1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 ALMA ANGELICA CHAVEZ VALDEZ, Case No.: 23-CV-1085 W (KSC)
14 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING CASE TO 15 v. THE SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURT 16 FIELD ASSET SERVICES, INC., et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19
20 On April 17, 2023, Plaintiff Alma Angelica Chavez Valdez filed a complaint in the 21 San Diego Superior Court alleging four causes of action. (See Notice of Removal [Doc. 1] 22 Ex. 1 [Doc. 1-3].) On June 10, 2023, Defendants removed the case to this Court asserting 23 jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). (Id. 2:24–27.) Because 24 Valdez’s lawsuit is not a class action, on July 10, 2023, this Court ordered Defendants to 25 show cause why the case should not be remanded for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 26 (See OSC [Doc. 5].) On July 17, 2023, Defendants filed their response and on July 19, 27 2023, Valdez filed her response. The Court finds the matter appropriate for resolution on 28 the papers. See Civ.L.R. 7.1d1. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds it lacks 1 subject-matter jurisdiction and ORDERS the case remanded to the San Diego Superior 2 Court. 3 4 I. DISCUSSION 5 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 6 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 7 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citation omitted). The burden of establishing subject-matter 8 jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. Additionally, district courts 9 “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, 10 even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 11 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss the 12 action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking). Consistent with these principles, the 13 removal statute “is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires 14 resolution in favor of remand. The presumption against removal means that the 15 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Moore-Thomas 16 v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and 17 quotation marks omitted). Whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists is to be determined 18 from the complaint. See Snavely v. Johnson, 2015 WL 52429254, at 1–2 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 19 8, 2015) (citations omitted). 20 Before Plaintiff Valdez filed her state-court lawsuit, she was a putative class 21 member of a lawsuit filed against Defendant Field Asset Services and other defendants 22 alleging misclassification and other California Labor Code violations. (Notice of 23 Removal 2:11–16.) The class action, entitled Bowerman et al. v. Field Asset Services, 24 Inc. et al., No. 3:13-cv-00057 (“Bowerman”), was filed in the Northern District of 25 California. (Id.) Although the class was initially certified by the district court, 26 Defendants appealed the decision and on July 5, 2022, the Ninth Circuit decertified the 27 class in a published opinion. (Id. at 2:17–21, citing Bowerman v. Field Asset Servs., Inc., 28 39 F.4th 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2022), as amended, 60 F.4th 459 (9th Cir. 2023).) 1 After Bowerman was decertified, Valdez filed this lawsuit in the San Diego 2 Superior Court. Defendants then removed the case, citing CAFA as the sole basis for 3 subject-matter jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal at 2:24–27.) 4 For CAFA jurisdiction to exist, Valdez’s state-court lawsuit must involve (a) a 5 class size of at least 100 members, (b) at least one plaintiff and one defendant that are 6 citizens of different states, and (c) an aggregate amount in controversy exceeding $5 7 million, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),(5),(6). “Subject matter 8 jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint.” See Snavely v. Johnson, 2015 9 WL 5242925, at *1 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 8, 2015) (citing Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 10 653 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998) and Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 932 (1987)). 11 Based on Vadez’s Complaint, two of the CAFA requirements are missing: Valdez is the 12 only named plaintiff and there are no class allegations (Compl. ¶ 4); and there are no 13 allegations remotely suggesting the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million 14 (see id.). 15 In their response to the OSC, Defendants argue that subject-matter jurisdiction 16 nevertheless exists because the “Northern District has retained federal jurisdiction over 17 Plaintiff’s individual claims at issue in the Bowerman case.” (Defs’ OSC Response [Doc. 18 7] at 2:3–5.) As a matter of fact, this argument is false. Valdez is not mentioned 19 anywhere in the Bowerman First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which is attached to 20 Defendants’ Notice of Removal. (See Notice of Removal, Exhibit 2 [Doc. 1-4].) Nor 21 have Defendants cited any orders from the district court presiding over Bowerman 22 indicating that it somehow retained jurisdiction over Valdez’s claims. 