or a post-traumatic change.

When Dr. Cohen examined her on November 6, 1997, he deemed that she was a suitable candidate for operative management in the form of arthroscopic surgery with a potential for open rotator cuff and biceps tendon repairs. However, five days [1220]*1220later, he was reluctant to proceed with surgery until Dr. James D. Perry had examined her in order to rule out an axial spine problem.

Dr. Perry examined her that same day. Ms. Chavis had complained of right arm and neck pain for the last three to four weeks. He recommended a cervical MRI, which she had. He re-examined her on November 13, 1997 and felt that the neck pain could be treated conservatively and that Dr. Cohen could proceed with the surgical repair of her rotator cuff tear.

Dr. Cohen operated on her on December 2, 1997. The next day, the hospital discharged her. On December 9, 1997, he examined her and found her incisions to be clean with no evidence of infection. She could begin physical therapy at home. |4He saw her, again, on December 18 and 23, 1997. On the 23rd, he cleared her to go to rehabilitation because her shoulder was much improved, and she was comfortable; however, she complained of neck pain, for which she was seeing Dr. Mool P. Nigam. Approximately three weeks later, Dr. Cohen found her shoulder to be quiescent and that she could go to Advanced Rehab Services, noting that she is still seeing Dr. Nigam for her neck. From January 14, 1998 through February 9, 1998, every three to four days, she attended Advanced Rehab Services physical therapy.

On February 11, 1998, Dr. Cohen saw her and determined that she had failed to show any improvement to the right shoulder active range of motion. He ordered an Arthrogram to assess the degree of rotator cuff integrity, which she had on February 18, 1998.

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Related

Clophus v. Taco Bell Corp./HotN'Now
732 So. 2d 692 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1999)
Chaisson v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co.
708 So. 2d 375 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1998)
Ben v. HOLTRACHEM INC.
772 So. 2d 326 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
798 So. 2d 1217, 1 La.App. 3 Cir. 175, 2001 La. App. LEXIS 2182, 2001 WL 1241873, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chavis-v-northrop-grumman-corp-lactapp-2001.