Chase v. County of Orange

87 So. 770, 81 Fla. 237
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedFebruary 28, 1921
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 87 So. 770 (Chase v. County of Orange) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chase v. County of Orange, 87 So. 770, 81 Fla. 237 (Fla. 1921).

Opinion

West, J.

Appellants for themselves and all others in like situation, owners of certain described lands lying within the boundaries of the Windermere Special Navigable Canal District in Orange County, Florida, who are taxpayers, brought suit against the appellees as county commissioners and clerk of the board of county commissioners of Orange County praying for an order enjoining and restraining appellees from selling a proposed issue o% bonds of said district amounting to $10,000 and enjoining and restraining said appellees from entering into a contract for the construction of the canals, bridges, cuts, fills, embankments and other works contemplated in such district indicated by certain plans and specifications for such work on file with the appellate clerk of the board of county commissioners of said county.

To the bill praying for injunction, temporary and permanent, an answer, was filed by appellees. Upon application for a temporary injunction on bill and answer and affidavits of the parties and others an order was made denying such application and refusing to grant such [240]*240temporary injunction. From this order an appeal -wa§ taken to this court and the denying of the application for the temporary injunction is assigned as error.

The special navigable canal district was created pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 7533, Special Acts of 1917, and subsequently by Chapter 7982, Special Acts of 1919, the petition presented to the board of county commissioners under the provisions of section 1 of the former act and the election held in said district to determine whether or not the territory described in said act should be constituted into a special navigable canal district and the proposed canal or canals constructed and .paid for as specified in said petition and the canvass of said election by the board of county commissioners and the order of the board constituting the said district, were confirmed and validated.

The object generally of the original statute under which the proceeding was had was to authorize the creating and «establishment of a special taxing district for the purpose -of raising the funds necessary to meet the expenses to be incurred in constructing and maintaining certain proposed navigable canals within the district. That the validation of the proceeding to create and establish such district was within the power of the Legislature is well established. Schultz v. State, 80 Fla. 564, 86 South. Rep. 428, Board County Com’rs v. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line, 80 Fla. 252, 86 South. Rep. 199; C. H. & N. Ry. Co. v. Welles, 78 Fla. 227, 82 South. Rep. 770; Cranor v. Com’rs Volusia County, 54 Fla. 526, 45 South. Rep. 455; Givens v. County of Hillsborough, 46 Fla. 502, 35 South. Rep. 88. Conceding this to be true, the principal contention of appellants is that the plans and specifications for the work proposed, that is to say, the number, location and dimensions of the [241]*241canals to be constructed, are not in conformity with. the. petition filed, with the board of county, commissioners, where the number and approximate location and dimensions of the canals to be constructed are stated, upon which the election providing for the creation of the district was held and the district created. And in support of this contention it is urged that if the number or location or dimensions of the canals proposed to be constructed are substantially variant from the number, location or dimensions stated in the petition for calling the election and upon .which the election was held, the appellees should be enjoined from proceeding with the work. This contention is entirely sound and there is no controversy upon-it. Whitner v. Woodruff, 68 Pla. 465, 67 South. Rep. 110; L’Engle v. Holmes, 65 Pla. 179, 61 South. Rep. 320. But the converse of the proposition is also true and the conclusions contended for depends upon the accuracy of the premise that the work proposed to be done as shown by the plans and specifications adopted deviates substantially from' the work proposed and determined upon by the election creating the district and fixing the number, location and dimensions of the canals therein.

By the petition for the election the approximate location of the proposed canals is given and the canals are designated by numbers from one to seven inclusive. The answer denies that in' the plans and specifications for the construction of the canals there is any substantial deviation in number or location from the petition, and this is verified not only by the .affidavit of the engineer, but by the plat of the territory embraced within the district showing the work proposed under the plans and specifications adopted. It is true that in the petition only seven canals are mentioned and in the plans and specifications there are eight, but canal number 2 in the plans and [242]*242specifications amounts to nothing more than the deepening of a shoal place in an arm of one of the lakes constituting the waterway, the expense of which, according to the affidavits, is inconsequential, amounting, according to the affidavit of one of the engineers, to slightly more than $100. Otherwise, the only difference with request to this feature of the case is that canals numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the petition are designated as canals numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in the plans and specifications. The result, with respect to location, is that canal number 1 in the petition and in the plans and specifications is identical ; canal number 2 in the petition is identical with canal number 3 in the plans and specifications; canal number 3 in the petition is identical with canal number 4 in the plans and specifications; canal number 4 in the petition is identical with canal number 5 in the plans and specifications; canal number 5 in the petition is identical with canal number 6 in the plans and specifications; canal number 6 in the petition is identical with canal number 7 in the plans and specifications; and canal numr ber 7 in the petition is identical with canal number 8 in the plans and specifications.

With respect to the dimensions of the canals, the dimensions of canal number 1 in the petition and in the plans and specifications are identical; of canal number 2 in the plans and specifications, which we have seen amounts to no more than a slight deepening of an existing waterway, the dimensions are given and this work is not referred to in the petition; of canal number 2 in the petition, which is number 3 in the plans and specifications, according to the allegations of the bill no dimensions are given in the plans and specifications, but if true this cannot be said to be a deviation from the petition; and as to the remaining canals, ignoring the difference [243]*243in the number by which they are designated, there is no difference as to dimensions, but they are identical. It will be seen, therefore, that with respect to the number, locatiou and dimensions of the canals there is really no material deviation in the plans and specifications for such canals from that contained in the petition for the election, and the contention upon this branch of the case is based upon the incident of a difference in the numbers by which the canals are designated and the giving by the engineer the number 2 to a place in a natural waterway constituting a part of the canal where a slight amount of dredging may, according to the engineer, be required, but which, according to all the evidence, is trifling in amount, and to some of the evidence is unnecessary, and which is not referred to in the petition.

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Bluebook (online)
87 So. 770, 81 Fla. 237, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chase-v-county-of-orange-fla-1921.