23 Defendants also argue the “great weight of authority from California district courts 24 and other circuits supports holding that federal courts retain jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s 25 individual claims despite the decertification of the Bowerman class.” (Defs’ OSC 26 Response at 1:16–27.) In support of this argument, Defendants cite cases that stand for 27 the well-settled principle that CAFA jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal and 28 that subsequent developments do not divest the court of jurisdiction over the case or the 1 claims of named plaintiffs. See Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, n. 12 (11th 2 Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “because jurisdictional facts are assessed at the time of 3 removal,” subject-matter jurisdiction continues to exist even if a narrowed class resulted 4 in fewer than 100 class members); United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber Mgf., Energy, 5 Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F3d 1087, 1091–1092 (9th 6 Cir. 2010) (held that denial of class certification does not divest the district of subject 7 matter jurisdiction over the same case); and Ellison v. Autozone Inc., 486 F. App’x 674, 8 675 (9th Cir. 2012) (reversing district court’s remand of a CAFA class action after the 9 plaintiff dismissed the class claims because “[w]here, as here, jurisdiction was proper at 10 the time of removal, subsequent dismissal or transfer of class claims does not defeat the 11 court’s CAFA jurisdiction over remaining individual claims.”) (citing United Steel, 602 12 F.3d at 1092). The problem with these cases is that they do not address whether CAFA 13 jurisdiction covers a subsequently filed state-court lawsuit by a former unnamed, putative 14 class member. 15 Defendants also cites two cases discussing whether CAFA jurisdiction exists over 16 cases that resulted from the district court’s severance of named plaintiffs from the CAFA 17 class action. See Louisiana v. American National Property & Casualty Company, 746 18 F.3d 633 (5th Cir.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 ALMA ANGELICA CHAVEZ VALDEZ, Case No.: 23-CV-1085 W (KSC)
14 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING CASE TO 15 v. THE SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR COURT 16 FIELD ASSET SERVICES, INC., et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19
20 On April 17, 2023, Plaintiff Alma Angelica Chavez Valdez filed a complaint in the 21 San Diego Superior Court alleging four causes of action. (See Notice of Removal [Doc. 1] 22 Ex. 1 [Doc. 1-3].) On June 10, 2023, Defendants removed the case to this Court asserting 23 jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). (Id. 2:24–27.) Because 24 Valdez’s lawsuit is not a class action, on July 10, 2023, this Court ordered Defendants to 25 show cause why the case should not be remanded for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 26 (See OSC [Doc. 5].) On July 17, 2023, Defendants filed their response and on July 19, 27 2023, Valdez filed her response. The Court finds the matter appropriate for resolution on 28 the papers. See Civ.L.R. 7.1d1. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds it lacks 1 subject-matter jurisdiction and ORDERS the case remanded to the San Diego Superior 2 Court. 3 4 I. DISCUSSION 5 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 6 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 7 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citation omitted). The burden of establishing subject-matter 8 jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. Additionally, district courts 9 “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, 10 even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 11 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss the 12 action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking). Consistent with these principles, the 13 removal statute “is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires 14 resolution in favor of remand. The presumption against removal means that the 15 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Moore-Thomas 16 v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and 17 quotation marks omitted). Whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists is to be determined 18 from the complaint. See Snavely v. Johnson, 2015 WL 52429254, at 1–2 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 19 8, 2015) (citations omitted). 20 Before Plaintiff Valdez filed her state-court lawsuit, she was a putative class 21 member of a lawsuit filed against Defendant Field Asset Services and other defendants 22 alleging misclassification and other California Labor Code violations. (Notice of 23 Removal 2:11–16.) The class action, entitled Bowerman et al. v. Field Asset Services, 24 Inc. et al., No. 3:13-cv-00057 (“Bowerman”), was filed in the Northern District of 25 California. (Id.) Although the class was initially certified by the district court, 26 Defendants appealed the decision and on July 5, 2022, the Ninth Circuit decertified the 27 class in a published opinion. (Id. at 2:17–21, citing Bowerman v. Field Asset Servs., Inc., 28 39 F.4th 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2022), as amended, 60 F.4th 459 (9th Cir. 2023).) 