Chasrick Heredia v. Michael Roscoe et al.

2021 DNH 175

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: November 12, 2021
• Docket: 21-cv-198-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Chasrick Heredia

v. Case No. 21-cv-198-PB Opinion No. 2021 DNH 175 Michael Roscoe et al.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Chasrick Heredia has sued several officers of the

Manchester Police Department for excessive use of force during

his arrest, fabrication of evidence, and malicious prosecution,

among other claims. Defendants moved for judgment on the

pleadings with respect to the fabrication and malicious

prosecution claims. Heredia subsequently agreed to dismiss the

malicious prosecution claims, so the only disputed issue is

whether defendants should prevail on their challenge to the

fabrication claim. Because defendants have not established that

they are entitled to judgment on that claim, I deny their

motion.

I. BACKGROUND 1

This case arose out of an incident that occurred in the

early morning hours of May 11, 2018. Manchester Police Officers

Michael Roscoe, Canada Stewart, Matthew Nocella, and Nathan

1 The facts are derived from the complaint and public records from the underlying criminal case. See Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001). Harrington responded to a noise complaint at a local bar. The

officers allegedly became agitated after Heredia, who was

recording the encounter, refused to follow their instruction to

leave the area. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15, Doc. No. 1-1. The complaint

alleges that Officer Roscoe and another officer “attacked

[Heredia], threw him to the ground, and slammed his head onto

the pavement.” Id. ¶ 15. After Officer Roscoe left Heredia to

detain another individual, Officer Stewart allegedly jumped on

Heredia and started punching him in the head. Id. Heredia

responded by struggling with Officer Stewart, who sustained a

concussion as a result. See Doc. No. 12-4 at 4-6. Officer

Roscoe intervened and “began repeatedly punching [Heredia] with

both fists in [his] face and head.” Compl. ¶ 16. Officers

Stewart and Nocella then “grabbed [Heredia], pushed him against

a parked vehicle, and then drove him to the ground again.” Id.

¶ 17. While Heredia was on the ground, Officer Roscoe allegedly

shot him with a taser. Id. ¶ 18. One of the officers ripped

the taser’s prongs out of Heredia, causing him lacerations. Id.

Despite Heredia’s apparent injuries, the officers refused his

requests for medical treatment and took him to jail. Id. ¶ 19.

Officers Roscoe, Stewart, Nocella, and Harrington all

reported that Heredia had grabbed Officer Stewart’s hair and

repeatedly punched her in the head during the incident. Id.

2 ¶ 20. Heredia alleges that he never punched Officer Stewart and

that the officers knowingly made those false reports. Id.

Heredia was charged with attempted murder, first-degree

assault, second-degree assault, simple assault, felony resisting

arrest, felony riot, two counts of misdemeanor resisting arrest,

and misdemeanor disorderly conduct. At trial, he denied that he

had punched Officer Stewart and argued that the officers had

used unlawful force against him. Part of his defense involved

questioning the credibility of Officers Roscoe and Stewart and

arguing that it was Officer Roscoe who inadvertently punched

Officer Stewart while punching Heredia. The jury acquitted

Heredia of the attempted murder and assault charges but

convicted him on the remaining charges. See Doc. No. 12-3 at 1-

2; Compl. ¶ 21.

After trial, Heredia learned that Officers Stewart and

Roscoe were in a committed, romantic relationship at the time of

the incident. Compl. ¶ 22. He moved for a new trial based on

their failure to disclose this relationship. The state court

granted Heredia’s motion, concluding that the undisclosed

information was knowingly withheld and that it was favorable to

Heredia because it pertained to the officers’ credibility and

potential motive to lie. See Doc. No. 12-3 at 4-7.

After the court ordered a new trial, Heredia pleaded guilty

to resisting arrest, riot, and disorderly conduct. The felony

3 resisting arrest indictment alleged that Heredia “struggled with

Officer Stewart as she attempted to handcuff [him] by punching

Officer Stewart in the face causing her to sustain a

concussion.” Doc. No. 7-2 at 4. The two misdemeanor resisting

arrest charges alleged that Heredia “struggled” with Officers

Roscoe and Nocella as they attempted to handcuff him. Doc. No.

7-4 at 8-9. The riot indictment alleged that he, with others,

“engaged Manchester Police Officers in a fight resulting in [a]

concussion to Manchester Police Officer Canada Stewart.” Doc.

No. 7-3 at 4. Lastly, the disorderly conduct charge alleged

that Heredia “stood in the middle of the road, refusing to leave

following multiple lawful orders to do so by Officer Roscoe.”

Doc. No. 7-4 at 10.

During the plea colloquy, Heredia contested the accusation

that he had punched Officer Stewart. See Doc. No. 12-4 at 4-6.

He agreed, however, that he was guilty of felony resisting

arrest because he had struggled with Officer Stewart, and she

sustained a concussion as a result. See id. He did not contest

the facts supporting the remaining charges. The court accepted

Heredia’s guilty pleas and sentenced him to time served.

In this action, Heredia has sued Officers Roscoe, Stewart,

Nocella, and Harrington in their individual capacities. He has

asserted claims for excessive use of force (Counts I-III),

failure to render medical treatment in violation of the due

4 process clause (Count IV), fabrication of evidence in violation

of his due process right to a fair trial (Count V), malicious

prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count VI),

common law assault and battery (Counts VII-IX), and common law

malicious prosecution (Count X).

