Chatman v. Page

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Chatman v. Page

1971 OK CR 169, 484 P.2d 537

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

DecidedApril 21, 1971

DocketA-16465

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 1971 OK CR 169 (Chatman v. Page) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Chatman v. Page, 1971 OK CR 169, 484 P.2d 537 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971).

Pincite

Opinion

*538 BUSSEY, Presiding Judge:

Roy D. Chatman, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was convicted in the District Court of Oklahoma County on July 15, 1967, and received a five year sentence, three years to be served in the state penitentiary, and the last two years suspended. The Defendant plead guilty on February 17, 1970, to automobile theft and received a two year sentence, which he is presently serving. The defendant has been advised by the prison authorities that upon completion of his present two year term, he will have to serve the remaining two years of the two year suspended sentence, and from said ruling has perfected a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court.

We have previously held in Buckley v. Page, Okl.Cr., 465 P.2d 769, that “It thus appears that the legislature, either intentionally or through oversight, has removed the authority of the sentencing court to suspend a portion of the sentence imposed.” Judge Nix dissented, stating: “I dissent in the above opinion by my learned colleagues for the reason that I strongly feel that a District Judge is invested with the inherent power to suspend all or any part of the sentence imposed by him.”

At the time Buckley v. Page, supra, was delivered, I was reluctant to overrule the unbroken line of cases holding that the trial court did not possess the authority to suspend the execution of a sentence in part. Upon reconsideration, I am compelled to agree with Judge Nix’s dissent in Buckley, supra. I believe the interest of justice can best be served by recognizing the power of a trial court to suspend the execution of a sentence either in whole or in part, and particularly is this true when, as in the instant case, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant labored under the misapprehension that the court possessed the inherent power .to impose the judgment and sentence pronounced. The Department of Corrections is accordingly directed that the defendant is to serve the remaining revoked portion of the sentence m Case No. 33361, and the two years’ sentence for auto theft, before he is released.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is accordingly Dismissed.

NIX and BRETT, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

*538 BUSSEY, Presiding Judge:

Roy D. Chatman, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was convicted in the District Court of Oklahoma County on July 15, 1967, and received a five year sentence, three years to be served in the state penitentiary, and the last two years suspended. The Defendant plead guilty on February 17, 1970, to automobile theft and received a two year sentence, which he is presently serving. The defendant has been advised by the prison authorities that upon completion of his present two year term, he will have to serve the remaining two years of the two year suspended sentence, and from said ruling has perfected a Writ of Habeas Corpus to this Court.

We have previously held in Buckley v. Page, Okl.Cr., 465 P.2d 769, that “It thus appears that the legislature, either intentionally or through oversight, has removed the authority of the sentencing court to suspend a portion of the sentence imposed.” Judge Nix dissented, stating: “I dissent in the above opinion by my learned colleagues for the reason that I strongly feel that a District Judge is invested with the inherent power to suspend all or any part of the sentence imposed by him.”

At the time Buckley v. Page, supra, was delivered, I was reluctant to overrule the unbroken line of cases holding that the trial court did not possess the authority to suspend the execution of a sentence in part. Upon reconsideration, I am compelled to agree with Judge Nix’s dissent in Buckley, supra. I believe the interest of justice can best be served by recognizing the power of a trial court to suspend the execution of a sentence either in whole or in part, and particularly is this true when, as in the instant case, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant labored under the misapprehension that the court possessed the inherent power .to impose the judgment and sentence pronounced. The Department of Corrections is accordingly directed that the defendant is to serve the remaining revoked portion of the sentence m Case No. 33361, and the two years’ sentence for auto theft, before he is released.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is accordingly Dismissed.

NIX and BRETT, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

1971 OK CR 169, 484 P.2d 537, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chatman-v-page-oklacrimapp-1971.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack