Charlton Beasley v. Officer Solow

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedMarch 5, 2026
Docket4:26-cv-00830
StatusUnknown

This text of Charlton Beasley v. Officer Solow (Charlton Beasley v. Officer Solow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charlton Beasley v. Officer Solow, (D.S.C. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA Charlton Beasley, #27341-076, ) C/A No. 4:26-830-TMC-TER Plaintiff, ) vs. ) ) Report and Recommendation Officer Solow, ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________________) This is a civil action filed by a federal prisoner, proceeding pro se. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and District of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court. Plaintiff paid the filing fee. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.1983). This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Such pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Id. ; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the plaintiff’s legal arguments for him, or conjure up questions never squarely presented to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). The requirement of liberal construction does

not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990) (The “special judicial solicitude” with which a [court] should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.). DISCUSSION Plaintiff was a federal prisoner in Edgefield at the time of the alleged event on April 16, 2025. Plaintiff sues a single defendant, an “education officer/GED prep teacher,” Solow. (ECF No.

1 at 2). Plaintiff alleges his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated and the Civil Rights Act has been violated. (ECF No. 1 at 4). Plaintiff alleges while at work at the prison, Plaintiff told Solow he was headed to the weekly religious service, Solow responded “you people,” and the next day Plaintiff was no longer needed at work. Plaintiff alleges he was fired from his prison job due to religious and racial discrimination.(ECF No. 1 at 5-6). Plaintiff requests monetary damages. Plaintiff did not file administrative exhaustion past the BP-10, regional director stage. (ECF No. 1 at 8). Plaintiff has not alleged he has completed the exhaustion process for a Bivens claim, which is different than FTCA exhaustion. In order to assert a Bivens claim in federal court, inmates

are first required to exhaust all inmate grievance procedures. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). The BOP provides a four-step grievance procedure. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq. First, an inmate must attempt to informally resolve the issue with staff.28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If that is 2 unsuccessful, the inmate must then submit “a formal written Administrative Remedy Request, on the appropriate form (BP-9),” within 20 days of the “date on which the basis for the Request occurred.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). “An inmate who is not satisfied with the Warden's response [to his Administrative Remedy Request] may submit an Appeal on the appropriate form (BP-10) to the

appropriate Regional Director within 20 calendar days of the date the Warden signed the response.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). Then, as a final avenue for relief, “[a]n inmate ... may submit an Appeal on the appropriate form (BP-11) to the General Counsel within 30 calendar days of the date the Regional Director signed the response.” Id. Exhaustion of a Bivens claim requires a prisoner to fully comply with all four stages of the internal prison grievance procedure; Plaintiff has not exhausted. Moore v. Rife, 2023 WL 2674860, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 29, 2023). Bivens claims are available on very limited grounds. Violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and

Eighth Amendments are cognizable claims under the expansion of Bivens under specific contexts. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Ziglar v. Abbasi,137 S. Ct. 1843, 1859 (2017); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390 (1971). “The Supreme Court has never recognized a First Amendment based Bivens remedy in any context.” Earle v. Shreves, 990 F. 3d 774, 779 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 n.4 (2012) (“We have never held that Bivens extends to First Amendment claims”)); Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 498-499 (2022). The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to federal individual defendants. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).

Liberally construed, to the extent Plaintiff intended to sue under the Fifth Amendment, Plaintiff’s allegations arise in a new context from Davis, which concerned only alleged sex discrimination on Capitol Hill. Bivens has never been extended to a Fifth Amendment due process claim or a claim for 3 race-based discrimination. Mays v. Smith, 70 F.4th 198, 203 (4th Cir. 2023). Plaintiff has failed to state a Bivens claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff only sues an individual defendant, but Plaintiff alleges he filed a Form 95 tort claim. (ECF No. 1 at 8).

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Related

Shelley v. Kraemer
334 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Davis v. Passman
442 U.S. 228 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Carlson v. Green
446 U.S. 14 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
United States v. Edward Lester Schronce, Jr.
727 F.2d 91 (Fourth Circuit, 1984)
Luther K. Barnett, Jr. v. Steve Hargett
174 F.3d 1128 (Tenth Circuit, 1999)
Reichle v. Howards
132 S. Ct. 2088 (Supreme Court, 2012)
Ziglar v. Abbasi
582 U.S. 120 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Vernon Earle v. Shreves
990 F.3d 774 (Fourth Circuit, 2021)

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Bluebook (online)
Charlton Beasley v. Officer Solow, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charlton-beasley-v-officer-solow-scd-2026.