Filed 8/31/26 Chatelaine Community Assn. v. McClendon CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
CHATELAINE COMMUNITY B338023 ASSOCIATION, (Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. SC129475)
v.
TERESA MCCLENDON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael E. Whitaker, Judge. Affirmed.
M. Toney Smith for Defendant and Appellant. Decker Law, James Decker and Griffin Schindler for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
In 2005, Teresa McClendon purchased a condominium in Playa Vista, California. Two years later, as part of an apparent effort to secure a home loan modification, McClendon transferred the property via recorded grant deed to Markus-Dane Investments, LLC (Markus-Dane). Markus-Dane failed to pay assessments due on the property to the homeowners association, Chatelaine Community Association (the Association). The Association then obtained a default judgment against Markus-Dane. When Markus- Dane failed to satisfy the judgment, the Association reacquired the property at a 2010 sheriff ’s sale. McClendon spent the next several years attempting to reclaim ownership of the property through a series of unsuccessful legal challenges. At least two courts sanctioned McClendon in connection with these challenges.
In 2018, the Association filed suit against McClendon to quiet title to the property. The trial court denied McClendon’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the Association’s motion for summary adjudication of its quiet title claim and several related causes of action. Following a court trial on the Association’s remaining claim for injunctive relief, the judge entered judgment and a permanent injunction against McClendon.
On appeal, McClendon asks us to reverse the rulings on the motions and vacate the injunction. She contends the Association lacked standing to pursue its quiet title claim and that purported irregularities in the transfer of the property from Markus-Dane to the Association compel reversal. We disagree. Further, McClendon’s challenge to the property’s transfer hinges on the false premise that McClendon maintained an ownership interest in the property at the time of the sheriff’s sale.
Accordingly, we affirm.
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FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Consistent with the standard of review governing motions for summary adjudication, we draw our summary from facts agreed upon by the parties and from facts as to which the evidence discloses no dispute. (See Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 525 [“ ‘[a]n issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence’ ”].)
A. McClendon Grants the Property to Markus-Dane In 2005, McClendon purchased the property. She financed the purchase with one or more loans from a Bank of America entity. A grant deed reflecting McClendon’s interest in the property was recorded on June 1, 2005. In early 2007, McClendon executed three documents—a grant deed, an addendum to the grant deed, and an assignment of deed of trust—purportedly as part of an attempt to secure a loan modification.
The grant deed, recorded on March 12, 2007, transferred the property from McClendon to Markus-Dane. The face of the deed bears the following handwritten notation: “This is a bona fide gift and the grantor received nothing in return, R&T 11911.”1 (Capitalization omitted.) McClendon contends that “Markus[-]Dane was assigned as an agent to represent [her] in negotiating and securing a modification of her purchase money debt to the Bank of America.” (Capitalization omitted.)
1 McClendon contends that “R&T 11911” “references Revenue and [Taxation] Code [section] 11911,” and that this section “specifies ‘exemptions’ to the transfer taxes that would have been due if Markus[-]Dane had purchased or been given full ownership of . . . McClendon’s real property dwelling.” (Capitalization omitted.)
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The addendum to the grant deed, dated March 12, 2007, provides that certain “terms and conditions must be fully satisfied before . . . McClendon releases and transfers all her interest in and terminates her right to claim the subject property.” The terms and conditions include that “[Markus-Dane] is responsible for all property taxes, insurance, HOA dues and all other fees associated with Playa Vista.” (Capitalization omitted.) The addendum further provides: “[Markus-Dane] ‘MUST’ refinance or payoff [sic] [the] 1st and 2nd trust deed[s] with Countrywide Home Loans within an eighteen (18) month period. [¶] If the 1st and 2nd trust deeds from Countrywide Home Loans are not fully satisfied within the 18[-]month period, . . . McClendon has the option of rescinding the grant deed . . . and request[ing] the grant deed is transferred/conveyed back into her name. [¶] If the property is sold or transferred prior to the satisfaction of the 1st and 2nd trust deed[s], Markus-Dane . . . will pay twenty thousand dollars . . . for . . . McClendon’s full release of any interest and terminate her right to claim [the] property.” (Capitalization omitted.) In her appellant’s brief, McClendon describes the addendum as having been “contemporaneously recorded” with the March 12, 2007 grant deed. But McClendon cites to nothing in the record supporting that the addendum ever was recorded.
