IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DARLA CHASE, Individually and as ) Administrator of the Estate of ) ROLAND T. WRIGHT, SR., and ) LAVERNE WRIGHT ) ) Plaintiffs, ) C.A. No. N24C-05-216 CLS v. ) ) BELL FUNERAL HOME, LLC, ) COLEMAN’S FUNERAL SERVICES, ) and HAVEN MEMORIAL PARK ) CEMETARY AND CREMATORY, ) INC., ) ) Defendants. )
Date Submitted: November 10, 2025 Date Decided: February 12, 2026
Upon Consideration of the Defendant Coleman Funeral Services’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. GRANTED.
ORDER
Gary S. Nitsche, Esquire for NITSCHE & FREDERICKS, LLC, Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Robert J. Cahall, Esquire for MCCORMICK & PRIORE, P.C., Attorney for Defendant Coleman’s Funeral Services.
SCOTT, J. Having considered Defendant’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings1 and Plaintiffs’ Response,2 it appears to the Court that:
1. This matter arises from the alleged mistaken cremation of Ronald T. Johnson’s
(“Decedent”) corpse, who wished to be buried in a casket.3
2. On January 8, 2024, Decedent passed away.4 That same day, family members
of Decedent, including Darla Chase and Laverne Wright (collectively, “Plaintiffs”),
arranged for Bell Funeral Home to take custody of Decedent’s body to prepare for
the funeral services and burial.5 Plaintiff Chase advised Bell Funeral Home that
Decedent wished to be buried in a casket.6
3. Coleman’s Funeral Services (“Coleman”) transported Decedent’s remains to
Bell Funeral Home.7 Plaintiffs allege that Coleman failed to place [an] identifying
tag on the Decedent’s remains[.]”8
4. On January 21, 2024, Plaintiff Chase went to Bell Funeral Home to inspect
the body before the services.9 When Plaintiff Chase noticed that the body was not
1 Def. Coleman Funeral Servs.’ Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings, D.I. 65 (“Def.’s Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings”). 2 Pls.’ Resp. to Def. Coleman Funeral Servs.’ Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings, D.I. 75 (“Pls.’ Resp.”). 3 See generally Amended Complaint, D.I. 54 (“Amended Compl.”). 4 Amended Compl. ¶ 6. 5 Id. ¶¶ 8, 13. 6 Id. ¶ 12. 7 Id. ¶¶ 9–10. 8 Id. ¶ 11. 9 Id. ¶ 17. the Decedent, she notified Bell Funeral Home employees.10 Bell Funeral Home
allegedly “tried to convince [Plaintiffs and other family members] that the corpse
was in fact her father.”11
5. Eventually, Plaintiffs learned that Decedent was cremated against his wishes
on or around January 20, 2024, after Haven Memorial Park Cemetery and
Crematory, Inc., failed to confirm Decedent’s identification.12
6. Collectively, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint against Bell Funeral
Home, LLC, Coleman Funeral Services, and Haven Memorial Cemetery and
Crematory, Inc., for negligence, gross negligence and mistreatment of the decedent’s
corpse, professional services negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
fraud and misrepresentation, and burial interference. 13
7. Coleman now moves for partial judgment on the pleadings, asking the Court
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”)
against it.14 According to Coleman, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for NIED because
they were not in the “zone of danger.”15
10 Amended Compl. ¶ 18. 11 Id. ¶¶ 18, 20–22. 12 Id. ¶¶ 27–28. 13 See generally Amended Compl. 14 See generally Def.’s Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings. 15 Id. ¶ 20. 8. On the other hand, Plaintiffs cite Armstrong v. A.I. Dupont Hospital for
Children16 to argue that the zone of danger extended to the circumstances of this
case because they witnessed the negligence as it continued to happen.17
Alternatively, Plaintiffs claim that Delaware law “permits recovery for emotional
distress without the need to satisfy the ‘zone of danger’ test” in an action for the
mistreatment of a corpse.18
9. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(c), “any party may move for judgment
on the pleadings.” “In resolving a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court accepts the truth of
all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-
movant.”19 The standard of review on a motion for judgment on the pleadings tracks
the standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).20 Accordingly, “[t]he Court
will not grant judgment on the pleadings unless, after drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party, no material issues of fact exists and
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”21
16 60 A.3d 414, 424 (Del. 2012). 17 Pls.’ Resp. ¶ 13. 18 Id. ¶ 14. 19 Fortis Advisors LLC v. Boston Dynamics Inc., 2025 WL 1356521, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 29, 2025) (citing D’Antonio v. Wesley Coll., Inc., 2023 WL 9021767, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 29, 2023)). 20 Silver Lake Office Plaza, LLC v. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc., 2014 WL 595378, at *6 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2014) (quoting Blanco v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 2012 WL 3194412, at *6 (Del. Super. Aug. 8, 2012)). 21 Four Cents Hldgs., LLC v. M&E Printing, Inc., 2025 WL 2366460, at *4 (Del. Super. Aug. 12, 2025) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Earthbound, LLC, 2024 WL 3067114, at *7 (Del. Super. June 5, 2024)). 10. The elements of a claim for NIED are: “(1) negligence causing fright to
someone; (2) in the zone of danger; (3) producing physical consequences to that
person as a result of the contemporaneous shock.”22