1 After Bowerman was decertified, Valdez filed this lawsuit in the San Diego 2 Superior Court. Defendants then removed the case, citing CAFA as the sole basis for 3 subject-matter jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal at 2:24–27.) 4 For CAFA jurisdiction to exist, Valdez’s state-court lawsuit must involve (a) a 5 class size of at least 100 members, (b) at least one plaintiff and one defendant that are 6 citizens of different states, and (c) an aggregate amount in controversy exceeding $5 7 million, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),(5),(6). “Subject matter 8 jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint.” See Snavely v. Johnson, 2015 9 WL 5242925, at *1 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 8, 2015) (citing Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 10 653 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998) and Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 932 (1987)). 11 Based on Vadez’s Complaint, two of the CAFA requirements are missing: Valdez is the 12 only named plaintiff and there are no class allegations (Compl. ¶ 4); and there are no 13 allegations remotely suggesting the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million 14 (see id.). 15 In their response to the OSC, Defendants argue that subject-matter jurisdiction 16 nevertheless exists because the “Northern District has retained federal jurisdiction over 17 Plaintiff’s individual claims at issue in the Bowerman case.” (Defs’ OSC Response [Doc. 18 7] at 2:3–5.) As a matter of fact, this argument is false. Valdez is not mentioned 19 anywhere in the Bowerman First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which is attached to 20 Defendants’ Notice of Removal. (See Notice of Removal, Exhibit 2 [Doc. 1-4].) Nor 21 have Defendants cited any orders from the district court presiding over Bowerman 22 indicating that it somehow retained jurisdiction over Valdez’s claims. 23 Defendants also argue the “great weight of authority from California district courts 24 and other circuits supports holding that federal courts retain jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s 25 individual claims despite the decertification of the Bowerman class.” (Defs’ OSC 26 Response at 1:16–27.) In support of this argument, Defendants cite cases that stand for 27 the well-settled principle that CAFA jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal and 28 that subsequent developments do not divest the court of jurisdiction over the case or the 1 claims of named plaintiffs. See Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, n. 12 (11th 2 Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “because jurisdictional facts are assessed at the time of 3 removal,” subject-matter jurisdiction continues to exist even if a narrowed class resulted 4 in fewer than 100 class members); United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber Mgf., Energy, 5 Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F3d 1087, 1091–1092 (9th 6 Cir. 2010) (held that denial of class certification does not divest the district of subject 7 matter jurisdiction over the same case); and Ellison v. Autozone Inc., 486 F. App’x 674, 8 675 (9th Cir. 2012) (reversing district court’s remand of a CAFA class action after the 9 plaintiff dismissed the class claims because “[w]here, as here, jurisdiction was proper at 10 the time of removal, subsequent dismissal or transfer of class claims does not defeat the 11 court’s CAFA jurisdiction over remaining individual claims.”) (citing United Steel, 602 12 F.3d at 1092). The problem with these cases is that they do not address whether CAFA 13 jurisdiction covers a subsequently filed state-court lawsuit by a former unnamed, putative 14 class member. 15 Defendants also cites two cases discussing whether CAFA jurisdiction exists over 16 cases that resulted from the district court’s severance of named plaintiffs from the CAFA 17 class action. See Louisiana v. American National Property & Casualty Company, 746 18 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding subject matter jurisdiction exists over plaintiffs whose 19 individual claims were severed from the CAFA class action); and Helm v Alderwoods 20 Group, 2011 WL 2837411, at *13 (N.D.Cal. July 18, 2011) (holding subject-matter 21 jurisdiction exists “over the claims of all of the individual named plaintiffs” that were 22 severed from the CAFA removed class action). These cases do not help Defendants 23 because Valdez was never a named plaintiff in Bowerman and, thus, her state-court 24 lawsuit is not the result of the district court’s severance of Valdez’s claims. 