Chase Whitehead v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedFebruary 18, 2026
Docket2:22-cv-01978
StatusUnknown

This text of Chase Whitehead v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company (Chase Whitehead v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chase Whitehead v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company, (D. Ariz. 2026).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Chase Whitehead, No. CV-22-01978-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Amica Mutual Insurance Company,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff Chase Whitehead’s (“Plaintiff”) Unopposed 16 Supplemental Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and 17 Certification of the Settlement Class. (Doc. 40). For the reasons stated below, the Court 18 will grant the Motion. 19 I. Background 20 Previously on March 20, 2025, Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Preliminary 21 Approval of Class Action Settlement and Certification was denied. (Doc. 39). The Court 22 found that Plaintiff failed to both satisfy Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement and 23 establish superiority under Rule 23(b)(3). (Id.) Because the Court already gave a 24 background of how the case originated and the layout of insurance stacking cases in 25 Arizona, the Court will not do so again here. (See Doc. 39 at 1–2). The Court’s reasoning 26 for allowing the preliminary certification to go forward is enunciated below. 27 II. Legal Standard 28 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), one or more members of a class may 1 sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if all four of the 2 following prerequisites are met: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 3 impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or 4 defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 5 (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). On top of satisfying the four prerequisites above, at least one of the 7 following must be true: (1) Risk of inconsistency: the prosecution of separate actions by 8 individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications or adjudications 9 that would be dispositive of non-party class member interests; (2) Appropriate Class-Wide 10 Injunctive Relief: injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a 11 whole because the conduct of the opposing party applies generally to the class; or (3) 12 Predominance and Superiority: questions of law or fact common to class members 13 predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action 14 is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 15 controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).1 When there is an underlying settlement in a class 16 action, that settlement needs the approval of the district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (e). At the 17 preliminary approval stage, the Court only needs to evaluate whether the proposed 18 settlement (1) appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, 19 (2) has no obvious deficiency, (3) does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class 20 representatives or segments of the class, and (4) falls within the range of possible approval. 21 See Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652, 665 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 22 III. Discussion 23 A. Class Certification 24 In the Court’s previous Order, the Court found that Plaintiff had satisfied all the 25 initial prerequisites under Rule 23(a), except 23(a)(1): numerosity. (Doc. 39 at 6). Because 26 that was the only prerequisite the Court found deficient, that is the only one the Court will 27 now address. If the Court did not make it clear previously, it will make clear now why the 28 1 Plaintiff only seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3). (See Doc. 36 at 23–26). 1 Court was not initially persuaded that Plaintiff had met 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement. 2 The Court’s prior Order observed the small class size, which the Court understands is not 3 a strict numerical requirement, but it was also concerned with Plaintiff’s lack of analysis 4 of other subfactors to support the Court’s finding of numerosity. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the 5 Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) (emphasizing that the numerosity requirement has 6 no absolute limitations, but instead turns on looking at the specific facts of the case). The 7 subfactors for numerosity that the Court would have been swayed by, and now is, are: (a) 8 geographic diversity of the class members; (b) their ability to institute separate suits; and 9 (c) the nature of the underlying action and the relief sought. Jordan v. Los Angeles Cty., 10 669 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, Cty. of Los Angeles v. 11 Jordan, 459 U.S. 810 (1982), modified, 726 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1984) (listing out the 12 subfactors to be analyzed within numerosity). 13 In his renewed Motion Plaintiff states that geographic diversity is satisfied because 14 the members of the class are spread across thirteen cities and five counties in Arizona. 15 (Doc. 40 at 6). One class member even resides in Washington state. (Id.) The Court finds 16 that this is adequate to show geographic diversity. 1 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on 17 Class Actions § 3:12 (5th ed. 2014) (“geographic dispersion of class members cuts in favor 18 of certification as joinder of all members of a dispersed class is likely less practicable than 19 joinder of all members of a similarly sized class residing in one neighborhood or working 20 in one workplace”). Class members are also unlikely or unable to initiate separate suits 21 because most would not be aware of their right to do so. Datta v. Asset Recovery Sols., 22 LLC, 2016 WL 1070666, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2016) (attributing the unlikelihood of 23 filing separate lawsuits to a finding that certification is appropriate). And while the nature 24 of the underlying relief sought is for compensatory damages, the Court will err on the side 25 of granting preliminary approval, considering that Plaintiff has supplemented his Motion 26 with more persuasive authority. (Doc. 41) (citing to recent caselaw in which a class size as 27 small as 25 was certified). Considering the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has now 28 satisfied the numerosity requirement to meet preliminary certification of the class. 1 Now that Plaintiff has met the four prerequisite requirements of 23(a)(1)–(4), the 2 Court will focus on what it found deficient in the Plaintiff’s previous Motion under 3 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) requires two separate inquires. The following being the two: “[1] 4 the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 5 affecting only individual members, and [2] that a class action is superior to other available 6 methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Rule 23(b)(3). Earlier, the 7 Court took no issue with the predominance part of Plaintiff’s Motion but found that 8 Plaintiff failed to show the Court that a class action was the superior way to resolve the 9 underlying cause of action. (Doc. 39 at 17). At that time, the Court found that the large 10 individual recovery a plaintiff would receive should they pursue the litigation as a 11 standalone without a class, although neutral, ultimately disfavored certification.

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Related

Charles L. Jordan v. County of Los Angeles
726 F.2d 1366 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc.
670 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. California, 2009)
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.
150 F.3d 1011 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)
Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.
252 F.R.D. 652 (E.D. California, 2008)
Horton v. Usaa Casualty Insurance
266 F.R.D. 360 (D. Arizona, 2009)

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Chase Whitehead v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chase-whitehead-v-amica-mutual-insurance-company-azd-2026.