Finally, the assignment of deed of trust granted to another entity, IPM Holdings, LLC, “all beneficial interest under that certain deed of trust dated December 29, 2006[,] executed by Markus-Dane . . . , Trustor, to Stewart Title Company, Trustee.” (Capitalization omitted.) Like the grant deed, the assignment of deed of trust was recorded on March 12, 2007.
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B. Markus-Dane Fails To Pay HOA Assessments on the Property, and the Association Acquires the Property Via a Sheriff ’s Sale After taking title to the property, Markus-Dane failed to pay assessments on the property due to the Association. On April 17, 2009, the Association filed a lawsuit against Markus-Dane seeking approximately $23,000 in unpaid assessments (Chatelaine Community Association v. Markus-Dane Investments, LLC (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 09CS01534)). On August 1, 2009, the Association obtained a default judgment against Markus-Dane in the lawsuit.
Seven months later, in March 2010, the Association obtained a writ of execution indicating an intent to levy upon the property to satisfy the default judgment. On November 17, 2010, the Association purchased the property at a sheriff ’s sale for the cost of the outstanding judgment (then $26,609.20). The sheriff ’s deed of sale reflecting the Association’s purchase of the property was recorded on January 24, 2011. McClendon contends that she had no notice of these proceedings until after the sale was complete.
In March 2011, the Association filed an unlawful detainer action against Markus-Dane and McClendon, who had not yet vacated the property (Chatelaine Community Association v. McClendon (Super. Ct. L.A. County No. 11R00802)). In early April 2011, McClendon and the Association entered a stipulated judgment in the unlawful detainer action that provided in pertinent part: “[The Association] is awarded possession of the [property].” The stipulated judgment also set forth certain forbearance terms that, if performed by McClendon, would have allowed her to continue to reside in the property. The Association contends that McClendon failed to perform the terms, and in July 2011, the Association evicted McClendon from the property.
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C. McClendon Files A Series of Unsuccessful Legal Challenges To Reclaim the Property Following the unlawful detainer action, McClendon made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to reclaim ownership of the property. In late April 2011, McClendon recorded a grant deed purporting to transfer the property from Markus-Dane to herself, as well as a declaration purporting to claim the property as her homestead. Also in 2011, McClendon filed civil harassment actions against five individuals the Association identifies as its board members. Each of these actions was dismissed.
In 2012, McClendon filed a quiet title action against the Association, Markus-Dane, and Bank of America (McClendon v. Chatelaine Community Association (Super. Ct. L.A. County No. SC119540)). Then, in December 2013—with her quiet title action pending—McClendon moved to set aside the stipulated judgment in the 2011 unlawful detainer action. On December 30, 2013, the court denied the motion.
In early 2014, McClendon moved to reopen her chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings—originally filed in December 2008 and closed in December 2011—“to pursue damages for a purported stay violation against [the Association].” After the bankruptcy court reopened the case, McClendon filed a “motion for damages for violation of automatic stay and creditor misconduct,” in which she argued that the Association “had notice of [her] bankruptcy case and . . . violated the automatic stay by ‘unlawfully obtaining possession of [her] real property.’ ” (Capitalization omitted.) In May 2014, the bankruptcy court denied the motion, noting that McClendon had failed to disclose the property as an asset in the bankruptcy proceedings:
“The court notes that [McClendon] did not list the property on Schedule A. . . . Debtors have an absolute duty to file complete and
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accurate schedules. [Citations.] Schedules and statements are signed under penalty of perjury. . . . [¶] In light of [McClendon’s] failure to list the property as an asset in [her] Schedule A [filing] and the conflicting evidence presented as to the property’s ownership, the court finds that [McClendon] has not met her burden in demonstrating that the property belongs to the estate . . . and therefore that the stay applied to [the Association’s] actions with respect to the property.” (Capitalization omitted.) “[T]he court also notes that issues similar to the issues presented in the instant motion were previously heard and determined in connection with [the Association’s] motion for relief from stay in [McClendon’s other] bankruptcy case before [another judge]. . . . The court has reviewed the docket in that case and is not convinced that [McClendon] has not engaged in bad faith in connection with the property.” (Capitalization omitted.) In support of the motion for summary adjudication giving rise to this appeal, the Association submitted to the trial court a copy of McClendon’s Schedule A filing in her 2008 bankruptcy proceeding. The schedule does not list the property as an asset.
