Chas. A. Brewer & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission

158 F.2d 74, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 3813, 1947 Trade Cas. (CCH) 57,515
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedDecember 5, 1946
Docket9993
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 158 F.2d 74 (Chas. A. Brewer & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chas. A. Brewer & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission, 158 F.2d 74, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 3813, 1947 Trade Cas. (CCH) 57,515 (6th Cir. 1946).

Opinion

MARTIN, Circuit Judge.

The petitioners for review invoke the jurisdiction of this court to set aside the findings and conclusions of the Federal Trade Commission and to vacate its cease and desist order, which was entered after a hear-, ing on the complaint of the Commission, the answer of respondent petitioners, abundant testimony and other evidence taken before a trial examiner; and upon that offi *75 cial’s report, the exceptions thereto, and the briefs of the respective parties.

The challenged order directed that the petitioners cease and desist from “selling or distributing in commerce, as ‘commerce’ is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 et seq., punch boards, push cards or other lottery devices which are to be used or may be used in the sale or distribution of merchandise to the public by means of a game of chance, gift enterprise, or lottery scheme.”

From the findings of fact of the Federal Trade Commission, it appears that petitioners, a Chicago firm long engaged in the business, are among the world’s largest manufacturers of punch boards and push cards. They manufacture some 5,000 different types of the one and about 3,000 different kinds of the other. Their annual sales aggregate more than 2,000,000 of such devices, which are sold to manufacturers of various other articles of merchandise and to both wholesale and retail dealers in other merchandise. The Commission found that, in the course and conduct of their business, petitioners caused their manufactured devices, when sold, to be transported from their place of business in Illinois to purchasers in various other states of the Union; and that they maintain “a course of trade in their punch boards and push cards in commerce among and between the various states of the United States.”

The Commission found specifically that, among the various types of punch boards and push cards manufactured and sold by petitioners, many are designed for use by retail dealers in the sale and distribution of merchandise to the public “by means of a game of chance, gift enterprise or lottery scheme.”

In its findings, the Commission describes the punch boards and push cards, which vary in detail but all involve the same principle. 1 Many of petitioners’ products are made to order to meet the requirements of the particular purchaser. In numerous instances, manufacturers and wholesale dealers, who purchase the punch boards and push cards from petitioners, make up assortments consisting of a board or card and a quantity of merchandise, and sell the complete assortment to a retail dealer.

The Commission found, further, that retail dealers used petitioners’ devices in the sale and distribution of merchandise to the public and that the boards and cards of petitioners are designed and sold for that *76 specific purpose, as evidenced, not' only from the make-up of the boards and cards, but also from statements contained in the catalogues advertising petitioners’ devices. Advertising statements of petitioners quoted by the Commission in its findings are set out in a footnote. 2

The Commission found that petitioners thus supply and place in the hands of retail dealers, either directly or indirectly, the means of conducting lotteries or games of chance in the sale of merchandise to the general public: “a practice which is in contravention of an established public policy of the .Government of the United States”; and that, through the supplying of such means petitioners knowingly and purposely assist and participate in the violation of this public policy.

In its findings, the Commission asserted that many retail dealers do not make use of lotteries or games of chance in the sale or distribution of merchandise, and that many manufacturers of and wholesale dealers in merchandise do not supply to their retailers the means of conducting lotteries. In consequence of the popular appeal of ■games of chance, much trade is diverted from these dealers, manufacturers and wholesalers, to competitors who do not supply such lotteries or games of chance.

The final finding of the Federal Trade Commission stated: “The practice of respondents [petitioners here] in selling and distributing their lottery devices thus serves to place in the hands of others means and instrumentalities whereby they are enabled to use unfair methods of competition and thereby unfairly to divert substantial trade to themselves from those who do not use such methods.”

The Commission concluded: “The acts and practices of the respondents as herein found are all -to the prejudice of the public and constitute unfair acts and practices in commerce within the intent and meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act."

In our view, all the findings of fact of the Federal Trade Commission are supported by evidence, disclosed in the record. The Federal Trade Commission Act distinctly provides that the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. 52 Stat. 111, 15 U.S.C.A., § 45. Accordingly, the findings of the Commission must be and are accepted here. The Act declares unlawful “unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.” The word “commerce” means, of course, “interstate commerce.’.’ By the terms of the Act, the Com *77 mission is vested with the power to issue cease and desist orders from the use of methods of competition, or acts, or practices, condemned by the Act.

The petitioners contend that the Federal Trade Commission lacks jurisdiction to issue a cease and desist order, forbidding them to sell and distribute punch boards and push cards or other lottery devices in interstate commerce, inasmuch as they sell only to those independently engaged in the sale of merchandise to the public and have no interest in or connection with such independent sale or distribution of merchandise, or in the trade affected by such sales. From the foregoing analysis of the Commission’s findings, however, it seems that the petitioners are not as independent of those to whom they sell and ship their products in interstate commerce as they would make it appear. With deliberate intent, using channels of interstate commerce, they put into the hands of others, including manufacturers and wholesale and retail dealers, the means of using “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Manufacturers and wholesale dealers who purchase their made-to-order punch boards and push cards frequently make up complete assortments of merchandise and boards or cards, which find their way into interstate commerce.

For 'the reasons hereinafter appearing, we have reached the conclusion that, in thus aiding and abetting, inducing and procuring manufacturers and wholesale and retail dealers in merchandise to use unfair or deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of competition, Charles A. Brewer and Son, though manufacturing no merchandise except the lottery devices which they ship in interstate commerce, fall within the restraining power of the Federal Trade Commission as vested by the Federal Trade Commission Act. 52 Stat. 111.

The Supreme Court, in Federal Trade Commission v.

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158 F.2d 74, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 3813, 1947 Trade Cas. (CCH) 57,515, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chas-a-brewer-sons-v-federal-trade-commission-ca6-1946.