11. The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs, as third parties, were in the zone of
danger as it concerns Coleman’s alleged negligence. In Robb v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the zone of danger prong as an
element of claims for NIED.23 The zone of danger entitles a party to recover only
where the “negligence proximately caused fright, [to] one within the immediate area
of physical danger from that negligence, which . . . produce[s] physical
consequences[.]”24 The Robb Court, however, left open the question of whether
recovery for NIED would be permitted “wherein fright arose from the peril of
another and the plaintiff was not in the path of danger created by the negligence
asserted.”25
12. In Armstrong, this Court answered the question left open by Robb, and
extended the zone of danger to third-party plaintiffs, holding “that a claim for
22 Rhinehardt v. Bright, 2006 WL 2220972, at *5 (Del. Super. July 20, 2006) (quoting Snavely v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 1985 WL 552277, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 18, 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Armstrong, 60 A.3d at 423. 23 210 A.2d 709, 715–16 (Del. 1965). 24 Id. 25 Id. at 711. [NIED] is a viable cause of action where the negligence is continuing and occurs in
the third person’s presence.”26
13. In Boas v. Christiana Care Health Services, Inc., this Court did not extend
the zone of danger to third-party plaintiffs where an autopsy was performed on an
infant without the parents’ consent.27 The Boas Court concluded that because the
plaintiffs’ fright arose from the peril of another, and they did not allege that the
negligence was continuing or occurred in their presence, they were required to allege
that they were in the zone of physical danger under Robb.28
14. Like Boas, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ mistaken cremation of
Decedent, against Decedent’s express wishes, caused them emotional distress, and
their fright arose when Bell Funeral Home attempted to convince Plaintiffs that the
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DARLA CHASE, Individually and as ) Administrator of the Estate of ) ROLAND T. WRIGHT, SR., and ) LAVERNE WRIGHT ) ) Plaintiffs, ) C.A. No. N24C-05-216 CLS v. ) ) BELL FUNERAL HOME, LLC, ) COLEMAN’S FUNERAL SERVICES, ) and HAVEN MEMORIAL PARK ) CEMETARY AND CREMATORY, ) INC., ) ) Defendants. )
Date Submitted: November 10, 2025 Date Decided: February 12, 2026
Upon Consideration of the Defendant Coleman Funeral Services’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. GRANTED.
ORDER
Gary S. Nitsche, Esquire for NITSCHE & FREDERICKS, LLC, Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Robert J. Cahall, Esquire for MCCORMICK & PRIORE, P.C., Attorney for Defendant Coleman’s Funeral Services.
SCOTT, J. Having considered Defendant’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings1 and Plaintiffs’ Response,2 it appears to the Court that:
1. This matter arises from the alleged mistaken cremation of Ronald T. Johnson’s
(“Decedent”) corpse, who wished to be buried in a casket.3
2. On January 8, 2024, Decedent passed away.4 That same day, family members
of Decedent, including Darla Chase and Laverne Wright (collectively, “Plaintiffs”),
arranged for Bell Funeral Home to take custody of Decedent’s body to prepare for
the funeral services and burial.5 Plaintiff Chase advised Bell Funeral Home that
Decedent wished to be buried in a casket.6
3. Coleman’s Funeral Services (“Coleman”) transported Decedent’s remains to
Bell Funeral Home.7 Plaintiffs allege that Coleman failed to place [an] identifying
tag on the Decedent’s remains[.]”8
4. On January 21, 2024, Plaintiff Chase went to Bell Funeral Home to inspect
the body before the services.9 When Plaintiff Chase noticed that the body was not
1 Def. Coleman Funeral Servs.’ Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings, D.I. 65 (“Def.’s Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings”). 2 Pls.’ Resp. to Def. Coleman Funeral Servs.’ Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings, D.I. 75 (“Pls.’ Resp.”). 3 See generally Amended Complaint, D.I. 54 (“Amended Compl.”). 4 Amended Compl. ¶ 6. 5 Id. ¶¶ 8, 13. 6 Id. ¶ 12. 7 Id. ¶¶ 9–10. 8 Id. ¶ 11. 9 Id. ¶ 17. the Decedent, she notified Bell Funeral Home employees.10 Bell Funeral Home
allegedly “tried to convince [Plaintiffs and other family members] that the corpse
was in fact her father.”11
5. Eventually, Plaintiffs learned that Decedent was cremated against his wishes
on or around January 20, 2024, after Haven Memorial Park Cemetery and
Crematory, Inc., failed to confirm Decedent’s identification.12
6. Collectively, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint against Bell Funeral
Home, LLC, Coleman Funeral Services, and Haven Memorial Cemetery and
Crematory, Inc., for negligence, gross negligence and mistreatment of the decedent’s
corpse, professional services negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
fraud and misrepresentation, and burial interference. 13
7. Coleman now moves for partial judgment on the pleadings, asking the Court
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”)
against it.14 According to Coleman, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for NIED because
they were not in the “zone of danger.”15
10 Amended Compl. ¶ 18. 11 Id. ¶¶ 18, 20–22. 12 Id. ¶¶ 27–28. 13 See generally Amended Compl. 14 See generally Def.’s Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings. 15 Id. ¶ 20. 8. On the other hand, Plaintiffs cite Armstrong v. A.I. Dupont Hospital for
