Mr. Justice Harlan,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The first question to be considered involves the jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment below upon writ of error. The United States contend that a judgment rendered in a suit brought under the act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, entitled
“
An act to provide for the bringing of suits against the government of the United States,” and commonly known as the Tucker Act, cannot be reexamined here except upon appeal. 24 Stat. 505. So much of that act as can have any bearing upon this case is printed in the margin.
The contention of the government as to the jurisdiction of this court is not well founded. Congress did not intend that
cases brought under this act in a District or Circuit Court of the' United States, should be brought here by appeal only.
Throughout all the provisions relating to actions commenced in those courts there is shown a purpose to preserve' the dis
tinction between cases at law, cases in equity, and cases in admiralty. The phrases “ judgment or decree,” “ right of exception or appeal,” “equity or admiralty,” “rights of appeal or writs of error,” and “appeal or writ of error,” taken in connection with the clause in the fourth section relating to the jurisdiction of the respective courts of the United States proceeding under the act and providing that “ the course of procedure sh9.ll be in accordance with the established rules of said respective courts, and of such additions- and modifications thereof as said courts may adopt;” with that part of section seven which in terms refers to the distinction between cases at law and cases in equity and admiralty, and directs that “ if the suit be in equity or admiralty the court shall proceed with the same- according to the rules of such courts ; ” with the express recognition in section nine, of the “ same rights of appeal or writs of error” in any suit brought under this act as were reserved in the statutes of the United States in that behalf at the date of the passage of the act; with the require-, ment, in the same section, that “ the modes of procedure in claiming and perfecting an appeal or writ of error shall conform in all respects, and as near as may be, to the statutes and rules of court governing appeals and writs of error in like causes ; ” and with the provision in section ten, making it the duty of the District Attorney, when the Attorney General shall determine “ whether an appeal or writ of error shall be taken or not” in cases in which “the judgment or decree” shall be adverse to the government, to cause “ an appeal or writ of error to be perfected in accordance with the terms of the statutes and rules of practice governing the same; ” these phrases, clauses, and provisions make it, we think, reasonably, clear that Congress intended that the final determination of suits brought under this act in a District or Circuit Court of the United States shall be reviewed here upon writ of error, if the case be one at law, and upon appeal, if the case is one cognizable in equity or in admiralty under the existing statutes regulating the jurisdiction of those courts.
But Congress, while recognizing the settled distinction between law, equity, and admiralty, did not intend that the
records of cases brought against the government under this act should contain all that is required in suits instituted in the courts of the United States under the general statutes regulating their jurisdiction and the modes of procedure therein. Neither the mode of procedure in the Court of Claims, nor the mode in which cases there determined may be brought here for reexamination, were changed by the act of March 3, 1887. But under that act, a judgment of a District or Circuit Court of the United States in an action at law. brought against the government, will be reexamined here only when the record contains a specific finding of facts with the conclusions of law thereon. In such cases, this court will only inquire whether the judgment below is supported by the facts thus found. And, we think, it was also the purpose of Congress to require like specific findings or statements of fact and conclusions of law in cases in equity and in admiralty brought under that act in the District and Circuit Courts of the United States, and to restrict our inquiry in such cases, as in actions at law, to the sufficiency of the facts so found or stated to support the final judgment.
For the reasons stated the motion to dismiss the writ of error for want' of jurisdiction in this .court to review, in that mode, the final judgment of the court below is overruled.
"Was the United States' liable upon the written contract of lease which is the foundation of this action ?
By the law in force when the lease sued on was executed, it was made the duty of the Postmaster General
“
to establish post offices.” By section 3732 of. the Revised Statutes it is provided,- as did, substantially, the statutes in force "when the lease was made, that
“
no contract or purchase on behalf of the United States shall be made unless the same is authorized by law, or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfilment, except in the "War and Navy Departments, for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, which, however, shall not exceed the necessities of the current year.” Act of March 3, 1825, c. 64, § 1, 4 Stat. 102; Act of March 2, 1861, c. 84, § 10, 12 Stat. 220.