Two months after the bankruptcy court’s ruling, in July 2014, the court in McClendon’s 2012 quiet title action granted the Association’s demurrer to McClendon’s complaint without leave to amend. The court found that McClendon’s quiet title action failed on several grounds, including that the doctrines of collateral and judicial estoppel defeated her claim: “The court finds collateral estoppel applies to the issue of ownership of the property. The bankruptcy court’s order finding the property does not belong to [McClendon’s] estate bars this court from re-adjudicating the issue of the property’s ownership. [¶] . . . [¶] The court further finds judicial estoppel applies here. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Throughout [McClendon’s] bankruptcy proceedings, she failed to list the
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property on [her] Schedule A. . . . [McClendon] took the position throughout her bankruptcy proceedings that she did not have an ownership interest in the property. However, in this matter, [McClendon] brings causes of action against the Association based on her alleged ownership of the property. [McClendon’s] positions in the two judicial proceedings are the exact opposite—she either owned the property or she did not own the property. Moreover, no facts indicate that [McClendon’s] position in the bankruptcy court was due to ignorance, fraud or mistake.” (Capitalization omitted.)
In December 2015, McClendon filed a document titled “motion of non-party McClendon to compel acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment” in the 2009 action the Association had filed against Markus-Dane to recover the unpaid assessments (Chatelaine Community Association v. Markus-Dane Investments, LLC (Super. Ct. L.A. County No. 09CS01534)). (Capitalization omitted.) The court denied the motion and sanctioned McClendon and her counsel for the frivolous filing. In the order imposing sanctions against McClendon’s counsel, the court found that “one of the purposes of filing the motion . . . was to annoy, harass, or otherwise wrongfully damage [the Association] [by] causing further cloud upon [its] title to the subject property.”
Finally, in 2017, another court sanctioned McClendon after she filed an unlawful detainer action against a tenant then residing in the property (McClendon v. John Doe (Super. Ct. L.A. County No. 17R01910)). The court explained that “[t]he basis for the . . . order . . . imposing sanctions [was] that . . . McClendon was previously evicted from the property at issue[,] . . . has not been the owner of the property since March 2007[, and] . . . six different Los Angeles County Superior Court judge[s]” had determined that “she lacks the right to possession or title.”
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D. The Association Files—And Prevails In—the 2018 Quiet Title Action Giving Rise to this Appeal On June 25, 2018, the Association filed suit against McClendon seeking to quiet title to the property. In the operative first amended complaint, the Association asserted claims for quiet title, cancellation of various purportedly fraudulent instruments recorded by McClendon (including the 2011 grant deed and homestead declaration), injunctive relief, declaratory relief, trespass, nuisance, negligent interference with economic relations, and intentional interference with economic relations.
On August 6, 2020, McClendon filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On August 20, 2020, the Association filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. In November 2020, the court held a combined hearing on the motions. The court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Association on its claims for quiet title, cancellation of instruments (with the exception of one claim seeking cancellation of “any instruments that McClendon might file in the future”), and declaratory relief. The court found that the undisputed evidence established that McClendon “conveyed all the rights, title[,] and interest in the property to Markus[-]Dane . . . on March 12, 2007 via a grant deed.” (Capitalization omitted.) The court further found that McClendon had failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding her title to the property. It rejected McClendon’s argument that her home loan on the property prevented its lawful transfer. It likewise rejected McClendon’s claim that the addendum to the March 12, 2007 grant deed created a triable issue concerning her interest in the property: “The addendum does not establish McClendon’s ownership interest in the property as of March 12, 2007 or November 17, 2010 [i.e., the date of the sheriff ’s sale]. The addendum does not provide for automatic nullification of [the]
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March 12, 2007 grant deed or automatic reversion of title to McClendon upon Markus[-]Dane’s failure to satisfy the conditions. [¶] . . . There is no evidence that the addendum was ever recorded, or that any third parties investigating title would have been able to find it. At best, the addendum would provide McClendon with legal claims against Markus[-]Dane.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The court denied summary adjudication of the Association’s remaining claims, including its request for an injunction, because it found the Association’s briefing too conclusory. The court then granted McClendon’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on one cause of action (the cancellation of instruments cause of action as to which it had denied summary adjudication) and denied the remainder of her motion.
In January 2024, the judge conducted a court trial on the Association’s claim for injunctive relief.2 At the conclusion of the trial, the court entered judgment and an injunction permanently enjoining McClendon from interfering with the Association’s ownership interest in the property.