25 Defendants next cite Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 586 .Supp.2d 1312 26 (M.D.Fla. 2008), which involves CAFA’s mass-action provision. That provision 27 includes, among other things, a numerosity requirement of 100 or more plaintiffs. After 28 defendants removed the cases under the mass-action provision, defendants indicated that 1 they planned to seek to sever plaintiffs’ claims for trial. Plaintiffs then moved to remand 2 arguing that defendants’ intent to sever the claims for trial would divest the district court 3 of jurisdiction because of CAFA’s numerosity requirement. Relying on the well-settled 4 rule that jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal, the district court denied the 5 motion to remand. Similar to all of the other cases Defendants cites, Cooper simply 6 reaffirms the general rule regarding when subject-matter jurisdiction is determined. It 7 does not support a finding that CAFA jurisdiction covers a state-court lawsuit filed by a 8 former unnamed, putative class member following denial of class certification or 9 decertification. 10 Finally, Valdez recently notified this Court of another district court evaluating 11 whether CAFA jurisdiction exists over a state court lawsuit filed by a former unnamed 12 putative class member of Bowerman. In Carranza v. Field Asset Services, Inc., 2023 WL 13 5170298 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2023), plaintiff Remberto Carranza filed a lawsuit in 14 the San Francisco Superior Court after the Bowerman class was decertified. In granting 15 the motion to remand, the district court first evaluated many of the same cases discussed 16 above and found they did not establish subject-matter jurisdiction over Carranza’s state 17 case. Id. at *3–4. The court then explained that “the filing of Bowerman’s complaint did 18 not attach CAFA jurisdiction to Carranza’s claims; had Carranza wanted to file his 19 individual claims at that point, he could have done so, and he only could have done so in 20 state court.” Id. at *4. As support, the court cited Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 21 927, 940 (9th Cir. 2001), wherein the Ninth Circuit explained that “a class action, when 22 filed, includes only the claims of the named plaintiff or plaintiffs.” Id. The district court 23 then continued: 24 [Defendant] FAS would not have been able to remove [Carranza’s] state court case at that point because of the lack of federal question and complete 25 diversity. When Bowerman’s class was certified, Carranza, as an “unnamed” 26 class member, “acquired a legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named plaintiff],” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975); United 27 States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1538 (2018) (same)—but there is 28 no caselaw saying that legal status necessarily confers subject matter 1 juultriimsdaictetiloyn f aoinlst.o I tnhdee feedd, ehraadl cthoeu rctl,a isnsc lruemdianign ewdh ceerert icfliaesds, caesr atinfi ucantnioanm ed 2 class member Carranza would have been entitled to opt out and file his own 3 individual case—in state court. Nothing about the subsequent decertification of the class caused federal subject matter jurisdiction to attach to Carranza’s 4 state law claims and force him to litigate in federal court. FAS points me to 5 no case law that provides otherwise, nor could I find any. This outcome makes sense: it would be unfair to find that laws about jurisdiction, see 28 6 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, do not apply to an individual simply because a 7 different individual filed other claims.
9 Id. at *4 (footnote omitted). 10 In sum, based on a review of Valdez’s Complaint, two of the CAFA requirements 11 are not met in this case: the lawsuit is not a class action and does not satisfy the amount 12 in controversy requirement. Defendants have also failed to cite any authority holding 13 CAFA jurisdiction covers a separate state-court lawsuit filed by a former unnamed, 14 putative class member. Additionally, as explained in Carranza, forcing Valdez to litigate 15 her claims in federal court makes no sense, particularly in light of the fact that had 16 Bowerman not been decertified, Valdez could have opted out of the class and pursued her 17 claims in state court. Finally, it is important to reiterate that the removal statute “is 18 strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of 19 remand.” Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244. For all these reasons, the Court finds 20 Defendants have failed to establish subject-matter jurisdiction over Valdez’s lawsuit. 21 22 II. CONCLUSION & ORDER 23 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction 24 over Plaintiff’s lawsuit and, therefore, ORDERS the case REMANDED to the San 25 Diego Superior Court.1 26
27 28 1 Plaintiff believes an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate. For the reasons stated in Carranza, 2023 1 In light of the remand, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 4] is TERMINATED 2 |jas MOOT. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED 4 || Dated: August 17, 2023 \ ° {Th ue Vor 6 Hn. 1 omas J. Whelan 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28