Much stress is placed by counsel' for the plaintiff upon the
clause making it the duty of the Postmaster General to establish post offices; the contention being that the power to establish a post office carries with it authority to lease rooms or a building in which the postmaster máy conduct the business of his office. In support of this position
Ware v. United States,
4 Wall. 617, is cited. But that case does not justify any such interpretation of the act of Congress. The question there was as to the power of the Postmaster General to discontinue a post office that had once been established by him under the authority conferred by the act of 1825, 4 Stat. 102, “ to- establish post offices.” This court, observing that the power to discontinue post offices is incident to the- power to establish them, unless there was some provision in the acts of Congress restraining its exercise, said: “ Undoubtedly, Congress might discontinue a post office which they had pre: viously established by law, and it is difficult to see why the Postmaster General may not do the same thing when acting under an act of Congress, expressed in the very words of the Constitution from which Congress derives its power.” Again: “Power to establish post offices and post roads is conferred upon Congress, but the policy of the government from the time the general post office was established has been to delegate the' power to designate the places where the mail shall be received and delivered to the Postmaster General.” p. 632.
There was no issue in that case as to the extent of the authority of the Postmaster General to bind the.
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Mr. Justice Harlan,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The first question to be considered involves the jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment below upon writ of error. The United States contend that a judgment rendered in a suit brought under the act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, entitled
“
An act to provide for the bringing of suits against the government of the United States,” and commonly known as the Tucker Act, cannot be reexamined here except upon appeal. 24 Stat. 505. So much of that act as can have any bearing upon this case is printed in the margin.
The contention of the government as to the jurisdiction of this court is not well founded. Congress did not intend that
cases brought under this act in a District or Circuit Court of the' United States, should be brought here by appeal only.
Throughout all the provisions relating to actions commenced in those courts there is shown a purpose to preserve' the dis
tinction between cases at law, cases in equity, and cases in admiralty. The phrases “ judgment or decree,” “ right of exception or appeal,” “equity or admiralty,” “rights of appeal or writs of error,” and “appeal or writ of error,” taken in connection with the clause in the fourth section relating to the jurisdiction of the respective courts of the United States proceeding under the act and providing that “ the course of procedure sh9.ll be in accordance with the established rules of said respective courts, and of such additions- and modifications thereof as said courts may adopt;” with that part of section seven which in terms refers to the distinction between cases at law and cases in equity and admiralty, and directs that “ if the suit be in equity or admiralty the court shall proceed with the same- according to the rules of such courts ; ” with the express recognition in section nine, of the “ same rights of appeal or writs of error” in any suit brought under this act as were reserved in the statutes of the United States in that behalf at the date of the passage of the act; with the require-, ment, in the same section, that “ the modes of procedure in claiming and perfecting an appeal or writ of error shall conform in all respects, and as near as may be, to the statutes and rules of court governing appeals and writs of error in like causes ; ” and with the provision in section ten, making it the duty of the District Attorney, when the Attorney General shall determine “ whether an appeal or writ of error shall be taken or not” in cases in which “the judgment or decree” shall be adverse to the government, to cause “ an appeal or writ of error to be perfected in accordance with the terms of the statutes and rules of practice governing the same; ” these phrases, clauses, and provisions make it, we think, reasonably, clear that Congress intended that the final determination of suits brought under this act in a District or Circuit Court of the United States shall be reviewed here upon writ of error, if the case be one at law, and upon appeal, if the case is one cognizable in equity or in admiralty under the existing statutes regulating the jurisdiction of those courts.
But Congress, while recognizing the settled distinction between law, equity, and admiralty, did not intend that the
records of cases brought against the government under this act should contain all that is required in suits instituted in the courts of the United States under the general statutes regulating their jurisdiction and the modes of procedure therein. Neither the mode of procedure in the Court of Claims, nor the mode in which cases there determined may be brought here for reexamination, were changed by the act of March 3, 1887. But under that act, a judgment of a District or Circuit Court of the United States in an action at law. brought against the government, will be reexamined here only when the record contains a specific finding of facts with the conclusions of law thereon. In such cases, this court will only inquire whether the judgment below is supported by the facts thus found. And, we think, it was also the purpose of Congress to require like specific findings or statements of fact and conclusions of law in cases in equity and in admiralty brought under that act in the District and Circuit Courts of the United States, and to restrict our inquiry in such cases, as in actions at law, to the sufficiency of the facts so found or stated to support the final judgment.
For the reasons stated the motion to dismiss the writ of error for want' of jurisdiction in this .court to review, in that mode, the final judgment of the court below is overruled.