Children16 to argue that the zone of danger extended to the circumstances of this
case because they witnessed the negligence as it continued to happen.17
Alternatively, Plaintiffs claim that Delaware law “permits recovery for emotional
distress without the need to satisfy the ‘zone of danger’ test” in an action for the
mistreatment of a corpse.18
9. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(c), “any party may move for judgment
on the pleadings.” “In resolving a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court accepts the truth of
all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-
movant.”19 The standard of review on a motion for judgment on the pleadings tracks
the standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).20 Accordingly, “[t]he Court
will not grant judgment on the pleadings unless, after drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party, no material issues of fact exists and
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”21
16 60 A.3d 414, 424 (Del. 2012). 17 Pls.’ Resp. ¶ 13. 18 Id. ¶ 14. 19 Fortis Advisors LLC v. Boston Dynamics Inc., 2025 WL 1356521, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 29, 2025) (citing D’Antonio v. Wesley Coll., Inc., 2023 WL 9021767, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 29, 2023)). 20 Silver Lake Office Plaza, LLC v. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc., 2014 WL 595378, at *6 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2014) (quoting Blanco v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 2012 WL 3194412, at *6 (Del. Super. Aug. 8, 2012)). 21 Four Cents Hldgs., LLC v. M&E Printing, Inc., 2025 WL 2366460, at *4 (Del. Super. Aug. 12, 2025) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Earthbound, LLC, 2024 WL 3067114, at *7 (Del. Super. June 5, 2024)). 10. The elements of a claim for NIED are: “(1) negligence causing fright to
someone; (2) in the zone of danger; (3) producing physical consequences to that
person as a result of the contemporaneous shock.”22
11. The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs, as third parties, were in the zone of
danger as it concerns Coleman’s alleged negligence. In Robb v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the zone of danger prong as an
element of claims for NIED.23 The zone of danger entitles a party to recover only
where the “negligence proximately caused fright, [to] one within the immediate area
of physical danger from that negligence, which . . . produce[s] physical
consequences[.]”24 The Robb Court, however, left open the question of whether
recovery for NIED would be permitted “wherein fright arose from the peril of
another and the plaintiff was not in the path of danger created by the negligence
asserted.”25
12. In Armstrong, this Court answered the question left open by Robb, and
extended the zone of danger to third-party plaintiffs, holding “that a claim for
22 Rhinehardt v. Bright, 2006 WL 2220972, at *5 (Del. Super. July 20, 2006) (quoting Snavely v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 1985 WL 552277, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 18, 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Armstrong, 60 A.3d at 423. 23 210 A.2d 709, 715–16 (Del. 1965). 24 Id. 25 Id. at 711. [NIED] is a viable cause of action where the negligence is continuing and occurs in
the third person’s presence.”26
13. In Boas v. Christiana Care Health Services, Inc., this Court did not extend
the zone of danger to third-party plaintiffs where an autopsy was performed on an
infant without the parents’ consent.27 The Boas Court concluded that because the
plaintiffs’ fright arose from the peril of another, and they did not allege that the
negligence was continuing or occurred in their presence, they were required to allege
that they were in the zone of physical danger under Robb.28
14. Like Boas, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ mistaken cremation of
Decedent, against Decedent’s express wishes, caused them emotional distress, and
their fright arose when Bell Funeral Home attempted to convince Plaintiffs that the
body in the casket was the Decedent when it was not.29 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim
for NIED arose from the peril of another, the Decedent. Further, the Amended
Complaint does not allege that the failure to place an identifying tag occurred in
Plaintiffs’ presence nor that Coleman’s negligence continued. Consequently,
Plaintiffs must allege they were in the zone of physical danger consistent with Robb.
26 Armstrong, 60 A.3d at 424, 426 (emphasis added). 27 2023 WL 4842102, at *1 (Del. Super. July 26, 2023). 28 Id. at *4 (distinguishing Armstrong from the facts at issue in this case). 29 Amended Compl. ¶¶ 44–45. 15. Plaintiffs do not allege that they were physically present when Coleman’s
actions occurred and thus fail to adequately plead a claim for NIED against Coleman.
16. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claim that there is a distinct, common-law cause of
action for the mistreatment of a corpse that permits recovery for emotional distress
without the need to show they were in the zone of danger is not relevant for purposes
of ruling on Coleman’s motion. Coleman only seeks judgment on Plaintiffs’ cause
of action for NIED. Hence, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument.
17. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Coleman Funeral Services’ Motion for
Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Calvin Scott Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.