McClendon timely appealed. On February 24, 2026, we provisionally granted McClendon’s request that we take judicial notice of certain superior court records in connection with this appeal. We now grant the request in full. (See Evid. Code, § 452.)
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1213–1214.) We likewise review
2 The court dismissed the Association’s remaining unadjudicated claims prior to trial.
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de novo a court’s order granting or denying a motion for summary adjudication, applying “the same standards as we would in reviewing a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment.” (Estate of Hastie (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1291.) Summary judgment motions are governed by a three-step procedure. “ ‘ “ ‘First, [a court] identif[ies] the issues raised by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond; secondly, [the court] determine[s] whether [a] moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claims and justify a judgment in movant’s favor; when a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment, the third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 492 (Los Angeles Unified School Dist.).)
De novo review, however, “ ‘ “does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues. As with an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant’s responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore, to point out the triable issues the appellant claims are present by citation to the record and any supporting authority. In other words, review is limited to issues which have been adequately raised and briefed.” ’ [Citation.]” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 492.)
Finally, we review a court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. (Thompson v. 10,000 RV Sales, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 950, 964.)
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B. McClendon Fails To Demonstrate Error McClendon contends that we must reverse the rulings on the motions and vacate the injunction because (1) the Association lacked standing to pursue its quiet title claim, and (2) the transfer of the property from Markus-Dane to the Association was invalid.3 McClendon’s standing argument fails. Here, the Association adequately alleged a personal interest in the dispute concerning ownership of the property by claiming that it held legal title to the property by virtue of the recorded sheriff’s deed of sale.
McClendon’s challenge to the validity of the 2010 transfer of the property from Markus-Dane to the Association likewise fails. She contends the transfer was invalid because (1) the Association failed to comply with the Enforcement of Judgments Law (EJL) (Code Civ. Proc.,4 § 680.010 et seq.), including its homestead exemption5 (see §§ 704.720–704.740), (2) the Association “putatively
3 The Association urges us to reject McClendon’s challenge to the ruling on her motion for judgment on the pleadings because she neglected to include a copy of the motion in the appellate record. We agree that McClendon has forfeited any challenge to that ruling by failing to provide a complete record. (See Barak v. The Quisenberry Law Firm (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 654, 660 [“[f]ailure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the] appellant”].) This forfeiture, however, does not affect the scope of our analysis because McClendon relies on identical arguments in challenging the rulings on both motions, as well as the court’s decision to issue the injunction.
4 Subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
5 The homestead exemption affords judgment debtors certain protections against the forced sale of their real property to satisfy a money judgment. (See California Coastal Com. v. Allen
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acquired” the property “by an unlawful sheriff ’s sale over which the court lacked jurisdiction” (boldface & capitalization omitted), (3) the Association filed “a misleading abstract of judgment . . . and writ of execution” “to precipitate [the] sheriff ’s sale of [the] property” (capitalization omitted), and (4) her home loan on the property prevented its lawful transfer from Markus-Dane to the Association.
These arguments hinge on the premise that the purported irregularities in the transfer injured McClendon because she retained some ownership interest in the property at the time of the 2010 sheriff ’s sale. But undisputed facts in the record foreclose that premise: McClendon transferred the property to Markus-Dane in 2007 via a recorded grant deed, and—consistent with that grant deed—McClendon did not identify the property as an asset in her 2008 Schedule A bankruptcy filing. Further, McClendon identifies no evidence supporting that she attempted to invoke the addendum to the grant deed to reclaim title to the property prior to the sheriff ’s sale.
McClendon insists that, even if Markus-Dane held legal title to the property at the time of the sale, her occupancy of the property through the sale date preserved her ability to claim a homestead exemption. The EJL, however, provides expressly that its “exemptions . . . apply only to [the] property of a natural person.” (§ 703.020, subd. (a).) Thus, once McClendon transferred the property to Markus-Dane, an LLC, no homestead exemption applied to the property. (See California Coastal, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 329 [“There is no ambiguity in the governing
(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 322, 328 (California Coastal).) “If the real property is the debtor’s home, the debtor may be eligible for a homestead exemption on the proceeds of the sale.” (Ibid., citing § 704.730.)
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statutes; the dwelling exemption is available only to a natural person, not to a corporation. Once [the appellant] conveyed the property to [a corporation], it was not owned by a natural person, and [the appellant] was not entitled to the protection of the homestead exemption” (fn. omitted)].)
Accordingly, we affirm.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and injunction are affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.