"Was the United States' liable upon the written contract of lease which is the foundation of this action ?
By the law in force when the lease sued on was executed, it was made the duty of the Postmaster General
“
to establish post offices.” By section 3732 of. the Revised Statutes it is provided,- as did, substantially, the statutes in force "when the lease was made, that
“
no contract or purchase on behalf of the United States shall be made unless the same is authorized by law, or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfilment, except in the "War and Navy Departments, for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, which, however, shall not exceed the necessities of the current year.” Act of March 3, 1825, c. 64, § 1, 4 Stat. 102; Act of March 2, 1861, c. 84, § 10, 12 Stat. 220.
Much stress is placed by counsel' for the plaintiff upon the
clause making it the duty of the Postmaster General to establish post offices; the contention being that the power to establish a post office carries with it authority to lease rooms or a building in which the postmaster máy conduct the business of his office. In support of this position
Ware v. United States,
4 Wall. 617, is cited. But that case does not justify any such interpretation of the act of Congress. The question there was as to the power of the Postmaster General to discontinue a post office that had once been established by him under the authority conferred by the act of 1825, 4 Stat. 102, “ to- establish post offices.” This court, observing that the power to discontinue post offices is incident to the- power to establish them, unless there was some provision in the acts of Congress restraining its exercise, said: “ Undoubtedly, Congress might discontinue a post office which they had pre: viously established by law, and it is difficult to see why the Postmaster General may not do the same thing when acting under an act of Congress, expressed in the very words of the Constitution from which Congress derives its power.” Again: “Power to establish post offices and post roads is conferred upon Congress, but the policy of the government from the time the general post office was established has been to delegate the' power to designate the places where the mail shall be received and delivered to the Postmaster General.” p. 632.
There was no issue in that case as to the extent of the authority of the Postmaster General to bind the. government by contract for the payment of mpney or for the léase of a building for a post office. That case did not call for any consideration of the general question, whether the words in the statute, “to éstablish post offices,” had the full meaning of the same' words found in the section of the Constitution enumerating the powers of Congress.
Nor is it necessary to. determine all that may be done by the Postmaster General under the power “ to establish post offices ” conferred upon that officer; for those words are to be interpreted in connection with the above statutory provision forbidding the making, except in the War and Navy Departments, and in those departments only for certain
things and under specified conditions, of any contract or purchase on behalf of the United States unless the same be authorized by law, or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfilment. There is no claim that the lease in question was made under any appropriation whatever, much less one adequate to its fulfilment. So that the only inquiry is, whether the contract of lease was •“ authorized by lsüw ” within the meaning of the statute relating to contracts or purchases on behalf of the government.
The counsel of the plaintiff contends that a contract of lease on behalf of the United States is authorized by law if made by the Postmaster General for the purpose of procuring rooms or a building for a post office established by him. The same argument would sustain a purchase by the Postmaster General, on behalf of the United States, of a building to be used for a post office so established by that officer. We cannot give our sanction to this interpretation of the statute. It would give the Postmaster General much larger powers than we believe Congress intended to give him. While the Postmaster General, under the power to establish post offices, may designate the places, that is, the localities, at which the mails are to be received, he cannot bind the United States by any lease or purchase of a building to be used for the purposes of a post office, unless the power to do so is derived from a statute which either expressly or by necessary implication authorizes him to make such lease or- purchase. The general authority “to establish post offices” does not itself, or without more, necessarily imply authority to bind the United States by a contract to lease or purchase a post-office building, although an appropriation of money to pay for the rent of a post-office building at a named place might give authority to the Postmaster General to lease such building in that locality as he deemed proper for the service, always keeping within the amount so appropriated. So also the power to lease a building to be used as a post office may be implied from a general appropriation of money to pay for rent of post offices in any particular fiscal year or years.
We have considered the case in the light of the statutes in
force when the lease of May 1, 1870, was executed. Shortly after that date, by the act of July 12,1870, c. 251, § 7, 16 Stat. 251, it was provided that no department of the government should expend, in any one year, any sum in excess of appropriations^made by Congress for that fiscal year, or involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money in excess of such appropriations. And that provision is reproduced in section 3679 of the Revised Statutes.
We are of opinion that the lease sued on was not authorized by law, and, consequently, no action can be maintained thereon.
The judgment is
Affirmed.