CHASE HUNTER v. JOANNE AUCLAIR & Another.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: November 26, 2025
• Docket: 25-P-0471
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-471

CHASE HUNTER

vs.

JOANNE AUCLAIR & another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Chase Hunter filed the underlying case in the Land Court

against her sister, Joanne Auclair. The allegations of the

amended complaint center on residential property that was

previously owned by the sisters' mother (decedent), who died in

July 2022. The property is the subject of a pending petition in

the Probate and Family Court for formal administration of the

decedent's estate. In October 2024 a judge of that court

entered an order authorizing the special personal representative

of the estate to manage and preserve the property. In December

2024 the judge entered a supplemental order directing that the

1 Jeffrey M. Siegel. special personal representative "shall have sole and exclusive

access to and control over" the property and that "[a]ny and all

claims a party may want to assert with respect to" the property

"shall be brought in this Court only." The judge later

scheduled a trial to begin on March 13, 2025, on two issues:

whether the decedent died without leaving a will (as alleged by

Auclair and contested by Hunter), and whether the special

personal representative is suitable to serve as personal

representative of the estate.

In the underlying case, Hunter claimed among other things

that she is the rightful owner of the property, that Auclair has

been unjustly enriched because Hunter has paid all the expenses

for the property since July 2022, and that Auclair committed a

breach of an agreement to allow Hunter to occupy the property

after July 2022. As relief, Hunter sought a declaration

establishing her rights to the property "during the pendency of

any adjudication regarding intestacy/testacy" and in the event

that "a final adjudication on the merits determines intestacy,"

and a resulting or constructive trust on the property "to

protect it from transfer, dissipation or encumbrances by"

Auclair. Auclair moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunter's claims

were frivolous and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

Probate and Family Court. In a detailed memorandum of decision

dated March 11, 2025, a Land Court judge allowed Auclair's

2 motion to dismiss on the grounds of pendency of a prior action,

see Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (9), as amended, 450 Mass. 1403

(2008), and lack of ripeness. Judgment entered dismissing the

amended complaint without prejudice,2 and Hunter appeals.

Rule 12 (b) (9) "provides for the dismissal of a second

action in which the parties and the issues are the same as those

in a prior action still pending in a court of this

Commonwealth." Lyons v. Duncan, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 770-771

(2012), quoting M.J. Flaherty Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar.

Co., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 339 (2004). Here, there is identity

of parties because both Hunter and Auclair are parties to the

pending Probate and Family Court action.3 In addition, we agree

with the Land Court judge's assessment that there is identity of

issues because the Probate and Family Court action "will

determine the parties' rights in the [p]roperty, if any, subject

2 Hunter filed the amended complaint but had not served it by the time the dismissal entered. As the Land Court judge observed, however, "regardless of which complaint is considered, the grounds for dismissal are consistent" because "[b]oth complaints present the same five counts, allege substantially similar facts, and seek identical relief: the award of full title to the [p]roperty."

3 Although the amended complaint added Auclair's attorney, Jeffrey M. Siegel, as a defendant, the Land Court judge concluded that this did not affect the rule 12 (b) (9) analysis because the amended complaint "fail[ed] to assert any grounds for relief against [Siegel] over which [the] court would have subject matter jurisdiction." Hunter does not challenge this conclusion on appeal.

3 to settlement of" the estate, and "any claims [Hunter] might

assert with regard to the [p]roperty" will be addressed in that

proceeding. We therefore conclude that the judge was correct to

dismiss the amended complaint based on the pendency of the

Probate and Family Court action.4

As best we understand Hunter's brief, she challenges the

rule 12 (b) (9) dismissal principally on the ground that the

Land Court judge "enforced" the Probate and Family Court judge's

December 2024 order, rather than "conduct[ing] [her] own

analysis." We do not agree with this characterization. The

Land Court judge gave detailed reasons why dismissal was

appropriate, including that the Probate and Family Court

proceeding "is the proper forum for [Hunter] to pursue her

claims regarding the [p]roperty, including any promises or

disclaimers of inheritance by her sister, and any accounting or

reimbursement for funding the [p]roperty's upkeep," and Hunter

"may not 'split' these claims from that pending action to

selectively litigate them in separate courts of her choosing."

The Land Court judge further observed that, once a personal

representative is appointed by the Probate and Family Court,

"matters such as inventory, accounting, and the resolution of

claims against [e]state assets will be addressed -- including

4 Affirming on this ground, we need not address whether the judge correctly dismissed Hunter's claims for lack of ripeness.

4 any claims [Hunter] might assert with regard to the [p]roperty."

It is plain from the decision that the Land Court judge

conducted her own analysis and did not merely "enforce" the

Probate and Family Court judge's order, as Hunter claims.

Rather, the Land Court judge cited the order only at the end of

her analysis and only to show that the Probate and Family Court

"stands ready to hear and adjudicate [Hunter's] claims

concerning the [p]roperty."

We discern no other coherent argument in Hunter's brief as

to why the Land Court judge erred in dismissing the case under

rule 12 (b) (9). The remainder of Hunter's arguments are either

conclusory or address issues that are not relevant to the

dismissal. These include her arguments regarding her motion for

endorsement of a memorandum of lis pendens and her motion to

disqualify Auclair's attorney, both of which the judge denied as

moot. We need not discuss these arguments further. See Mass.

R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

Auclair has requested an award of her appellate attorney's

fees and double costs on the ground that Hunter's appeal is

frivolous and part of a pattern of vexatious litigation. We

agree that the appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, within

fourteen days of the date of this decision, Auclair may file an

application for attorney's fees and double costs. Hunter may

5 have fourteen days to respond. See Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass.

9, 10-11 (2004).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Shin & Singh, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: November 26, 2025.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.