Chaslavka v. Mechalek

99 N.W. 154, 124 Iowa 69
Supreme Court of Iowa·Decided April 8, 1904·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

McClain, J.

This action was originally brought by Mary Chaslavka and Frank Chess to secure partition of a certain tract of land of which their brother Michael Chess had died seised; the allegations of the petition being, in general, that the two plaintiffs and the defendant Annie Mechalek were the sisters and brother of decedent, and his heirs; that he died intestate, seised of the premises; and that each of the three heirs named became possessed by inheritance of a one-third interest in said premises. The defendants, who are husband and wife, set up a claim of title to the entire premises under a deed made to them in 1897, and, as an independent defense and claim of title, allege that in 1891 the deceased had executed a will devising one-third of his estate to plaintiff Mary Chaslavka, and two-thirds thereof to the defendant Annie Mechalek. The plaintiffs, by way of reply, pleaded that at the time of the execution of the will, and also when the deed was executed, the deceased, Michael Chess, was of unsound mind and incapable of executing either a will or [71]*71deed. Subsequently, in a probate proceeding in the. same court, the will was admitted to probate, over the objection of Mary Chaslavka and Frank Chess that the deceased was mentally incapable of executing a valid will, whereupon Frank Chess dismissed the action so- far as he was concerned, and the case was tried as between Mary Chaslavka and Frank and Annie Mechalek on the issue as to the validity of the deed. The court found that the deceased was possessed of sufficient capacity to execute a valid deed, and entered a decree for defendants, and the appeal is from this decree. The pleadings presented some issues not tried, which need not be considered on this appeal.- The sole question now before us is as to the mental capacity of the deceased at the time of the execution of the deed.

On the trial the evidence on each side was presented by depositions, and, as the ease is in equity, we must try it de novo on the evidence thus presented, as embodied in the record, without regard to the conclusions of the trial court.

1- ?ncompetenon°eviSnce. The bearing of the testimony of the witnesses, and the effect to be given to it for the purpose of reaching a satisfactory conclusion, can be understood and appreciated only by chronological presentation of the facts re-to the mental condition of the deceased during the period of his life to which the evidence relates. It appears that he was, by nationality, a Bohemian; that he had very little, if any, education, and spoke the English language quite imperfectly. Upon attaining the age of some twelve to fifteen years, he became afflicted with epilepsy, and had the fits characteristic of that disease with more or less frequency, and, as it appears, with increasing frequency and violence, until'the,time of his death, in the year 1900. While still a young man he inherited some property from his father, and for a'time after his father’s death resided with his brother and sisters in Benton county. It appears from depositions of several witnesses who were associated more or less intimately with him while in Benton county [72]*72that lie was mentally dull and stupid, and comprehended with difficulty what was said to him, and entered into conversation but slightly, under any circumstances, with his associates. It appears that he was engaged with his brother-in-law and sister in carrying on the farm which had been owned by his father, but there is practically no showing that at this time he engaged in business transactions on his own responsibility. In the year 1891 the deceased, accompanied by one Fullmer, the husband of an aunt, went to Humboldt county and purchased a tract of land, constituting the principal part of the real estate of which he subsequently died seised. He made this purchase in part with- money derived from the sale of his interest in the Benton county farm, which had belonged to his father, and in part with money furnished by. his sister Annie, who was at that time unmarried. It appears that he had previously inspected the land in company with the defendant Frank Mechalek, who was already living with the Chesses, and who had gone with him to investigate land in Minnesota and northwestern Iowa. In the purchase of the land, Fullmer conducted the negotiations, and also accompanied the deceased to a lawyer’s office in Humboldt, where the will was executed to which reference has already been made. The testimony relating to the entire transaction involving the purchase of the land and the execution of the will shows that deceased did little, if anything, more than to indicate his acquiescence in and approval of what was done in his behalf by Fullmer. Within two years after the purchase of the land, defendant Frank Mechalek had intermarried with Annie, the sister of the déceased, codefendant with her husband in this case, and the couple had gone to reside on. the land in Humboldt county purchased by the deceased, as already stated; and from that time on the deceased resided with them on the land, and engaged with them in carrying on the usual farming operations. Nowhere does it appear what arrangements were made as to the division of profits, but deceased and Frank Mechaleic seem to have acted jointly [73]*73in whatever business was done, connected with the carrying on of the farm. Indeed, it appears that Frank Mechalek assumed the greater share of the responsibility in business transactions.

Many witnesses testify as to tire mental condition of deceased from 1891 to about 1895 or 1896, expressing the conclusion that during that time he was mentally sound, but the facts disclosed show a very slight foundation on which to base any competent judgment as to .his mental capacity. The transactions referred to were very simple ones — such as the sale of grain hauled from the farm to the usual dealers in the market town, the purchase of a few loads of coal, and the purchase of a team of mules; and on cross-examination it was developed that in several instances the deceased was simply carrying out arrangements entered into when he and his brother-in-law had been together, and his brother-in-law had taken the active part in the negotiations. Not one of the witnesses testified to any extended conversation or dealings with deceased, and they agree in speaking of him as being uncommunicative, and carrying on whatever conversation or transaction he was engaged in by affirmative and negative words or signs in response to what was said to him. The witnesses seemed inclined to attribute the reluctance or inability of deceased to carry on a conversation or engage in a business transaction to a difficulty in using the English language, but the brother-in-law and one or two other witnesses refer to him as speaking English with reasonable ease, although his conversation with his relatives seems to have been usually in Bohemian. We are inclined to' think, in view of the entire evidence, that the difficulty of holding conversations or engaging in any kind of intercourse or business transaction with deceased was due to a continuation of the dullness and stupidity observed by witnesses while he still resided in Benton county, rather than his inability to use the English language. Some of the witnessés who testified as to his mental condition while in Benton county were themselves Bo[74]*74hemians, and their impression as to his lack of sense was not due to any inaptness on his part in the use of English.

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Chaslavka v. Mechalek, 99 N.W. 154, 124 Iowa 69 (iowa 1904).

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