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings with respect

to the fabrication of evidence (Count V) and malicious

prosecution (Counts VI and X) claims. The parties subsequently

stipulated to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the

malicious prosecution claims. See Doc. No. 11. Thus, the

present motion concerns only the fabrication claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings at any time

“[a]fter the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); see R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-

Nuñez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006). A motion for judgment

on the pleadings is subject to the same standard of review as a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). Collier v. City of Chicopee, 158 F.3d 601, 602 (1st

Cir. 1998). Accordingly, in reviewing a motion for judgment on

the pleadings, I “must accept all of the nonmovant’s well-

pleaded factual averments as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in his favor.” Rivera–Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d

631, 635 (1st Cir. 1988) (cleaned up). I may enter judgment on

5 the pleadings “only if the uncontested and properly considered

facts conclusively establish the movant’s entitlement to a

favorable judgment.” Zipperer v. Raytheon Co., 493 F.3d 50, 53

(1st Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment on the

pleadings with respect to the claim that they fabricated the

story that Heredia had punched Officer Stewart. Defendants

contend that the fabrication claim is barred by (1) the doctrine

announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), (2) judicial

estoppel, and (3) collateral estoppel. The premise that

underlies all three arguments is that Heredia admitted to

punching Officer Stewart when he pleaded guilty to felony

resisting arrest, which precludes him from now arguing that the

punching story is a fabrication. Because the pleadings do not

support that premise, the motion is denied.

A. The Heck Doctrine

Under Heck, a plaintiff convicted of a crime cannot obtain

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any actions that “would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction” until the

conviction is set aside. 512 U.S. at 486-87. By the same

token, “a plaintiff cannot bring a section 1983 fabricated-

evidence claim that is analogous to the common-law tort of

malicious prosecution ‘prior to favorable termination of [the]

6 prosecution.’” Jordan v. Town of Waldoboro, 943 F.3d 532, 545

(1st Cir. 2019) (quoting McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149,

2156 (2019)). Where the underlying conviction has not been

invalidated, “a court must examine the relationship between the

§ 1983 claim and the conviction, including asking whether the

plaintiff could prevail only by negating an element of the

offense of which he was convicted.” O’Brien v. Town of

Bellingham, 943 F.3d 514, 529 (1st Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

Defendants argue that Heredia’s claim that they falsely

accused him of punching Officer Stewart necessarily implies the

invalidity of his conviction for felony resisting arrest. I

disagree. Proving that he did not punch her would not negate an

element of that offense.

Under New Hampshire law, a person is guilty of felony

resisting arrest when he “knowingly or purposely interferes with

a person recognized to be a law enforcement official . . .

seeking to effect an arrest or detention” and the act of

resisting causes serious bodily injury to another person. N.H.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:2. As defendants point out, the

indictment for this offense alleged that Heredia “struggled with

Officer Stewart as she attempted to handcuff [him] by punching

concussion.” Doc. No. 7-2 at 4. During the plea colloquy,

however, Heredia specifically contested the punching claim and

7 instead only agreed that he had caused a concussion to Officer

Stewart by struggling with her. The facts to which he agreed

were sufficient to establish the elements of the offense. The

contested allegation of punching was not a necessary fact to

secure his conviction. Rather, it was mere surplusage in the

indictment that, even if proven to be false, does not imply the

invalidity of Heredia’s conviction. Accordingly, Heck does not

bar his claim that defendants fabricated the punching story.

B. Judicial Estoppel

Judicial estoppel “prevents a party from prevailing in one

phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a

contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” Thore v.

Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 181 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting New Hampshire

v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)). For guilty pleas, the

First Circuit has declined to adopt a per se rule prohibiting a

party from admitting to certain facts as part of a plea colloquy

and then denying those same facts in a § 1983 action. See id.

at 185. The applicability of judicial estoppel in this context

turns on the equities of the particular case, including whether

reasonable justification has been offered for the change in

position. See id. at 185-87.

As discussed above, punching Officer Stewart was not a

necessary element of the offense of felony resisting arrest to

which Heredia pleaded guilty. In fact, he specifically disputed

8 that allegation during his plea colloquy. Because he is not

taking a contrary position when he now alleges that defendants

fabricated the punching story, judicial estoppel does not bar

his claim.

C. Collateral Estoppel

Collateral estoppel bars a party to a prior action from

relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined

in the prior action. Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 778

(2003). For this equitable doctrine to apply, “the issue

subject to estoppel must be identical in each action, the first

action must have resolved the issue finally on the merits, and

the party to be estopped must have appeared as a party in the

first action, or have been in privity with someone who did so.”

Id.

Whether defendants falsely accused Heredia of punching

Officer Stewart was not actually litigated and determined in the

underlying criminal case. Contrary to defendants’ argument,

Heredia did not previously admit to the punching. Instead, he

contested that allegation, and the state court nonetheless

accepted his guilty plea. Therefore, collateral estoppel does

not bar his fabrication of evidence claim. 2

2 I agree with defendants that the fabrication claim cannot be used to recover damages for the time Heredia served in prison, considering that the conviction and sentence he received following his guilty pleas were not tainted by the alleged 9 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I deny defendants’ motion for

judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 7) with respect to the

fabricated evidence claim (Count V).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro Paul J. Barbadoro United States District Judge

November 12, 2021

cc: Counsel of Record

fabrication. The Supreme Court, however, has signaled that “other types of harm independent of a liberty deprivation” could support a fabrication claim. See McDonough, 139 S. Ct. at 2155 n.2. Because the briefing on this issue is not well developed, I decline to address it at this stage. 10